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Introduction and lay summary
The papers of this thesis all look at different aspects of organisational governance and strategy. In
particular these papers look at organisations that seem to be behaving in counterintuitive ways.
For instance all around the world governments often spend disproportionately large amounts of
money in the few months at the end of the fiscal year and in the private sector firms often advertise
against their rivals even though by doing so they may face greater competition from these rival
firms.
In these papers I look into whether these behaviours are as a result of a strategy or perhaps
reflect some form of a problem in organisational governance. I try to analyse the effects on market
efficiency and what steps a government or regulator might take to improve the outcome of the
market. The approach is generally theoretical but in the case of the first paper on government
spending I calibrate a theoretical model to Northern Ireland spending data.
In the rest of this document see non-technical abstracts for my three papers. Note that in order
to avoid maths I had to simplify papers considerably so these nontechnical abstracts should not
be cited.
Putting it off for later - Procrastination and end of fiscal year
spending spikes
The first paper of this thesis considers the issue of end of fiscal year government spending. Gov-
ernments regularly spend a large portion of their annual budgets in the last few months of the
fiscal year. As an example 16% of UK government capital expenditure is done in the final month
of the fiscal year. The Northern Ireland government spends more than 3 times as much on capital
goods in the final month as compared to the average month. In 2014-2015 UK government capital
9
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Figure 1: Northern Ireland departmental spending over the fiscal year0.1
spending rose in the last month of the year by £3.9 billion which is more than the cost of the
U.S.S. Ronald Reagan Supercarrier.
This kind of spending is regularly criticized for being wasteful, for instance a 1980 US Senate
subcommittee estimated that 2% of US government contract expenditure was wasted due to rushing
at the end of the fiscal year. Recent research by Liebman and Mahoney (2013) has also backed up
this view using more modern data on the value of US government IT spending.
But what is causing it? We can note that any explanation needs to have two features. The first
is that there is some force which encourages departments to hold back some money in the early
months of the year. The second is some force which encourages departments to spend this held
back money at the end of the year.
The Liebman and Mahoney (2013) view is that this kind of spending is caused by government
departments building up a rainy day fund (or “precautionary savings”) to use in case of sudden
expenses that occur. In this model the force for holding back funds is uncertainty. The force
to spend the money at the end of the fiscal year comes from expiring budgets that means that
departments cannot save money from one fiscal year to the next. The Liebman and Mahoney
(2013) solution to the problem is to allow government departments to “rollover” funds from one
fiscal year to the next. They argue that with this policy in place departments will build up a rainy
day fund once and then hang onto it and thus there will be no end of fiscal year spending spikes.
This is a interesting paper and the explanation for end of fiscal year spending that they propose
is intuitive. My analysis suggests however that precautionary savings and expiring budgets provide
at best a partial explanation. The first bit of evidence come from the UK which did implement
rollover budgeting starting in the 1998-1999 fiscal year. Heightened end of fiscal year spending did
CHAPTER 0. INTRODUCTION AND LAY SUMMARY 11
Figure 2: UK Central government final month spending over time
not seem to change as a result. Indeed in every fiscal year since final month government capital
spending has been greater than the monthly average (it is usually a bit more than 50% higher).
This is quite significant as it suggests that if rollover does not abate end of year spending then
expiring budgets are not underlying the problem. This can be seen in figure 2.0.2
The second bit of evidence I assemble comes from a cross section of Northern Ireland govern-
ment departments from 2008-2013. The Liebman and Mahoney (2013) theory would suggest that
departments that have the most uncertainty would build up the most precautionary savings. These
departments would then exhibit the greatest spending spikes at the end of the fiscal year. I test this
with my Northern Ireland government departmental spending data sample and find that actually
the departments with the least uncertainty have the greatest spending spikes which is opposite to
the implication of the Liebman and Mahoney (2013) model. The third bit of evidence comes from
the amount of uncertainty you need to have in order to explain the amount of money departments
hold back to spend at the end of the year. When this is examined closely the implication is that
government departments face demand for their services which is many times less predictable than
inflation, unemployment or the prevailing interest rate. The implied level of uncertainty seems
unrealistic in the real world.
I propose a different explanation based around procrastination. Here public servants hold back
some money because there is effort in spending it and they would prefer to put off the effort. At the
0.2Here you can see UK final month spending for every year from 1990-1991 to 2013-2014. On the y axis of
this figure is March spending divided by the average month of each fiscal year while on the x axis are all of the
fiscal years. There are three spending series: government cash outlays; capital expenditure and current expenditure.
There are three budgetary regimes in this period: No rollover where money could not be saved into the next fiscal
year; End of Year Flexibility (EYF) where full rollover was allowed and finally Budgetary Exchange System (BES)
which allowed rollover but with more restrictions than the EYF system. The key takeway from this figure is that
the implementation of rollover budgeting did not seem to impact end of fiscal year spending spikes.
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end of the fiscal year they are judged (in part) by their usage of their budget and so they rush to
spend money in order to look good for their managers. I show this explanation is more consistent
with the three features of spending noted in the preceding two paragraphs than the precautionary
saving model.
Whether precautionary savings or procrastination is the correct explanation is important for
determining how to fix the problem. While the precautionary savings explanation would suggest
end of year spending could be disincentivised by allowing government to rollover their funds between
fiscal years this approach will not help if end of year spending is caused by procrastination. So
instead I propose a more direct way in which a parliament can encourage departments to not
procrastinate.
My solution is a kind of tax on departmental spending that increases throughout the fiscal
year.0.3 This means that it is relatively cheaper for government departments to spend in the early
months of the fiscal year relative to the last months of the fiscal year. To give a simple example
consider a government department with a budget of £120 that faced a tax of 0% in the first
six months of the year and 20% in the second six months of the year. This means that if the
government department spent their entire budget in the first six months of the year they could buy
£120 worth of stuff but if they spent it in the second six months of the year they could only buy
£100 pounds worth of stuff. This gives an incentive for these departments to avoid procrastination.
It also means that if departments do procrastinate then at least some of this rushed spending is
returned to treasury through these “taxes”.
So how beneficial could such a tax be? This is a hard question as there are two things to
consider. One is some money wasted at the end of the fiscal year could be saved with a mechanism
like this tax. The second is that some value might be getting lost if departments have a good
spending opportunity but the parliament will not give funds to the department for fears they will
procrastinate and subsequently spend the money poorly. That is to say there is an opportunity
cost of end of year spending in that it deters parliaments from giving budgets when it would be
better for them to do so (in the absence of end of year spending problems).
To try and get an idea of the total value that a tax could deliver I calibrated an economic
model of departmental procrastination with spending data from Northern Ireland. I then inserted
my tax into this model and saw how government departments reacted to it. What I found is that
the value of government spending increased substantially in every variation of the model that I
considered. Thus the recommendation of this paper is that such a tax should be implemented to
deter end of fiscal year spending spikes and encourage more even spending throughout the fiscal
0.3Of course this is not really a tax as the taxed money goes from a government department’s budget into general
treasury. It could alternatively be thought of as a budgetary reduction through time but I personally find that
thinking about it kind of like a tax is more intuitive.
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year.
Comparative Advertising: The role of prices
This paper investigates some of the strategic aspects related to a firm’s decision to engage in
comparative advertising. Comparative advertising is where firms compare their good to a rival good
in their advertising. There are a few papers on this in economics (and many more in marketing)
that looked at comparative advertising as disclosing the attributes of goods as compared to the
attributes of rival goods.
For instance one paper (Barigozzi et al., 2009) argues that firms engage in comparative adver-
tising in order to show that they are high quality. By comparing their good’s quality to a rival good
in their advertising, a firm opens itself up to litigation if the claims they make are unreasonable.
This means that only a high quality firm would do this and hence comparative advertising allows
firms with high quality goods to separate themselves from lower quality firms.
The other key paper in this field (Anderson and Renault, 2009) thinks about comparative
advertising as showing individual consumers what the best good is for them. By doing this a
weaker firm may be able to ensure that some consumers come to them. This mechanism is probably
clearer with a simple example. Consider that you know that 70% of people like coke more than
pepsi and 30% of people like pepsi more. You do not know if you will like coke or pepsi more
however. If you were to buy a good however, you would pick coke because there is a 70% chance
that you are one of the people that like coke more. This is bad for Pepsi because everyone that
doesn’t know what they like can reason with the same logic and buy coke so Pepsi makes no sales.
But what if Pepsi could engage in comparative advertising which tells everyone all of the features
of coke and pepsi? Then people would know whether they are a coke person or a pepsi person
before they go to buy the good. This will mean that Pepsi will get 30% of the market which is
much better than the 0% they could manage without comparative advertising.0.4
To me however it seems like there was a significant amount of comparative advertising that
could not be explained by these previous papers. There are certain examples of comparative
advertising that contrasted a firm’s price with an external firm’s price for essentially the same (or
very similar) goods. Here the focus is not on contrasting good characteristics because often no
large difference exists.
Take for instance the advertisements of Progressive Direct, an American auto insurance com-
pany that gives prospective consumers the prices offered by competitors for comparable insurance
0.4Please note that in order to avoid maths this paragraph does simplify this paper considerably, particularly by
avoiding talk about the strategic pricing choices of coke and pepsi.
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plans. They air advertisements promising “we compare our direct rates side by side to find you a
great deal, even if its not with us”. Another example is provided by Amazon who allow competing
firms to sell products on their site.0.5
As a final example consider the online travel agent Skyscanner which allows searchers for
flights to automatically get prices from competing services like Expedia. This behaviour seems
counterintuitive. Considering that a consumer is currently on Skyscanner’s webpage, why are they
making it easier for that consumer to go to a rival website?
My explanation of this is built around the general tendency of consumers to judge quality by
price. If a firm sets a high enough price for an item then a consumer can reason “If it were a low
quality good that was cheap for the firm to produce then the firm would be want to sell it for a
low price (with high sales quantity). The price is high though which must mean the good must
cost alot to produce and it is a high quality good”. Thus setting a high price can be a method
through which a firm can show consumers that their good is high quality.
Often however the price that is required to communicate this high quality is so high that
the firm is not making much money because the quantity they sell is so low. If the firm could
communicate their high quality another way they would like to do so they could drop their price
to a lower level (with higher sales volume).
This is the basic insight through which I explain price comparative advertising. Firms sell the
same goods as their rivals and consumers can realise that as the goods sold are identical, their
quality must also be identical. Instead of charging a high price to signal high quality a firm can
instead charge a lower price whilst engaging in price comparative advertising against a rival firm.
The consumers can see the high price charged by the rival firm and realise that the good is high
quality and buy from the advertising firm (which has the lower price).
The rest of this paper is comprised of analysing how this market will operate in equilibrium.
Clearly if all firms were advertising like this there would not be any high pricing firms left to
convince consumers the good was high quality. As it turns out advertising against rivals means
that a firm can signal their high quality more efficiently than by setting a high price: the downside
is that this firm faces greater price competition from the firm they advertise against. This means
that in equilibrium there will be firms setting a high price and avoiding competition as well as
firms that face greater price competition whilst advertising. This conforms to the intuition that
the firms offering price checks tend to be the firms that are the lower pricing firms in the market.
There are other things I find that are less intuitive though. One is that firms do not earn any
greater profit from advertising than from setting a high price. Whilst they do not need to set such
0.5Amazon also receives a portion of the revenues from these external sellers on their website. Whilst these
revenues no doubt play some role in Amazon’s decision to operate this marketplace it is also true that this allows
Amazon customers to compare Amazon’s prices with other vendors.
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a high price (with low sale quantity) and thus signal more efficiently, any extra profits from this
are completely eroded from additional price competition. Thus in equilibrium, firm profit will be
unchanged from the case where there is no advertising. The effect on consumers however is very
positive as they benefit from lower prices both from firms not price signalling as much as well as
from greater price competition in the market.
Whilst regulators in Europe and the United States have long allowed comparative advertising
it is still banned in countries like Saudi Arabia and China. In Japan it is allowed but seldom used
as it is considered impolite by consumers. The conclusion of this research is that market efficiency
and prices for consumers could both be improved by more widespread comparative advertising.
Thus the recommendation of this paper is that comparative advertising should be legalised and
encouraged by legislators and regulators.
It’s good to be bad: A Model of Low Quality Dominance in a
Full Information Consumer Search Market (with Margaryta
Klymak)
This paper starts with a simple question: Why do some firms tell consumers that they are low
quality? That may seem a strange question but if you look at some advertising that is around
that certainly seems to be part of the message they are trying to communicate. Take Ryanair for
example, a self proclaimed “no frills” airline. Ryanair regularly communicates that they are low
quality through the way they approach the media. As an example in 2011 they publicly floated
the idea of charging for toilet use on a plane. Their CEO has also made many statements to the
media suggesting low quality like when he said “Anyone who thinks Ryanair flights are some sort
of bastion of sanctity where you can contemplate your navel is wrong. We already bombard you
with as many in-flight announcements and trolleys as we can. Anyone who looks like sleeping, we
wake them up to sell them things.”
Looking at the market for lawyers in America reveals a similar story. There are no less than
3 American lawyers who call themselves ”the hammer”. In Texas there is a lawyer named Bryan
Wilson who advertises by calling himself the “Texas Law Hawk”, riding jetskis and throwing sticks
of dynamite in his commercials. This kind of advertising is strongly discouraged by the American
Bar Association who warn that “lawyers should consider that the use of inappropriately dramatic
music, unseemly slogans, hawkish spokespersons, premium offers, slapstick routines or outlandish
settings in advertising does not instill confidence in the lawyer or the legal profession”.
It certainly seems that these firms want to communicate that they low quality to the market or
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at the very least they are unconcerned with being perceived that way. Why would a firm want to
disclose their low quality however? One potential explanation is that maybe this kind of advertising
gets free media coverage. If this coverage meant that many consumers knew about the firm but
judged it to be low quality however then it is not clear the firm would be better off.
This paper presents a different explanation in a consumer search model. Consumer search
theory is an area of economic theory & industrial organisation where it is possible to get really
counterintuitive results. This is great from one perspective as counterintuitive results can be quite
interesting. It also means however that it can be difficult to explain a result without resorting to
a mathematical model. For this reason I have to use a little bit of maths in what follows to make
it make sense.
Consider a market where there is a low quality firm and a high quality firm each of which
makes a good costlessly. The consumers are a diverse bunch with some that are are willing to pay
alot to get better quality (“high taste consumers”) while some others are nearly indifferent and
would not pay much to upgrade from the low quality good to the higher quality good (“low taste
consumers”).0.6 Now consider that every day every consumer walks to one of the firms. Each firm
now needs to determine a price to offer all of the consumers that approach them. The consumers
can accept that price and buy the good; walk to the other firm with a search cost (or bootleather
cost) of $1 or go home and get a utility worth $0.
So what price should a firm choose to charge? One thing that a profit maximising price must
satisfy is that one of the consumers should be just about indifferent to buying and taking their
outside option (of either walking to the other firm or going home). If this were not the case then
the firm could increase their price and get a higher margin without losing any consumers because
noone is close to being indifferent.0.7 This is the key aspect of the firm’s pricing decision that we
will use to figure out what happens in this market.
Let’s look at the problem for the high firm. Lets say they choose a midtaste consumer to be
indifferent. This means the firm would like to sell to this consumer and all of the consumers with a
higher taste than her. Now to determine the price that the high firm should charge this consumer.
This is largely determined by the outside option of walking to the other firm to buy there. She
anticipates that she can get a utility of $5 if she bought the low firm good (after paying the low
firm’s price). Let us also say that she values the high good at $10. We can now work out that her
outside option is worth $4 and so to be made indifferent the firm will charge her (and everyone
with a higher taste) $6 which will give her a utility of $4. Now consider what happens the next
0.6You can think of the market for flights: everyone prefers more legroom to less legroom but very tall people
care alot and very short people don’t care very much.
0.7By contrast if a consumer is about indifferent to buying the good than a price increase could tip them to prefer
their outside option and the firm would lose this consumer.
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day. She can anticipate that if she goes to the high firm again she will end up with a utility of $4.
If she goes to the low firm initially however she will end up with a utility of $5. So she will go to
the low firm initially.
Now they have lost her the high firm wants to make a slightly higher taste consumer indifferent
to maximise their profit. Lets consider the case of this new consumer to be made in different. This
consumer anticipates that he can get a utility of $5 from buying from the low firm (after paying the
low firm’s price) and values the high good at $11. He also faces the same $1 search cost. Now his
outside option is worth $4, the high firm should charge him a price of $7 to make him indifferent
and he will end up with a utility worth $4. Now consider what happens the next day. He can
anticipate that if he goes to the high firm again he will end up with utility worth $4 . If he goes
to the low firm initially however he will have ended up with a utility of $5. It is again better to go
to the low firm initially.
Now it should be clear that there is some unravelling going on. Every day the low firm manages
to peel off those high firms consumers that care the least about quality. This will continue until
the high firm has no consumers left. The low quality firm will achieve market domination. Note
that a key thing that is necessary for this to work is that consumers choose what firm to approach
when they enter the market. If consumers did not know the quality of the two firms then this
mechanism would not work and the high quality firm would be able to keep a decent amount of
consumers. Thus this unravelling result can have the effect of encouraging low quality firms to
disclose their low quality and this disclosure can drive the high quality firm out of the market.
Another key element is that a firm cannot promise to set a particular price before consumers
visit the firm. If firms could commit to a certain fixed price then the unravelling could not continue.
A key element of the unravelling is that every time the high firm loses a consumer who cares about
quality relatively little, they increase their price because their remaining consumers care more
about quality. If a price could be committed to then this could not continue. This means that
clearly this model is not appropriate for markets where prices are set and posted, however it would
be appropriate for other markets where prices are generally unknown or set after a consumer visits
a firm.
The policy implication of this paper is that the market can be made more efficient by banning
low quality firms from advertising or communicating to the market. This is a problematic impli-
cation as it could be argued that consumers and firms have a moral right to free communication
before entering into a transaction. Nonetheless there may be some cases where it is feasible and
desirable to ban low quality disclosure. The best example that I know of is the American market
for lawyers where the American Bar Association (ABA) banned all lawyers from advertising from
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1907 until 1977 (when the Supreme court overturned that advertising ban on freedom of speech
grounds). This paper implies that by allowing advertising the market is lead to a state where
low quality lawyers get a large amount of business with negative impacts on consumers and high
quality lawyers. Thus this paper suggests an additional reason in support of the ABA’s argument
lawyers should not advertise.
Chapter 1
Putting it off for later:
Procrastination and end of fiscal
year spending spikes
Abstract: Many governments internationally exhibit heightened end of the fiscal year spending.
These end of fiscal year spending spikes often concern policy makers due to their tendency to result
in lower quality spending. This paper uses UK data to offer evidence against the precautionary
savings explanation for spending spikes. An alternate explanation is offered with procrastination
driving heightened end of fiscal year spending. A new technique of time variant budgetary taxes is
calibrated to the model and shown to be effective for smoothing spending and improving spending
efficiency throughout the fiscal year.1.1
JEL Codes: H11, H50, H61
Keywords: Government spending; fiscal year distortions
1.1 Introduction
Heightened spending at the end of the fiscal year is a salient feature of government spending. It
has been observed in a variety of contexts including Canadian Military spending [Hurley et al.,
2013], United States Government Procurement [Liebman and Mahoney, 2013], West German local
1.1Stuart.Baumann@ed.ac.uk, I would also like to thank for useful comments Philipp Kircher, Ludo Visschers,
Mike Elsby, Javier Gómez Biscarri, Margaryta Klymak, Sergei Plekhanov, José V. Rodŕıguez Mora, Daniel Schäffer,
Carl Singleton and Andy Snell. For providing their spending data I would like to thank the Northern Ireland
government. This work was supported by the Economic and Social Research Council. Notwithstanding the advice
I have received from many sources, any errors here are my own. An earlier version of this paper has been circulated
as Edinburgh School of Economics discussion paper 260
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government job training programs [Fitzenberger et al., 2014] as well as in the Australian government
[Mannheim, 2012]. It can also be seen in the U.K. where 16% of governmental capital spending
occurs in the last month of the fiscal year. In the 2011-2012 fiscal year this heightened spending
represented an extra £9.5 billion of expenditure relative to the average month of this year.
This concentration of spending in the later months of the fiscal year has presented a problem
for policy makers due to the tendency for rushed spending to be of lower quality. Some evidence
for this comes from the United States where as far back as 1980 a senate subcommittee provided
a conservative estimate that 2% of contract expenditure is wasted at the end of the fiscal year
due to spending being rushed [US Senate subcommittee on oversight of government management,
1980]. A more recent analysis is provided by Liebman and Mahoney [2013] who analysed data on
US government IT procurement and found that projects commissioned at the end of a fiscal year
are 2.2 to 5.6 times more likely to receive a quality score of “low quality”.
In light of this inefficiency, this paper uses UK and Northern Ireland data to look at two key
research questions. The first is what causes government departments to defer spending until the
end of the fiscal year and the second is what policy responses are effective in counteracting this
problem and improving the efficiency of government spending. To the former question, there are
two putative explanations that are often offered but prove spurious. The first is that in many
countries (but not currently the UK) if the departments do not spend their whole budget they
lose the unspent portion back to general treasury. The second is that if they do not spend their
whole budget then their budget for future fiscal years can be reduced. While both of these may
be arguments for spending the entire budget in a fiscal year they are not arguments for deferring
spending until the final months of the fiscal year. There must be some other mechanism that
encourages departments to defer spending until the end of the fiscal year.
As of yet the most developed economic model to offer such a mechanism is that of Liebman and
Mahoney [2013] who explained end of fiscal year spending through precautionary savings coupled
with annually expiring budgets. Government departments build up a rainy day fund to insure
themselves against stochastic shocks. At the end of the fiscal year they cannot carry over this
fund to the subsequent fiscal year and hence they spend it all. The clear policy implication is to
allow the use of “rollover” policies where unspent appropriations can be saved to be spent in future
years.
This paper shows however that there are solid reasons for believing that this mechanism cannot
fully explain the spending spikes seen in practice. Amongst other indicators this paper shows
that heightened end of fiscal year spending persisted when the United Kingdom implemented a
rollover policy to allow departments to save funds between fiscal years. There is no sign that the
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implementation of this policy had any effect in smoothing fiscal year spending.
This paper offers an alternative explanation of spending spikes being caused by procrastina-
tion.1.2 Departmental performance is primarily measured on a fiscal year basis and discounting
provides an incentive for departments to delay spending money (and incurring disutility from the
associated effort of spending it wisely) until later in the fiscal year. It is shown that the testable
predictions of this model are more consistent with the UK and Northern Ireland experience than
the precautionary savings model. This distinction between models is important as both models
yield substantially different policy prescriptions.
In this model there are two ways in which spending spikes can be inefficient. The first is that
the diminishing returns of government spending suggest that measures to smooth spending over
the fiscal year can increase the efficiency of government spending. The second is that there are
production shocks to government departments that are i.i.d. throughout the fiscal year. Heightened
spending at the end of the fiscal year suggests that governments are not varying spending optimally
in response to shocks with beneficial shocks earlier in the year being underutilized.
A new budgetary mechanism, time variant budgetary taxes, is suggested to smooth spending
throughout the fiscal year. With this mechanism spending worth x pounds would cost x pounds
for a department in month 1 and xθ pounds in month 12 (with θ > 1), thus making procrastination
more costly for the department. This tax is then calibrated to the model which shows they are
suitable for smoothing spending over the fiscal year and can lead to greater value spending.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 demonstrates fiscal year spending patterns and
highlights a few aspects of the UK budgetary system that are relevant for the evaluation of testable
model predictions. The procrastination model of government spending is then presented and
calibrated to the data in section 1.3. Section 1.4 briefly outlines the precautionary savings model
of Liebman and Mahoney [2013] before comparing the testable predictions of each model in the UK
experience. Policy implications to smooth spending are then discussed and calibrated in section
1.5 before section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Government Spending in the United Kingdom
The United Kingdom operates on a fiscal year running from April to March. Budgets are split
by the purpose of the funds including current expenditure and capital expenditure. Current ex-
penditure budgets are intended for the payment of operational expenses such as wages, rent and
1.2The term “procrastination” is often taken to imply time inconsistency in economics (for instance see Prelec
[2004]). The model presented in this paper does not require time inconsistency. Two calibrations are done in section
1.3, one with time inconsistent discounting with the other using exponential discounting in a completely rational
framework.
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transfer payments. Capital expenditure budgets refer to money which is allocated for investment
in durable assets that will benefit the department over an extended period. This may include
computers, furniture, vehicles & building renovations.1.3
The United Kingdom government traditionally budgeted on a fiscal year basis with unspent
funds being withdrawn from departments at the end of each fiscal year. This was changed with the
introduction of a rollover mechanism in the 1998-1999 fiscal year [Crawford et al., 2009]. Called
the “End of Year Flexibility” (EYF) scheme, departments were able to retain an entitlement to
all of their unspent appropriation from previous years. Whilst treasury encouraged departments
to make rollover available to all managers within each department, there is some evidence of cases
where rollover did not cascade to lower level budget holders [Hyndman et al., 2007].
Concerned at the levels of “savings” that departments were accruing under the EYF scheme, the
incoming coalition government overhauled this system in the 2010 spending review. The overhaul
amounted to the implementation of a more restrictive rollover system as well as the loss of all
savings accrued under the previous system [HM Treasury, 2010, Section 1.17]. The new “Budget
Exchange System” (BES) came into force for the 2011-2012 fiscal year and included set limits of
between 0.75% (for larger agencies) and 4% (for smaller agencies) on how much expenditure could
be carried forward [HM Treasury, 2013, Chapter 2]. In addition the Budget Exchange System
included measures to prevent savings from being accumulated over long periods of time by only
allowing money to be rolled over once.
1.2.1 Northern Ireland Spending
The primary dataset for this study consists of monthly spending for various departments of the
Northern Ireland (NI) government for the fiscal years 2008-2009 to 2012-2013.1.4 This data is
segmented by capital and current expenditure and is disaggregated for all NI government depart-
ments.1.5 In addition data is available showing how much each department carried between fiscal
years.
The NI government is a good case study as it provides a wide range of governmental services
and consists of departments of varying size. In addition it is generally subject to the same bud-
getary restrictions as the wider UK government. Thus this NI dataset offers variation between
departments without variation in budgetary framework or general environmental conditions.
Figure 1.1 shows average monthly spending (aggregated across all Northern Ireland departments
1.3Budgets are further split by the planning horizon of the funds. This division is less important for the purposes
of this paper and discussion is deferred for online appendix 1.B.
1.4This data as well as the UK central government current & capital expenditure series (detailed in section 1.2.2)
are based on accrual accounting meaning expenditure is recorded in the month when the underlying economic
transaction took place rather than the month in which cash was exchanged.
1.5Summary statistics on a departmental basis are provided in tables 1.B.2 and 1.B.3 in online appendix 1.B.
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Figure 1.1: Average monthly spending in Northern Ireland 2008 - 2013
and the fiscal years 2008 - 2013) divided by the annual average monthly spending level, a measure
of in-year spending that will be termed the spending ratio. A month in which spending is typically
equal to the average annual monthly expenditure would have a spending ratio of 1. There is a
small spending spike for current expenditure, the average final month spending ratio being 1.38.
This is not particularly surprising as wages, transfer payments and other routine expenditures are
inherently regular expenses. Capital expenditure is generally more discretionary and it can be seen
that they exhibit heightened spending at the end of the fiscal year with a final month spending
ratio of 3.06 over the years in the sample.1.6
There is some variation in the size of each year’s spending spike but there does not appear to
be any consistent pattern governing this variation. There does not appear to be any consistent
cointegrating relationship between the capital and current expenditure spending ratio series for
each department. In neither the case of Northern Ireland nor the UK central government is there
any evidence of a link between elections and the pattern (rather than level) of spending over the
fiscal year.
1.2.2 UK Central Government Spending
The secondary dataset for this research consists of UK central government aggregate spending data
split by current or capital expenditure. To give a relative idea of the size of these two categories
of spending, for the 2013-2014 fiscal year capital expenditures contributed 5.5% of the spending
1.6The size of capital spending spikes relative to current expenditure spending spikes is consistent with the finding
(using USA data) of Liebman and Mahoney [2013, pages 2-3] of greater spending spikes for “maintenance and repair
of buildings, furnishings and office equipment, and I.T. services and equipment” all of which are typically capital
expenditure items.
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Figure 1.2: End of year spending from 1990-1991 to 2013-2014
total. One additional series is available for net central government cash outlays, a rough proxy for
general government expenditure.
The spending ratios for the final month of each fiscal year from 1997-1998 to 2013-2014 are
presented in figure 1.2. It can be seen that in every fiscal year capital spending was significantly
heightened in the last month of the fiscal year. This figure also displays when the rollover systems
were changed. The first change was from no rollover to the EYF system for the 1998-1999 fiscal
year. The second change is the replacement of EYF by BES for the 2011-2012 fiscal year. It can
be seen that neither the implementation of the EYF scheme or its abolition and replacement with
a weaker scheme had any sizable effect of the size of end of fiscal year spending spikes (see also
Crawford et al. [2009, Figure 3.2]). As will be discussed in section 1.4.2, this is an important
testable prediction of the models to be presented in sections 1.3.1 and 1.4.1.
1.2.3 The quality of end of fiscal year spending
An important consideration is the quality of end of fiscal year spending. Some qualitative evidence
comes from Hyndman et al. [2007] who conducted interviews with various budget managers in
the UK public sector. Some interviewees argued that the potential for waste was abated by
departmental controls, primarily including a reserve list of nonessential spending items which can
be used if leftover funds are available. Other interviewees were more critical of end of fiscal year
spending and referred to this practice pejoratively as “flag-pole painting”. It is suggested that items
from this reserve list were of questionable quality and furthermore that such spending is often “over
the odds” in terms of the prices contractors charge. Whilst some departments tried to prevent this
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by getting contractors to commit to fixed prices for whole fiscal years, these contractors are often
fully engaged at the end of year leaving the department having to find a different contractor at a
higher price anyway.
Whilst no quantitative research is available based on UK data, Liebman and Mahoney [2013]
use data on United States IT procurement controls to examine the quality of year-end spending.
As they note IT spending is ubiquitous across government agencies and the quality of IT spending
may be a valid proxy for spending more generally. They have access to some ordered categorical
data series for the quality, timeliness and cost of IT projects commissioned at various points of
the fiscal year. They find that projects commissioned at the end of a fiscal year are between 2.2
and 5.6 times more likely to rated as low quality. An earlier paper was that of McPherson [2007]
who interviewed various US Department of Defence managers with budgets ranging from $200 000
to $20 billion. 95% of these managers agreed that end of year spending was a problem with the
managers estimating that 24% of spending from the last two months of the fiscal year goes to low
priority projects and 8% is “at least partially wasted [McPherson, 2007, page 40]”.
It is plausible that these conclusions from the United States would be valid in the United
Kingdom. Whilst the political systems of each country differ, the principal-agent relationship
between legislative bodies that appropriate budgets and a nonpolitical public service that spend
them is similar. A key constraint in end of year spending is that some production inputs such as
departmental time and resources cannot be scaled up to the same extent as spending which leads
to diminishing returns. This is as true for the United Kingdom as for the United States.
As was the case in Liebman and Mahoney [2013] this paper models production as having
diminishing returns to spending.1.7 A further mechanism for inefficiency is present in the stochastic
model (section 1.3.2) where end of year spending leads to inefficient variation in spending over the
fiscal year in response to i.i.d. production shocks.
1.3 Procrastination
Numerous explanations could be offered for heightened end of fiscal year spending. This section
will discuss procrastination whilst section 1.4 discusses the precautionary savings model of Liebman
and Mahoney [2013].1.8 A recent paper of Frakes and Wasserman [2016] used a micro level dataset
to find evidence of procrastination in the public sector. They examine US patent office workers
who are given a quota of patent applications to review with deadlines occuring every two weeks.
It was found that these workers completed about half of their tasks on the last day of the quota
1.7Further discussion of the diminishing returns assumption is available in online appendix 1.F.
1.8Alternate and less plausible explanations of spending spikes are briefly discussed in online appendix 1.F.
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period. Consistent with the view that this was caused by procrastination, this backloading of effort
was exacerbated when the patent office’s telecommuting program was implemented and workers
were subject to less supervision.
The model of procrastination that this paper proposes is motivated by two key observations.
The first is that there are effort costs to departments from efficiently spending money. There
often exists an extensive procedure for spending public funds, implemented to ensure probity,
transparency and value for money. Spending money in a way that satisfies all such requirements
is likely to be a strenuous activity. For instance in order to employ a contractor to perform a
maintenance operation on a bridge, a public sector worker would have to advertise and operate a
tender process before regularly monitoring quality, safety and traffic control while the works are
underway. Outsourcing this activity to private sector project management firms typically costs
between 7-15% of the project value [Bryne, 1999] which gives an idea of the effort costs involved.
The second observation is that ministers, managers and departments are often (formally and
informally) judged on their performance to a substantial degree on a fiscal year basis. At a min-
isterial level some evidence for this comes from Hyndman et al. [2007], where many interviewees
mentioned political pressure to avoid potentially embarrassing underspends. One interviewee re-
counted pitching a three year programme to a minister who refused it in favor of a one year plan
because he had the political need to show results each year to other politicians [Hyndman et al.,
2007, p.230-231]. Performance evaluation is also important for managers with impacts on both the
bonuses paid to these managers as well as career prospects. The former of these is observable and
it can be seen that these bonuses are structured around the fiscal year being distributed in October
for performance in the preceding fiscal year [Hope, 2012]. These bonuses can be significant with
managers in the Serious Fraud Office taking £3900 in both the 2008− 2009 and 2009− 2010 fiscal
years [Serious Fraud Office, 2010].
This annual pattern of monitoring is also evident at a departmental level with all regular
oversight reporting (both from parliamentary committees and the audit office) as well as general
financial reporting being produced and published on a fiscal year basis. A key part of informal
performance evaluation comes from the media and politicians who judge departments to a large
extent based on this fiscal year reporting. Hyndman et al. [2007, p.234] write that even with the
possibility of rollover “there might still be pressure to spend up to the budget rather than carry
forward unspent surpluses because of the potential media, or perhaps political, pressures”. Similar
points have been made in the United States where the United States General Accounting Office
[1980, p.10] reported that “in spite of large and increasing unobligated balances, agency personnel
seem impelled to obligate all available funds in the year appropriated, without distinguishing
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between funding periods, to avoid agency reprograming actions or congressional inquiries about
unspent appropriations”. In these cases a lack of rollover ability is not the culprit as these funds
were not linked to a specific fiscal year.1.9
This feature of performance being evaluated at fiscal year intervals is easily rationalised. Perfor-
mance is often measured in cost per output terms and therefore cannot be examined independently
of expenditures. Thus there are economies of scale in examining performance at the same intervals
as the fiscal year (budget) interval. This suggests that delayed utility from expenditure is likely a
feature of other budgetary systems where spending spikes are observed.1.10
This paper will argue that the measurement of performance at discrete intervals can lead to a
spike of activity towards the end of the interval. In the same way students often exert heightened
effort in the weeks before their exams, departments spur to action in the lead up to the end of
the fiscal year when performance is evaluated. This burst in activity explains end of fiscal year
spending spikes.
1.3.1 A deterministic model of procrastination
Here a simple model will be developed in order to illustrate how procrastination can lead to end of
fiscal year spending spikes. This is done in a deterministic setting and without loss of generality
departments are not allowed to rollover funds.1.11 Aside from the tractability advantages of a
deterministic setting, this highlights the differences between this model and the precautionary sav-
ings model (to be outlined in section 1.4.1) where uncertainty is entirely responsible for heightened
end of fiscal year spending.
There are two time periods and two agents, a representative department and the parliament.
The representative department chooses when to spend in the fiscal year subject to an annual
budget of B. Spending in period t is denoted xt. A department receives positive utility from
its performance, a monotonically increasing function of its expenditure denoted v(xt) - however
departmental performance is only realised at the end of the fiscal year.1.12 A department realizes
disutility from effort which is realised immediately. Effort in a period is a continuously differentiable
increasing function of spending and is denoted e(xt). Discounting applies between periods via a
1.9A recent international example of this kind of political pressure comes from Russia where the governor of
Saint Petersburg, Georgy Poltavchenko, publicly denounced public sector managers and denied them bonuses as
they collectively spent only 92.4% of the budget allocated to them in the 2014 fiscal year, an amount he thought
insufficient [NTV News, 2015].
1.10More discussion of the UK’s performance monitoring system as well as some evidence of similar behaviour in
other countries is available in online appendix 1.F
1.11Note there is no loss of generality in not allowing rollover in a model lacking stochastic elements and with
concave utility functions. Discounting and the lack of precautionary savings ensure departments would never want
to save even if they were allowed to.
1.12One example may be that departments get utility from their production, but this is only recognised at the end
of the fiscal year. In this case we could have v(xt) = g(xt). Another case is that departments are assessed solely on
how much they spend by the end of the fiscal year (as may occur when production is unobservable).
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parameter D < 1.
Subject to an annual budget of B, a department chooses an expenditure level each period. A
department has the choice variables of x1 and x2 to maximise:
max
x1,x2≥0
D [v(x1) + v(x2)]− e(x1)−De(x2) (1.1)
s.t. x1 + x2 ≤ B
Here it can be seen that performance in the first two periods v(x1) and v(x2) is realised in the
second period. Effort is always realised in the period in which spending occurs however.
Production is denoted g(xt) and the department’s optimal spending level (from the maximisa-
tion of equation 1.1) as a function of the budget is denoted xt(B). The parliament gains utility
from production realized instantly. The parliament also realizes disutility (instantly) from the so-
cial cost of the funds denoted λxt. For simplicity the government discounts within the fiscal year at
the same rate as the department. Subject to the autonomy of a department in selecting spending
levels in each period, a parliament has the choice variable of the budget, B, to maximise:1.13
max
B
g(x1(B))− λx1(B) +D [g(x2(B))− λx2(B)] (1.2)
The following conditions are placed on the performance, production and effort functions:
g(0) = 0 v(0) = 0 e(0) = 0 (1.3)
g′(0) > 0∀x v′(x) > 0∀x e′(x) > 0∀x (1.4)
v′′(x) < e′′(x)∀x (1.5)
g′′(x) < 0∀x (1.6)
Dv′(0) > e′(0) (1.7)
The first two conditions (1.3, 1.4) are elementary and simply state that production, performance
and effort are zero when spending is zero and rise as spending increases. The third condition (1.5)
ensures that the marginal utility for performance for a department approaches the marginal effort.
This assumption is necessary to avoid corner solutions where all funds are expended in the last
period.1.14 The fourth condition (1.6) is necessary so that the government prefers an even spending
1.13This model expands upon the model of Liebman and Mahoney [2013] and reduces to the same model if
e(x1) = e(x2) = 0∀x, performance is recognised immediately and if there are stochastic shocks in each period. As
will become apparent however the mechanism behind this procrastination model is very different to the precautionary
savings that drive the Liebman and Mahoney [2013] model and both models lead to different testable predictions.
1.14For instance if both functions are linear, but v′(x) > e′(x), all spending will occur in the last period.
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pattern (Proposition 2). The fifth condition (1.7) represents a weakened inada condition for v(x).
First order conditions yield the following simple results (proofs in appendix 1.A)
Proposition 1. For any given budget departments will choose strictly higher spending in the second
period relative to the first.
The intuition for this result is that the department expects the same reward from spending in
either the first or second period. In planning their year however they face a lower effort cost (due
to discounting) from spending in the second period. As a result the total utility from spending
increases with time and departments spend more in the second period.
Proposition 2. Constant spending in each period is optimal for the parliament at some level which
will be denoted xPar.
The parliament realises the social cost of spending and the utility from production instanta-
neously. There do not exist any time distortions and hence the same level of spending that is
optimal in every period.
Proposition 3. There is no budget that the parliament can set to achieve its optimal level of
spending, xPar, in each period.
This is immediate from propositions 1 and 2.
1.3.2 A calibrated procrastination model
The previous discussion in a deterministic environment was useful in presenting the central mecha-
nism through which procrastination can lead to delayed spending. In this section a procrastination
based model is calibrated to the data to show that the procrastination mechanism is robust to the
presence of shocks and is capable of describing the full size of spending spikes seen in the data.
The model is calibrated to the Northern Ireland departmental capital spending dataset.1.15 As
this data is monthly the model is expanded to encompass 12 periods per year. It is necessary to
provide functional forms of various functions. The form of the performance function v(xm) is given
by xδt where δ < 1. The form of the effort function e(xm) is linear and is given by Ωxm.
1.16
Rollover is allowed in the model as was the case for Northern Ireland departments over this
1.15For a discussion of the data see online appendix 1.B. The subset of the data used for the calibration was
departments with an annual budget of more than £1 million over the fiscal years 2009-2010, 2010-2011 and 2011-
2012. The annual budget for each department is estimated based on the amount spent in each month as well as
the amount saved into the next fiscal year. Monthly spending is then divided by the annual budget so that annual
spending and net rollover accrued in a year sum to one.
1.16Imposing linearity on the effort function is not a quantitatively important restriction as flexibility is allowed
in v(xm) = xδm and it is the net of this curvature against the curvature of the effort function which dictates how
departmental utility from spending changes with time and hence the pattern of spending.
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period. In each period the problem of the department is:




m,y − Ωxm,y +D1Em,y [Vm′(Bm′,y′ , αm′,y′)] (1.8)
Subject to:
Bm′,y′ = Bm,y − xm,y + κm (1.9)
Bm,y ≥ 0∀m, y (1.10)
Where m, y give the current month and year and m′, y′ give the month and year in one months
time.1.17 Dn is the discounting n periods into the future. Note that the performance function is
discounted between the current month and the end of the fiscal year (when m = 12). κm is the
receipt of the annual budget. This is taken to be 1 if m = 1 and 0 otherwise.1.18





Two calibrations are performed, one for exponential discounting and one for hyperbolic dis-
counting. Exponential discounting is done with the form:
Dn = β
n (1.12)
with β taking the value of 0.996 (5% annual discounting1.19). The second model has quasi-
hyperbolic discounting [Laibson, 1997] of the form:
Dn = knβ
n (1.13)
Where k is a constant if n ≥ 1 and 1 if n = 0. This model is calibrated to the values k = 0.975,
β = 0.998.1.20
These two models are calibrated in the following way. The value functions are first found
1.17This system for indexing time is convenient for reasons of modular arithmetic. For instance if it is currently
m = 12, y = 3 then the next month is m′ = 1, y′ = 4 and the month after that is m′′ = 2, y′′ = 4.
1.18In choosing a constant budget there is an implicit simplifying assumption here that the parliament does not
choose a budget conditional on departmental savings but instead choose a stationary budget that maximises long
run expected utility. Discussion of this assumption is included in online appendix 1.H.
1.19There have been a number of papers who have found evidence of discounting rates in excess of 5%, including
Warner and Pleeter [2001] and Harrison et al. [2002]. Whilst here we impose a discounting rate of 5% it is shown
in online appendix 1.I that a similar model fit is available with a discounting rate of 10%.
1.20These parameters are chosen so that total annual discounting kβ12 is 5% with half of the discounting coming
from the hyperbolic parameter and half from exponential discounting.
CHAPTER 1. PUTTING IT OFF FOR LATER 31
numerically for each of the twelve months. The first order condition of (1.8) with respect to xt is







xm,y, Bm,yt and m can be input to this equation to give the αm,y shock that would have caused
the spending decision, xm,y. The lognormal pdf is then used with these αm,y shocks to calibrate
the model with maximum likelihood.
Exponential Quasi-hyperbolic









Shocks Mean 0.001 0.001
Shocks Standard Deviation 0.011 0.012
Final Month spending ratio 2.584 3.554
RSS 3.139 0.478
Log Likelihood 1310.602 1281.764
Here the shocks mean and standard deviation refer to the first 2 moments of the implied shocks after they are transformed to the normal
distribution. They should be equal to 0, σ to match the shock process anticipated by departments in the model. The RSS refers sum of squared
differences between the predicted monthly spending values (from the long term average of simulations) and the average spending from the data
over the fiscal year. This is also summarised in figure 1.3.
Table 1.1: Calibrated Parameters
The calibrations can be seen in figure 1.31.21 as well as in table 1.1. The nature of exponential
discounting means that spending increases are constrained to be increasing regularly throughout
the year. Thus while this model performs reasonably well in describing the slow increase in the
early months it cannot describe the large increase at the end of the fiscal year. The hyperbolic
model performs better in this regard.
In both calibrations the curvature of the performance function is close to the (linear) curvature
of the effort function. This indicates that in order for modest amounts of discounting to explain
the size of observed spending spikes, departments need to have a weak preference for evenly spend-
ing money throughout the fiscal year. There also exists a tradeoff between the curvature of the
performance function and discounting. It is shown in online appendix 1.I that it is possible to
calibrate 10% (total) discounting versions of the exponential and hyperbolic discounting models
that achieve almost exactly the same model fit as the 5% discounting models. These calibrations
require more curvature of the performance function (a lower δ) to compensate for the departments
greater desire to delay spending. If the same performance function was used with this greater
1.21Note that the data differs slightly from table 1.1 due to the exclusion of data from 2009 & 2012 and the removal
of outliers. This is as discussed in footnote 1.15 on page 29.
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Figure 1.3: The exponential and hyperbolic models calibrated to Northern Ireland departmental
spending data
discounting rate departments would delay too much spending leading to excessively large spending
spikes. There also exists a link between the curvature of the performance function and the vari-
ance of the shock process. If the performance function is more concave the departments have a
stronger preference towards smoothing spending and a greater volatility shock process is necessary
to explain deviations from the average spending pattern over the year.
One interesting feature of simulations that were performed was the relationship between shock
volatility and the size of spending spikes (holding other parameters constant). The procrastination
model predicts that more volatility would induce more even expenditure and smaller end of year
spending spikes. The intuition for this is simple: when the shock variance is greater the incentive
for departments is to time spending to take advantage of beneficial shocks rather than timing
towards the end of the year to delay the expenditure of effort. As shocks are i.i.d. across each
month this is a force which evens out spending over the year.1.22 This is a key testable prediction
of the procrastination model which is examined in section 1.4.2.
1.4 Discussion
A natural question is how the procrastination model compares to alternate models of government
spending. Currently the most developed model in the literature is the precautionary savings model
of Liebman and Mahoney [2013]. This section will first briefly recount the precautionary savings
1.22This is shown in online appendix 1.I.
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model before moving to a discussion of its performance against the procrastination model.
1.4.1 The Precautionary Savings Mechanism
Liebman and Mahoney [2013] present a model to explain end of fiscal year spending spikes based
on precautionary savings. In their model the value of spending is stochastic and as a result
departments build up precautionary savings throughout the year to spend in the case of positive
productivity shocks. At the end of the year these savings stocks are then expended as no rollover
of unspent funds is allowed.
Government departments want to maximize the value of their production without regard for
the social cost of this spending. Their objective function can be written as:
Vm(By,m|αy,m) = max
By,m≥xy,m≥0
αy,mg(xy,m) + βEy,m[Vm′(By′,m′ |αy′,m′)] (1.15)
The remaining budget is given by
By′,m′ =
 By,m − xy,m if m < MBy+1 + χ(By,M − xy,M ) if m = M (1.16)
Where y,m are the current year and month and y′,m′ are the year and month in one month’s
time. xy,m refers to monthly spending, g(xy,m) is a monotonically increasing concave production
function, By+1 is the next year’s budget, By,m is the available funds at the beginning of period
y,m, Vm(By,m|αy,m) is the value function for the department and αy,m is a monthly stochastic
parameter without persistence. M is the number of months in the fiscal year. χ is a parameter
describing the amount of rollover into the next fiscal year, where χ = 1 describes full rollover and
χ = 0 implies that no rollover is allowed. In the benchmark case no rollover is allowed.
The mechanism for end of year spending spikes here is precautionary savings driven by the
αy,m parameter. At the start of the year agencies accrue a rainy day fund to allow sufficient funds
to spend in the event of a high future αy,m. At the end of a year this cannot be carried over and so
agencies spend this money. The concavity of the production function means that this concentration
of funds in the end of the year represents inefficient spending.
The clear policy implication is to allow agencies to save unspent funds and spend these savings
in future years. This would eliminate the spending spikes and prevent the associated low value
spending. While this mechanism sounds plausible and may provide a partial explanation in some
cases, there are reasons for believing that the majority of the effect is left unexplained by this
mechanism.
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1.4.2 Model comparison
The UK’s changes between budgetary rollover mechanisms
The U.K. traditionally had expiring budgets where unspent money was returned to treasury at the
end of every fiscal year. A full rollover system (the EYF system) was then implemented for the
1998-1999 fiscal year before it was repealed and replaced with a more restrictive rollover system
(the BES system) for the 2011-2012 fiscal year. The prediction of the precautionary savings model
in this case is straightforward. The size of spending spike should have abated while the EYF scheme
was in effect.1.23 The new BES scheme should have resulted in spending spikes greater than existed
under the EYF scheme as it is more difficult for some departments to access rollover.1.24
These predictions are not backed up by the data however. The size of the final month spending
ratio can be seen in figure 1.2. It appears that neither the implementation of the EYF scheme nor
its replacement by the BES scheme had any significant impact on the size of end of year spending
spikes.
To more rigorously test this conclusion a series of t-tests were done for each spending series.
Each t-test tested the null hypothesis that the vector of final month spending ratios for a given
regime and series came from a distribution with the same mean as the vector of final month
spending ratios coming from the other two regimes for that series. In no case was there sufficient
evidence to reject the null hypothesis of no difference. The p-values from these tests along with
the means and standard deviations for every series & regime are offered in table 1.B.4 (in online
appendix 1.B).
Whilst inconsistent with the precautionary savings model, the lack of an impact for rollover is
completely consistent with the procrastination model where rollover or the lack thereof does not
play a crucial role.
Volatility and Spending spikes
The precautionary savings model holds that spending spikes are a result of volatility in the pro-
duction process for public goods. Therefore an implication of the model would be that higher
levels of volatility would lead to greater spending spikes. This is the opposite prediction from the
procrastination model where the shock process is a force which evens spending throughout the
fiscal year. This is because departments must balance the utility benefit (through discounting) of
1.23Indeed simulations show that when rollover is applied to the procrastination model spending spikes should be
completely eliminated (see online appendix 1.J).
1.24Note that while a particularly high spending spike in 2010-2011 might be expected due to the planned abolition
of stocks, measures were taken to prevent departments from accessing these funds [The National Assembly for Wales,
2010]
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procrastination with the exploitation of beneficial shocks.1.25
This can be tested using a dataset of large Northern Ireland departments for the five financial
years from 2008− 2009 to 2012− 2013. The subset chosen for this regression was all department-
budget-years with an annual budget of at least 10 million pounds.1.26
For each department-budget-year a volatility measure was constructed by looking at the relative
difference between a monthly spending number and the average of the preceding and following
month. The intuition is that a “low volatility” spending sequence should have monthly spending
figures that are approximately the average of the two adjacent spending values. This annual






∣∣∣∣xm,y,d,b − 12 (xm−1,y,d,b + xm+1,y,d,b)1
2 (xm−1,y,d,b + xm+1,y,d,b)
∣∣∣∣ (1.17)
This measure is calculated using spending values from the first 6 months of every fiscal year. As
volatility early in the year may indicate a different budget position going into the second half of
the year, a renormalised spending spike is used. This is the proportion of funds available as of the





Where B7,y,d,b describes the funds remaining to the department as of the start of month 7 in year
y for department d, budget b. Nominal values were used for x12,y,d,b and B7,y,d,b meaning that
these spending values and budgets are measured in pounds rather than the proportion of available
funds spent.1.27
These volatility variables are split to allow for different relationships between volatility and
renormalised spike mean for capital expenditure and for current expenditure.1.28 The following
regression equation with various levels of fixed effects was estimated:
Renormalised Spikey,d,b = β0 + β1(Current Volatility)y,d,b + β2(Capital Volatility)y,d,b
+ β3(Current Expenditure)y,d,b + Year FE + Other FE (1.19)
Aside from the year fixed effects, three levels of fixed effects are used to control for departmental
1.25These model implied relationships between volatility and spending spikes are shown from Monte Carlo results
in appendices 1.J and 1.J.
1.26This lower threshold is necessary as the use of relative error as a measure of volatility is problematic when
monthly spending figures can be zero (which often occurs for smaller departments). Robustness checks on this
monetary threshold can be found in online appendix 1.D.
1.27This is to avoid annual budgets from being used in the calculation of both the volatility measure and the
renormalised spike which would complicate the interpretation of the regression. Robustness checks with alternate
spending measures is available in online appendix 1.D.
1.28Specifically (Current Volatility)y,d,b = (Volatility)y,d,b(Current Expenditure dummy)y,d,b and the capital
volatility variable is coded analogously.
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heterogeneity. The first is no fixed effects, the second is departmental fixed effects and the third
is department-budget fixed effects (where only variation within a department-budget is used and
the current expenditure dummy drops out). The regression results can be seen in table 1.2.
While the pooled regression has a positive coefficient on the volatility of current expenditure, this
significance disappears once time invariant heterogeneity is controlled for. In all cases there is
a significantly negative relationship between the volatility of the capital spending series and the
renormalised spike.1.29 As end of fiscal year spending spikes are largest for capital expenditure
this can be interpreted as evidence for the procrastination model and against the precautionary
savings model.1.30
Table 1.2: Volatility and Renormalised Spike
RenormalisedSpike
(1) (2) (3)
Volitility (Current) 0.110∗∗∗ 0.076 −0.064
(0.034) (0.052) (0.052)




Fixed Effects No Department Department x Budget
Fiscal Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 115 115 115
R2 0.425 0.459 0.148
Adjusted R2 0.388 0.344 −0.170
F Statistic 11.320∗∗∗ (df = 7; 107) 11.399∗∗∗ (df = 7; 94) 2.404∗∗ (df = 6; 83)
Notes: ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level.
∗Significant at the 10 percent level.
Standard errors are clustered at the (Department), (Department), (Department x Budget) levels respectively.
The uncertainty required to generate the data
When the baseline CRRA calibration of the model of Liebman and Mahoney [2013] is examined it
is immediately clear that it requires a high variance shock process to fit the observed magnitude
of spending spikes. The distribution of the stochastic parameter, αy,m is calibrated to have a log
normal standard deviation of 1.73.1.31 This calibration is done in order to hit a final month spending
ratio of 2.18, meaning that final month spending is 2.18 times the annual average. Changes in the
distribution of the αy,m parameter would have two effects however, the first is in uncertainty and
hence the amount of precautionary savings generated. The second is the extent to which spending
changes month to month. A more comprehensive calibration strategy would take this into account
calibrating the variance of αy,m to fit both aspects of the data.
It should be noted that variation in the effectiveness of government spending is not precisely
what is needed for precautionary savings - what is needed is unpredictability. In this way the
1.29A range of robustness checks are included in online appendix 1.D.
1.30Intertemporal variation in the UK central government spending series was used to reach a similar conclusion
in online appendix 1.E.
1.31Due to the multiplicative way αy,m enters equation (1.15) this distribution would indicate that the top end of
the middle 66% (The shock greater than 83.3% of the distribution and less than 16.7% of the distribution) would
result in 28 times more output than the bottom end of the middle 66%. The top end of the middle 95% of this
distribution would result in 834 times more output than the bottom end of the middle 95%.
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variance of the αy,m could alternatively be thought of as uncertainty about future production
rather than variation in future production. Whilst αy,m is an abstract model parameter, it may be
possible to get an idea of the plausibility of its calibrated variance by comparing it to the observable
unpredictability of fundamentals in the economy.
Stark [2010, Tables 1-4] has published estimates of the errors of the survey of professional
forecasters over the period 1985 Q1 to 2007 Q4 in predicting real output growth, inflation, the
unemployment rate as well as the interest rate on 10-year Treasury bonds. The one quarter ahead
Root Mean Square Errors (RMSEs) of these 4 variables are 1.65, 0.95, 0.25 and 0.53 respectively.
By contrast on a month to month basis the implied RMSE of the calibration shocks is 19.4.1.32
This reliance on an amount of uncertainty that might not be credible is a shortcoming of the
precautionary savings model that is not shared by the procrastination model where shocks do not
play the crucial role.1.33
1.5 Policy Responses to heightened end of year spending
From Proposition 3 the government is not able to induce its desired spending levels in every period.
Clearly procrastination could be avoided with continuous performance evaluation however this may
not be feasible with the annuality of budgeting, fiscal reporting and parliamentary oversight being
entrenched in how the public sector operates.1.34 Even if institutional inertia were not a factor it
is possible that continuous performance evaluation would not be organisationally feasible or cost
effective to implement.
This section examines another measure that is are available to even spending across the fiscal
year within an annual budgeting framework. Throughout this section it is assumed that it is
possible for the desired level of spending to be achievable in any singular period through offering
a sufficiently high budget.1.35 By making this restriction attention is focused on the problem of
inducing even expenditure (the shape of spending) over the year rather than adjusting the absolute
level of spending over the year.
1.32Calculated by taking E[αy,m] as the forecast and a sample of 10 billion random draws of the distribution as
the realized values.
1.33One solution to this criticism might be to interpret the uncertainty as being i.i.d. amongst low level depart-
mental managers. In this case excessively large month to month changes in spending would not be seen in aggregate
data. This assumption would be very tenuous however as shocks to different departmental managers are likely to
be highly correlated as they service the same population and buy goods and services in the same economy at the
same time. It would also raise the question why managers in a department could not collectively insure each other
against these shocks.
1.34For instance when asked about moves away from annuality (such as EYF) one public sector manager gives a
vivid description of this entrenchment telling Hyndman et al. [2007, p.231] that “Annuality is a useful mechanism
because, to be blunt, I don’t know any other ... It’s the culture I work in. I haven’t had any experience of any other
culture ... It’s difficult for me because I can’t really compare it.”
1.35This implies that the marginal utility from spending at the parliamentary optimal level is positive for the
department in every period. Were this not the case the parliament would need to increase v(xt) (for instance
through increasing performance pay) or decrease e(xt) (for instance through hiring more public servants) in order
to induce the parliamentary optimal level of spending.
CHAPTER 1. PUTTING IT OFF FOR LATER 38
It is useful to first discuss what features are attractive in a feasible policy solution that could
actually be implemented. The first property is that any policy measure should be of low cost.
Aside from rollover, auditing is the most relied upon technique for preventing low value spending.
A former Australian finance minister has suggested the only way to prevent excessive spending
is to apply external scrutiny [Mannheim, 2012]. A key disadvantage of auditing is that it can be
expensive which limits its potential for its widespread use.1.36
Due to the strong reticence of elected representatives to give up control of spending [McPherson,
2007, page 28], a policy would be more likely to be implemented if it does not result in a loss of
power for elected officials. The loss of parliamentary control associated with rollover budgeting is
the leading reason the UK’s rollover system was tightened in 2010.1.37 A successful measure should
also be simple to understand and implement. Furthermore it should be robust to interference by
different levels of the bureaucracy.1.38
1.5.1 Time-variant budgetary tax
In this section we propose a new technique of time variant budgetary taxes to achieve even spending
using the simple deterministic model introduced in section 1.3.1. With a time-variant budgetary
tax (hereafter simply referred to as a tax), spending in later months of the year is more expen-
sive relative to earlier months of the fiscal year. These taxes are not taxes in the normal sense
but represent reductions on a department’s appropriated budget at a higher level than what the
department actually spent. The implementation of these taxes would not necessarily mean lower
overall spending as the department’s budget could be increased to compensate for these taxes being
levied on purchases made later in the year.
Let θ describe a tax rate by which expenditures in the second period are more expensive. The
budget constraint faced by a department in equation 1.1 is replaced by:
x1 + θx2 ≤ B (1.20)
otherwise the department’s problem is unchanged. Note here that both θ and B are choice variables
for the parliament and hence taxes give parliaments more power to control spending in the fiscal
year.
Proposition 4. Time-variant budgetary taxes are sufficient to induce the parliamentary optimal
expenditure level, xPar, in each period.
1.36Analysis of the effectiveness of audits in this context is deferred to the online appendix 1.F.
1.37In a letter to the author former UK chief secretary to the treasury Danny Alexander said of the EYF system:
“departments were able to build up unlimited stocks of underspends which they were free to draw down and spend
at any time. This posed a clear risk to effective control of public spending.”
1.38For instance in the case of rollover Hyndman et al. [2007] found cases where budget managers did not have
rollover as managers higher up in the department wanted control of unspent funds each year.
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This is the ratio of marginal utility from spending in the second period divided by marginal
utility of spending in the first period with both evaluated at the parliamentary optimal spending
level. This optimal θ may differ between every department leading to the parliament taxing each
department at different rates. If for any reason a parliament was constrained to implement a
common θ for several different departments it is simple to show that choosing the minimum θ
rate across all departmental specific θ values would bring each department closer to parliamentary
optimal spending relative to the no taxation case.1.39
1.5.2 Calibrated time variant budgetary tax
With the calibrated parameters of section 1.3.2, the long term spending behaviour of departments
is well defined. In order to assess time variant budgetary taxes in a stochastic setting however a
production function must be assumed.1.40 We assume a function of:
Production(αy,m, xy,m) = αy,mx
γ
y,m (1.22)
Where αy,m are the same shocks that enter the department’s utility function
1.41 and γ is a curvature
parameter to be discussed.
With the assumption of a production function and the calibration of departmental behaviour
with a budget of 1 we can numerically estimate the social cost that would have lead to an optimal









The functional form taxes will take over the year needs to be chosen.1.42 For the exponential
discounting model, a deterministic version of the calibrated model has an analytical solution for
1.39This may not be the constrained optimal θ for the parliament however. To find an optimal common θ level
the inefficiency of excessive early spending (from a too high θ) would have to be balanced with the inefficiency of
excessive late spending (from a too low θ).
1.40One option would be to assume the production function is congruent to the calibrated performance function.
This is a different way of saying that performance reviews simply sum up all production done in the year. This is
not done in this paper as the performance function is calibrated relative to the imposed linear effort function.
1.41The assumption of a shared shock process is reasonable in the principal-agent context of the parliament-
department relationship. If shocks were uncorrelated with parliamentary utility then parliaments would seek to
contract departments in such a way as to align shocks.
1.42More effective taxes could be found by optimising 11 different tax rates and the budget however this is com-
putationally not feasible.
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Where θm gives the tax in month m. The annual budget is then set so that the department can








Where xpar is a deterministic approximation of parliamentary optimal spending found by taking








For the quasi-hyperbolic discounting model the taxation function (1.24) performed poorly in
smoothing spending and so tuning parameters, ∇ and Υ were added to give a form of θm =
∇δD11xδ−1par −ΩDm−1
∇δD11xδ−1par −Ω
for m ≤ 11 and θ12 =
∇δD11xδ−1par −ΩDm−1
∇δD11xδ−1par −Ω
+ Υ for the final month.1.43
An assumption also needs to made for either the value of γ or the value of λ, the remaining
parameter being able to be found from equation (1.23). A conservative approach is to choose a γ
that will tend to underestimate the gains from the imposition of a tax. A near linear production
function may be thought to be a conservative choice in that there are lesser diminishing returns
during spending spikes. However a near linear production function also means that the underutil-
isation of beneficial shocks early in the year is particularly inefficient as such shocks could have
been exploited to a greater degree.
With the prior belief that a near linear production function would be a conservative choice it
was chosen to impose a curvature value of γ = 0.95, implying a modest level of diminishing returns.
Robustness checks were then carried out which found that this assumption is not critical and other
choices lead to quantitatively similar percentage gains from tax implementation.1.44 These checks
show that the forces described in the preceding paragraph roughly compensate for each other as γ
changes within the range of credible curvature parameters. These robustness checks are detailed
in online appendix 1.C.
For each of the two models a perfect agency simulation is done with funds being spent exactly
1.43Exponential discounting is used for Dm−1 in the functional form equation (1.24). The quasi-hyperbolic form
was not used after a calibration with this form performed worse than Dm−1 with an exponential form. These tuning
parameters were optimised by maximising parliamentary expected utility for both parameters with budgets being
set according to equation 1.25.
1.44Although the production function imposed does change the absolute level of parliamentary utility before and
after the imposition of a tax.
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5% Exponential 5% Quasi-hyperbolic






Average x1 1.4% 3.18%
Average x12 21.5% 29.6%
Average Annual Production 1.101 1.102
Average Annual Spending 1 1
Parliament Utility 0.055 0.055
Tax Model
B 1.788 1.752
Tuning Parameters (∇, Υ) NA 0.491, 0.022
Final Month Tax (θ12) 1.049 1.048
Average x1 8.98% 9.09%
Average x12 7.52% 9.55%
Average Annual Production 1.881 1.869
Average Annual Spending 1.747 1.726
Parliament Utility 0.064 0.062
Perfect Agency
Average Annual Production 1.961 1.953
Average Annual Spending 1.781 1.773
Parliament Utility 0.098 0.098
Gains from tax 16.1% 12.6%
Maximum possible gain 78.8% 76.7%
Note that start month and end month spending amounts are not listed for the perfect agency case as monthly spending will be even at 8.3%
( 1
12
of annual spending). Utility gains from the tax and from the perfect agency models are relative to the no tax model. The tax equation
formula can be found in equation 1.24 for the exponential model, the taxation formula for the quasi-hyperbolic model is as described on page
40.
Table 1.3: Calibrated Time Variant Budgetary Tax
in accordance with the parliament’s utility function. This is done to give the maximum possible
gains from implementing some policy mechanism in this stochastic environment. The output of
simulations for both models along with simulations for when taxes are applied and when perfect
agency occurs is presented in table 1.3.
Even with this simple tax formula it can be seen that quite large gains are possible. The expo-
nential and quasi-hyperbolic models have available utility benefits of 16.1% and 12.6% respectively.
These gains are realized in three ways. The first is that heightened spending in the final months of
the fiscal year is less likely to encounter inefficiency from diminishing returns. The second is that
more even expenditure better utilises shocks which are i.i.d. throughout the fiscal year. The third
is that the parliament can offer larger budgets as less spending takes place at low marginal value.
It can be seen that the assumed functional forms were moderately successful in smoothing
spending. The exponential model has long run spending decreasing from a ratio of 1.08 in the first
month to 0.90 in the last month. The quasi-hyperbolic model has its smallest average spending
ratio of 0.91 in the 7th month with its greatest spending ratio at 1.15 in the last month of the fiscal
year. Both tax formulas used were simple however and taxes calibrated with more parameters
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could likely improve upon the results reported in table 1.3.
The maximum gains from the perfect agency simulations are larger than the benefits possible
with a tax at 78.8% and 76.7%. In both models there is little difference between annual average
spending in the tax case and the perfect agency case. In conjunction with the reasonably even
spending in the tax case this suggests that the reason the tax case underperforms the perfect
agency case is in less efficient exploitation of shocks.
Two calibrations with 10% discounting were also performed (presented in online appendix 1.I)
which lead to greater gains from a tax than their 5% discounting counterparts. As the higher
discounting rates indicate a stronger preference for delayed spending these 10% calibrations offset
this tendency by having a more concave performance function which encourages more even spend-
ing. This means that the curvature of the departmental utility function is closer to the curvature
of the parliament’s utility function which leads to departmental spending choices closer to the
parliamentary optimum. When the tax is calibrated there are utility benefits of 45.3% and 25.1%
possible for the exponential and quasi-hyperbolic versions which compare to the perfect agency
benefits of 64.3% and 62.9%. These calibrations indicate that the benefits from taxes have some
level of robustness to the discounting rates and time consistency applied.
These gains are also robust to what γ value is imposed with every tax simulation performed in
this research1.45 achieving a taxation benefit of more than 10% over the no taxation case.1.46
1.6 Conclusion
This paper has detailed the governmental end of fiscal year spending spike phenomena using ev-
idence from the United Kingdom. The key contributions of this paper are threefold. The first
contribution is the development of a model for heightened end of year spending based on procrasti-
nation. The second is the model comparison of the procrastination model against the precautionary
savings model which demonstrates the poor performance of the precautionary savings model in
the UK experience. The third contribution is in the invention of time variant budgetary taxes as a
policy tool to even spending and facilitate more efficient spending from government departments.
Time variant budgetary taxes are the recommendation of this paper. They are likely to be of
low cost, easy to implement and understand, do not take power away from elected politicians and
1.45All calibrations are detailed in table 1.3, online appendix 1.I or online appendix 1.C.
1.46One potential concern is that if a model were written with persistent shocks, time variant budgetary taxes
might discourage prudence by encouraging early spending before persistent shocks are revealed. This scenario has
not been estimated due to the curse of dimensionality making the computation too difficult (as persistent shocks
introduce another state variable to departmental value functions). However even in this case it is likely that taxes
could be calibrated to make some welfare gains. In the worst case tax rates could be set to one so welfare losses
should never result with a properly calibrated tax. Whilst proper calibration might be difficult where there is ex
ante limited information about the model specification or parameters, it is anticipated that a government could act
conservatively by implementing taxes at a low level and adapting them in later years based on realised spending
and performance data.
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are shown to be capable of smoothing spending throughout the fiscal year. Based on calibration
results this paper estimates that the surplus that departments deliver for the parliament (and
taxpayers) could be increased with the imposition of a time variant budgetary tax.
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Appendices
1.A Proofs
The important feature of the procrastination model is that departmental utility from spending is
time dependent. For ease and clarity of the proofs we define and use a concept of departmental
time dependent utility.
A time dependent departmental utility function (ut(xt)) in which in each period satisfies:
∂ut(xt)
∂xt
> 0 ∀t when xt = 0 (1.A.1)
∂2ut(xt)
∂x2t
< 0 ∀ t, x (1.A.2)






∀x for t > T (1.A.4)
Clearly the procrastination model above is an example of such a model with ut(xt) = Dv(xt) −
Dte(xt) where D1 = 1 and D2 = D < 1.
As discussed in the first paragraph of section 1.5 it is assumed that the marginal utility of
spending is positive at the parliament optimal level of spending in any period of the year. This
CHAPTER 1. PUTTING IT OFF FOR LATER 47
assumption translates to the following expression1.47:
∂ut(xpar)
∂x
> 0 for t = tmin (1.A.5)
Where tmin is the start of the fiscal year.
Proof of Proposition 1
We can write a Lagrangian for the department:













Note that if the budget constraint doesn’t bind Λ = 0, if it does Λ is positive. In either case the
department will spend in each period until the marginal value of spending is equal to the shadow
price Λ. From condition (1.A.4) when the marginal value at time 1 is Λ, the marginal value at
time 2 is higher. Hence the department will spend more in the second period.
Proof of Proposition 2
Suppose the parliament could choose spending in each period. We write the government objective
function as:







Condition 1.6 implies a unique solution for both FOCs at x1 = x2.
Proof of Proposition 3
From Proposition 1 we have the strict inequality x2 > x1. Therefore it is not possible to get
x2 = x1 = xPar.
1.47If this was violated the parliament would need to adjust vt(xt) in order to induce their desired spending level.
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Proof of Proposition 4
We assume the parliament will set a budget such that it will be fully expended1.48:
























Aside from current and capital expenditure, budgets are further split by the planning horizon of the
funds in two categories: Annual Managed Expenditure (AMEs) and Departmental Expenditure
Limits (DELs). AMEs are set annually and are intended for demand driven expenses including
welfare payments, hospital admissions and public sector pension scheme payments. DELs are set
in the spending review process and are intended for expenses which can be planned for in advance
including wages and rent costs. Spending reviews occur every three years [Crawford et al., 2009]
and each time set DELs for the coming three years. The purpose of this system is for departments
to know their budgets for the coming fiscal years and be able to plan accordingly with AME funds
being available on a shorter horizon to cover demand driven expenses that are more difficult to
plan for.
Northern Ireland Data
Monthly Northern Ireland spending figures were accessed from a Freedom of Information request
to the Northern Ireland government. This data is based on accrual accounting and only includes
DEL data. The restriction to DEL data is due to the division of responsibilities between the
UK government and the Northern Ireland government (who supplied the data). Although AMEs
constitute about 40% of spending in Northern Ireland [Northern Ireland Department of Finance
and Personnel, 2012] this restriction is not particularly important. Firstly the data most relevent
for spending spikes is the capital spending data (See footnote 1.6 on page 23). Almost all Northern
1.48This will be true of any parliament optimally setting a budget and tax. Time variant budgetary taxes will be
ineffective if the budget constraint never binds.
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Irish capital spending is DEL spending and as such is represented in our data.1.49 The second
reason is that DELs are spending items that are driven by departmental decisions rather than
being demand driven and outside of departmental hands. A restriction to DEL expenditures
therefore focuses attention to those areas of government spending that are more discretionary and
thus where the underlying principal agent relationship of interest occurs. This is in contrast to
AMEs which are demand driven and largely include transfer payments such as public sector pension
schemes.
Devolved administrations have certain privileges that Whitehall departments do not. The
extent of these depends on the budgetary system and therefore changed after the 2010-2011 financial
year. An important privilege is that devolved administrations do not need to notify treasury in
advance of any planned underspends (and associated rollover) [Hutt, 2011]. Taken in total the
differences in budgetary restrictions are relatively minor however.
The data is split by current and capital expenditure for every year except for the fiscal years
2011-2012 and 2012-2013 when “Non Ringfenced Resource Expenditure” and “Ringfenced Resource
Expenditure” were summed up to get current expenditure. In addition this data was adjusted in
three ways. Firstly these monthly spending figures are as realised by departments and reported to
UK treasury in May of each year (2 months after the end of the fiscal year). The total department’s
total outturn figure is then officially recorded in August each year with no new monthly series
being created. The sum of the monthly spending series can differ from the final figure reflecting
accounting adjustments between May and August. To correct for this the monthly spending figures
are scaled such that the sum reflects the final outturn figure. The second adjustment accounts for
the the differing number of days in each month. All monthly spending figures are normalised
to their proportion of annual total spending (after taking account for rollover). Thirdly some
months (about 2% of observations) record negative spending figures reflecting asset sales being
recorded along with expenditures. In the cases of NIAUR 2012-2013 Current Expenditure and
DOE 2008 Capital Expenditure, these department-budget-years were dropped in their entirety as
annual spending was negative (revenue from asset sales exceeded capital expenses). In other cases
negative months were dropped.1.50
Over and underspend figures were attained from a freedom of information request for the years
2009-2010, 2010-2011 and 2011-12. For 2012-2013 provision estimates were taken from Northern
1.49The Department for Employment and Learning is the only notable exception receiving about 80% of its capital
budget from AMEs with all other departments receiving less than 5% of their capital budget from AMEs. The
qualitative conclusions of the calibrations are robust to the omission this department.
1.50These decisions on dealing with negative values are relevant for the calibration and for the regressions of section
1.4.2. In the case of the calibration, the model presented requires positive spending values and hence it is not possible
to attain a likelihood for negative spending values. The effect in the regression case is likely to be minimal. If the
regressions in 1.4.2 are repeated only with department-budget pairs that have 60 observations (no negative values
in a 5 year period) the results become more significant. This regression is shown in section 1.D.
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Ireland Department of Finance and Personnel [2013] while outturn figures were taken from Northern
Ireland Department of Finance and Personnel [2014]. For 2008-2009 provision and outturn figures
are taken from Northern Ireland Department of Finance and Personnel [2009] and Northern Ireland
Department of Finance and Personnel [2010] respectively.1.51 Between these fiscal years each
department’s balance of funds can be found using the EYF and BES rollover rules as applicable.
Figures for the exact level of rollover for each department going into 2008-2009 were not available
and hence these were estimated by taking the total rolledover funds for Northern Ireland as of
the start of the 2008-2009 fiscal year the total funds for Northern Ireland were taken from HM
Treasury [2008, Table 6] and attributing them to each department based on the combined savings
of each department as accumulated in the 2005-2006 and 2006-2007 fiscal years [Northern Ireland
Assembly Research and Library Service, 2008, Table 6.1,6.2].
A regression of current and capital spending on month dummies can be seen in table 1.B.1.
The observations in this case include monthly departmental spending for each department for each
of the 5 years.
Table 1.B.1: Regressions on Northern Ireland Spending
Spending
Capital Expenditure Current Expenditure
(1) (2)
April 0.012 (0.016) 0.073∗∗∗ (0.003)
May 0.043∗∗∗ (0.016) 0.075∗∗∗ (0.003)
June 0.041∗∗∗ (0.016) 0.080∗∗∗ (0.003)
July 0.044∗∗∗ (0.016) 0.075∗∗∗ (0.003)
August 0.056∗∗∗ (0.016) 0.080∗∗∗ (0.003)
September 0.064∗∗∗ (0.016) 0.074∗∗∗ (0.003)
October 0.066∗∗∗ (0.016) 0.081∗∗∗ (0.003)
November 0.057∗∗∗ (0.016) 0.085∗∗∗ (0.003)
December 0.084∗∗∗ (0.016) 0.080∗∗∗ (0.003)
January 0.063∗∗∗ (0.016) 0.080∗∗∗ (0.003)
February 0.123∗∗∗ (0.016) 0.087∗∗∗ (0.003)
March 0.347∗∗∗ (0.016) 0.130∗∗∗ (0.003)
Observations 1,008 972
R2 0.402 0.919
Adjusted R2 0.395 0.918
Residual Std. Error 0.145 (df = 996) 0.025 (df = 960)
F Statistic 55.774∗∗∗ (df = 12; 996) 904.508∗∗∗ (df = 12; 960)
Notes: ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level.
∗Significant at the 10 percent level.
Northern Ireland’s NIAUR (Energy Regulator) current
expenditure observations were omitted as being extreme outliers.
1.51Note that underspend can be calculated by subtracting outturn from provision. Overspend refers to the case
when underspend is negative. Overspend is comparatively rare and departments are generally sanctioned in such
cases for spending more than they were authorised to.
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Table 1.B.2 shows summary statistics by department while department abbreviations are shown
in table 1.B.3.
The UK Government
The UK Central Government Spending data was taken from the Office of National Statistics as
the series: MF6S - Central Government: Total current expenditure: (£m) and MF6T - Central
Government: Total capital expenditure: (£m). These series are accrual based meaning that
expenditure is recorded in the month the underlying economic transaction took place rather than
the month in which cash was exchanged.1.52 All raw spending figures have been adjusted to reflect
the differing number of days in each month. These series do not divide between DEL and AME
expenditure but represent aggregate spending.
The UK Central Government cash outlays series was taken from the Office of National Statistics
as the series: RUUP - Central Government: Cash outlays (£m). All raw spending figures have
been adjusted to reflect the differing number of days in each month.
Table 1.B.4 shows summary statistics and t-tests relating to the three series on figure 1.2 and
is discussed on page 34.
1.52This is imperfect however with several large capital receipts relating to the sales of 3G licenses in 2000 and the
decommissioning of British Nuclear Fuels in 2005 being ascribed to particular months. For this reason some months
of the 2000-2001 fiscal year have been omitted and the remaining months spending ratios renormalised.
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Table 1.B.3: Northern Ireland department abbreviations
DeptCode Department
AOCC Assembly Ombudsman Commissioner for Complaints
DARD Department of Agriculture and Rural Development
DCAL Department of Culture, Arts and Leisure
DE Department of Education
DEL Department for Employment and Learning
DETI Department of Enterprise, Trade and Investment
DFP Department of Finance and Personnel
DHSSPS Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety
DOE Department of Environment
DOJ Department of Justice
DRD Department for Regional Development
DSD Department for Social Development
FSA Food Standards Agency
NIA Northern Ireland Assembly
NIAO Northern Ireland Audit Office
NIAUR Northern Ireland Authority for Utility Regulation
OFMDFM Office of First Minister and Deputy First Minister
PPS Public Prosecution Service
All All
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1.C Curvature of production function robustness checks
Table 1.3 and the discussion of section 1.5.2 concentrates on the case of γ = 0.95. Here a robustness
check was carried out to assess the extent to which the benefits of a tax change when a different
γ value is assumed. This was done for the 5% exponential discounting model. For a range of γ
values from 1 to 0.5 time implied social cost (λ) was found from equation 1.23. xPar was then
found using equation 1.26. For the purposes of the γ = 1 case a γ value of 0.95 was used for the
purposes of equation 1.26.
γ λ xPar Benefits From Tax Benefits from Perfect Agency
1.00 1.007 0.310 68.629 ∞
0.95 1.046 0.145 1.161 1.790
0.90 1.086 0.152 1.109 1.847
0.85 1.128 0.152 1.103 1.838
0.80 1.171 0.149 1.107 1.809
0.75 1.229 0.144 1.116 1.756
0.70 1.288 0.139 1.123 1.696
0.65 1.36 0.131 1.127 1.614
0.60 1.426 0.123 1.125 1.529
0.55 1.229 0.144 1.116 1.756
0.50 1.288 0.139 1.123 1.696
All of these benefits are for the 5% exponential calibration. For the γ = 1 estimation for the purposes of equation 1.26, a γ value of 0.95 was
chosen in finding the parliament desired spending level. Furthermore in this case the the utility improvement proportion should be interpreted
with caution as a result of this assumption as well as the fact that utility in the no tax case was close to zero and numerical imprecision can
have a large relative impact when calculating utility gains.
Table 1.C.1: Robustness checks for the gains from imposition of a tax for the 5% exponential
discounting case.
1.D Econometric Robustness checks - Section 1.4.2
This appendix will present a series of robustness checks for the regressions of table 1.2 to show that
the conclusion of these regressions is similar if alternate choices are made in model specification or
data preprocessing.
Alternate Volatility Measure

















The three regressions from table 1.2 are repeated with this alternate volatility measure with
the results presented in table 1.D.1.
Figure 1.D.1 shows the volatility and renormalised spike for each department-budget-year as
well as the plot for this alternate volatility measure. The left hand side data is that used for three
regressions of table 1.2 whilst the right hand side data was used for table 1.D.1. The top of the
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Figure 1.D.1: Volatility and Renormalised Spikes
Table 1.D.1: Alternative Volatility Measure and Renormalised Spike
RenormalisedSpike
(1) (2) (3)
AltVolitility (Current) 0.088 −0.087 −0.200∗
(0.128) (0.160) (0.115)




Fixed Effects No Department Department x Budget
Fiscal Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 116 116 116
R2 0.423 0.449 0.192
Adjusted R2 0.386 0.333 −0.106
F Statistic 11.318∗∗∗ (df = 7; 108) 11.058∗∗∗ (df = 7; 95) 3.328∗∗∗ (df = 6; 84)
Notes: ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level.
∗Significant at the 10 percent level.
Standard errors are clustered at the (Department), (Department), (Department x Budget) levels respectively.
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figure shows capital expenditure volatilities and renormalised spikes while the corresponding points
for the current expenditure series are on the bottom.
Separate Regressions
One potential concern is that the year fixed effects are not well suited for either current or capital
expenditure due to the presence of the other expenditure series. As a result separate regressions
for each type of expenditure were performed which are presented in table 1.D.2.
Table 1.D.2: Volatility and Renormalised Spike - Seperate Regressions by budget
RenormalisedSpike
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Volitility (Current) 0.110∗∗∗ −0.059
(0.032) (0.041)
Volatility (Capital) −0.060∗∗ −0.100∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.038)
Fixed Effects No Department No Department
Fiscal Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 66 66 49 49
R2 0.226 0.267 0.069 0.148
Adjusted R2 0.162 −0.013 −0.040 −0.278
F Statistic 3.509∗∗∗ (df = 5; 60) 3.431∗∗ (df = 5; 47) 0.633 (df = 5; 43) 1.110 (df = 5; 32)
Notes: ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level.
∗Significant at the 10 percent level.
Standard errors are clustered at the (Department), (Department x Budget), (Department),
(Department x Budget) levels respectively.
While the coefficient on capital volatility is significantly negative in the third and fourth regres-
sions of table 1.D.2 these regressions fail the F-test of significance. This is a result of the increased
degrees of freedom caused by budget specific year fixed effects. This can be seen by repeating
the regressions of table 1.D.2 without including year fixed effects. This can be seen in table 1.D.3
where it can be noted that the departmental FE model for capital expenditure now passes the
F-test of model significance.
Table 1.D.3: Volatility and Renormalised Spike - Seperate Regressions by budget and no year FEs
RenormalisedSpike
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Volitility (Current) 0.108∗∗∗ −0.067
(0.035) (0.064)
Volatility (Capital) −0.065∗∗ −0.107∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.039)
Fixed Effects No Department No Department
Fiscal Year FE No No No No
Observations 66 66 49 49
R2 0.063 0.017 0.044 0.126
Adjusted R2 0.049 −0.253 0.024 −0.166
F Statistic 4.315∗∗ (df = 1; 64) 0.872 (df = 1; 51) 2.163 (df = 1; 47) 5.173∗∗ (df = 1; 36)
Notes: ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level.
∗Significant at the 10 percent level.
Standard errors are clustered at the (Department), (Department x Budget), (Department),
(Department x Budget) levels respectively.
Controlling for the remaining budget
Another potential concern is that the use of renormalised spikes does not perfectly remove budget
constraint issues from the regression. As a robustness check then we repeat the three regressions of
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table 1.2 whilst controlling for the remaining budget as of the seventh month, B7,y,d,b. This can be
seen in table 1.D.4. The coefficients are similar to table 1.2 and in addition the coefficients on the
log remaining budget are not generally significant which indicates that the benchmark specification
is successful in seperating budget issues from the volatility-spending spike relationship of interest.
Table 1.D.4: Volatility and Renormalised Spike - Including Remaining Budget
RenormalisedSpike
(1) (2) (3)
Volitility (Current) 0.074∗∗ 0.040 −0.068
(0.032) (0.057) (0.053)




Log(Remaining Budget) −0.015∗ −0.035 −0.018
(0.009) (0.023) (0.063)
Fixed Effects No Department Department x Budget
Fiscal Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 115 115 115
R2 0.442 0.475 0.150
Adjusted R2 0.400 0.356 −0.181
F Statistic 10.505∗∗∗ (df = 8; 106) 10.511∗∗∗ (df = 8; 93) 2.073∗ (df = 7; 82)
Notes: ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level.
∗Significant at the 10 percent level.
Standard errors are clustered at the (Department), (Department), (Department x Budget) levels respectively.
Varying the inclusion criteria - Annual Budget
The set criteria for inclusion was that the department-budget had a budget of 10 million pounds
in a given year. If this is loosened such that a threshold budget of 5 million pounds were set then
significance is reduced but still significant at 10% in the specifications with fixed effects. This can
be seen in table 1.D.5.
Table 1.D.5: Volatility and Renormalised Spike - 5 million pounds provision threshold
RenormalisedSpike
(1) (2) (3)
Volitility (Current) 0.062 0.049 −0.041
(0.051) (0.049) (0.048)




Fixed Effects No Department Department x Budget
Fiscal Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 130 130 130
R2 0.446 0.454 0.099
Adjusted R2 0.414 0.342 −0.210
F Statistic 14.045∗∗∗ (df = 7; 122) 12.701∗∗∗ (df = 7; 107) 1.767 (df = 6; 96)
Notes: ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level.
∗Significant at the 10 percent level.
Standard errors are clustered at the (Department), (Department), (Department x Budget) levels respectively.
Varying the inclusion criteria - Monthly positive spending
A small number of zero and negative spending values were disregarded when estimating volatility
due to the relative volatility measure being used sensitive to these cases. Thus some department-
budget-years had volatility calculated by taking an average of fewer than 4 month-volatilities in a
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way analogous to equation 1.17. We test the impact of this decision by repeating the benchmark
regressions on the subset of department-years with all positive spending values. The significance
is maintained in this specification as can be seen in table 1.D.6.
Table 1.D.6: Volatility and Renormalised Spike - All 12 months of positive spending
RenormalisedSpike
(1) (2) (3)
Volitility (Current) 0.097 0.063 −0.110
(0.071) (0.089) (0.083)




Fixed Effects No Department Department x Budget
Fiscal Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 95 95 95
R2 0.426 0.484 0.193
Adjusted R2 0.379 0.345 −0.185
F Statistic 9.210∗∗∗ (df = 7; 87) 9.917∗∗∗ (df = 7; 74) 2.552∗∗ (df = 6; 64)
Notes: ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level.
∗Significant at the 10 percent level.
Standard errors are clustered at the (Department), (Department), (Department x Budget) levels respectively.
Varying the inclusion criteria - Years of data
In the benchmark specification no thresholds were set for the number of years of data that were
present. This may have an impact as some departments have more years of data with which to set
fixed effects. If a threshold is introduced such that 5 years of data are necessary for inclusion into
the regression (and thus the panel is balanced) then significance is maintained. This can be seen
in table 1.D.7.
Table 1.D.7: Volatility and Renormalised Spike - 5 years of spending data
RenormalisedSpike
(1) (2) (3)
Volitility (Current) 0.102∗∗∗ 0.024 −0.067
(0.036) (0.057) (0.049)




Fixed Effects No Department Department x Budget
Fiscal Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 95 95 95
R2 0.470 0.501 0.183
Adjusted R2 0.427 0.383 −0.098
F Statistic 11.017∗∗∗ (df = 7; 87) 10.890∗∗∗ (df = 7; 76) 2.608∗∗ (df = 6; 70)
Notes: ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level.
∗Significant at the 10 percent level.
Standard errors are clustered at the (Department), (Department), (Department x Budget) levels respectively.
Calculating Volatility and renormalised spike with other than 6 months.
In the benchmark setting 6 months were taken to calculate the volatility (with equation 1.17) and
the final 6 months were used for calculating the renormalised spending spike with equation 1.18.
Here we repeat the benchmark regressions with the first 4 months and the first 8 months used for
calculating the volatility in tables 1.D.8 and 1.D.9 respectively. In these cases the renormalised
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respectively. The benchmark regression
coefficients are much less significant when 4 months used to calculate volatility as there only exists
months 2 and 3 for calculating volatility. The regressions with volatility from the first 8 months
remains strongly significant however.
Table 1.D.8: Volatility and Renormalised Spike - 4 months for calculating volatility
RenormalisedSpike
(1) (2) (3)
Volitility (Current) 0.072∗ 0.081∗ −0.004
(0.039) (0.046) (0.055)




Fixed Effects No Department Department x Budget
Fiscal Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 108 108 108
R2 0.445 0.492 0.126
Adjusted R2 0.406 0.375 −0.231
F Statistic 11.435∗∗∗ (df = 7; 100) 12.037∗∗∗ (df = 7; 87) 1.823 (df = 6; 76)
Notes: ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level.
∗Significant at the 10 percent level.
Standard errors are clustered at the (Department), (Department), (Department x Budget) levels respectively.
Table 1.D.9: Volatility and Renormalised Spike - 8 months for calculating volatility
RenormalisedSpike
(1) (2) (3)
Volitility (Current) 0.189∗∗ 0.045 −0.012
(0.077) (0.086) (0.097)




Fixed Effects No Department Department x Budget
Fiscal Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 113 113 113
R2 0.384 0.416 0.137
Adjusted R2 0.342 0.289 −0.194
F Statistic 9.332∗∗∗ (df = 7; 105) 9.346∗∗∗ (df = 7; 92) 2.140∗ (df = 6; 81)
Notes: ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level.
∗Significant at the 10 percent level.
Standard errors are clustered at the (Department), (Department), (Department x Budget) levels respectively.
Alternate Spending Series
In the main regressions the spending and budget variables were expressed in pounds. In addition
the budget value used to renormalise the spending spike included rollover funds. In this section
I use three other spending and budget series to repeat the regressions of table 1.2. The first is
a spending value expressed as a proportion of annual outturn with the complementary B7,y,d,b
value describing the proportion of outturned funds unspent as of the start of the seventh month.
Any rollover funds are ignored in this specification. These regressions are presented in table
1.D.10. The second is similar but with spending being as a proportion of annual provision and the
complementary B7,y,d,b being the proportion of the allowed budget being unspent as of the start
of the seventh month. Again rollover funds are ignored. These regressions are presented in table
1.D.11 . The third spending series gives spending as a proportion of annual provision plus saved
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rollover funds as of the start of the year with the complementary B7,y,d,b being the proportion of
total available funds (provision + rollover) being unspent as of the start of the 7th month. Rollover
is accounted for in this regression. These regressions are presented in table 1.D.12.
Table 1.D.10: Volatility and Renormalised Spike - Spending as proportion of outturn
RenormalisedSpike
(1) (2) (3)
Volitility (Current) 0.110∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗ −0.054
(0.041) (0.048) (0.052)




Fixed Effects No Department Department x Budget
Fiscal Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 115 115 115
R2 0.455 0.492 0.157
Adjusted R2 0.419 0.384 −0.158
F Statistic 12.748∗∗∗ (df = 7; 107) 12.995∗∗∗ (df = 7; 94) 2.579∗∗ (df = 6; 83)
Notes: ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level.
∗Significant at the 10 percent level.
Standard errors are clustered at the (Department), (Department), (Department x Budget) levels respectively.
Table 1.D.11: Volatility and Renormalised Spike - Spending as proportion of provision
RenormalisedSpike
(1) (2) (3)
Volitility (Current) 0.110∗∗∗ 0.076 −0.064
(0.034) (0.052) (0.052)




Fixed Effects No Department Department x Budget
Fiscal Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 115 115 115
R2 0.425 0.459 0.148
Adjusted R2 0.388 0.344 −0.170
F Statistic 11.320∗∗∗ (df = 7; 107) 11.399∗∗∗ (df = 7; 94) 2.404∗∗ (df = 6; 83)
Notes: ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level.
∗Significant at the 10 percent level.
Standard errors are clustered at the (Department), (Department), (Department x Budget) levels respectively.
Table 1.D.12: Volatility and Renormalised Spike - Spending as proportion of funds inc. rollover
RenormalisedSpike
(1) (2) (3)
Volitility (Current) 0.051 0.051 −0.060∗
(0.039) (0.043) (0.037)




Fixed Effects No Department Department x Budget
Fiscal Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 115 115 115
R2 0.241 0.300 0.280
Adjusted R2 0.192 0.151 0.012
F Statistic 4.858∗∗∗ (df = 7; 107) 5.758∗∗∗ (df = 7; 94) 5.391∗∗∗ (df = 6; 83)
Notes: ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level.
∗Significant at the 10 percent level.
Standard errors are clustered at the (Department), (Department), (Department x Budget) levels respectively.
Alternate Panel Data Techniques
If first differences or random effects are used in place of fixed effects significance of the capital
volatility variable is maintained. This can be seen in table 1.D.13.
CHAPTER 1. PUTTING IT OFF FOR LATER 62
Table 1.D.13: Volatility and Renormalised Spike - First Differences and Random Effects
RenormalisedSpike
(1) (2)
Volitility (Current) −0.083 0.096∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.032)




Panel Structure First Differences Random Effects
Fiscal Year Dummies Yes Yes
Observations 89 115
R2 0.206 0.405
Adjusted R2 0.148 0.367
F Statistic 3.549∗∗∗ (df = 6; 82) 10.424∗∗∗ (df = 7; 107)
Notes: ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level.
∗Significant at the 10 percent level.
Standard errors are robust.
1.E Time Series: Final Month Cash-outlays and Variance
Modelling variance with GARCH models
We can also examine this relationship using intertemporal variation for the cash outlays series over
the period from the 1984-1985 fiscal year to the 2013-2014 fiscal year.1.53 The following regression
was run (with each year being an observation):
Final Month Cash-Outlay Ratioy = β0 + β1Variancey + εy (1.E.1)
where y is a year index. In order to create the Variancey variable, two GARCH models were
estimated. Due to the sensitivity of equation 1.E.1 to the final month spending value, each model
was calculated with the omission of the final month of each year. As the final month of the year
is March and March is dropped the month of April comes immediately after February in this 11
month year.1.54 This has the effect of estimating variance using only the residuals from the first
11 months of the fiscal year to ensure that final month spending does not impact both sides of
equation 1.E.1.1.55 The following models of cash outlays were estimated (with monthly data of
1.53A similar methodology was attempted for the other two spending series but with only about half as many years
being available estimates of equation 1.E.1 were insignificant and did not pass the F test of model significance.
1.54Thus when it is the first month of the year then t− 1 is the 11th month of the previous year and t− 11 is the
first month of the previous year.
1.55The dropping of the 12th month is not critical for these results. The variance coefficients in table 1.E.1 are
actually more strongly negative when all 12 months are used. These regressions are omitted for brevity but are
available on request from the author.
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this 11 month year):




11ln(Cash Outlays)t−i + θ11∆
11ln(Cash Outlays)t−11 + εt
(1.E.2)











11ln(Cash Outlays)t−i + εt (1.E.3)





These two models were then used to estimate the conditional variance throughout the period.1.56
The raw Cash Outlayst, the ∆
11ln(Cash Outlays)t series as well as the estimated conditional vari-
ances from each model and final month cash-outlay ratios can be seen in figure 1.E.1. In this figure
the conditional variance for model 1.E.2 is in black and the conditional variance for model 1.E.3
is in blue. The regression outputs are shown in table 1.E.2.1.57
For each model, predictions of the conditional variance, σ2t , were estimated for each month (in
the 11 month year). These monthly estimated variances were then averaged to give an annual
series to match the annual final month cash-outlay ratio data so each observation is for a year.
The regression of equation 1.E.1 was estimated using the variances from each model as well as
the logs of these variances. These regressions are presented in table 1.E.1 which lead to similar
conclusions as the Northern Ireland cross sectional regressions of section 1.4.2. Higher variance is
associated with lower spending spikes.1.58
1.56The 1984 - 1985 and 1985 - 1986 fiscal year were used in the calculation of each GARCH process and then
dropped for the estimation of equations 1.E.1 to ensure sufficient data was available beforehand to estimate the
conditional variance series.
1.57In this figure the conditional variance for model 1.E.2 is in black and the conditional variance for model 1.E.3
is in blue
1.58Note that whilst the coefficients both models are significantly negative the size of the estimated variance
coefficients is different for each model. This is not an issue for this regression. Variances are estimated based on
model residuals which depend on model specifications. A more complex model will generally have lower residuals
and lower variance of the residuals. It is the changes in variance over time for a given model that matter for these
regressions and not the (model dependent) magnitudes of the variance.
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Figure 1.E.1: ∆12ln(Cash Outlays)t and estimated conditional variances
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Table 1.E.1: Regression for Spending Spike Vs Variance
Dependent variable:
Final Month Cash-Outlays Ratio
First Model Second Model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variance −213.357∗∗∗ −3.938∗∗∗
(70.771) (0.975)
Log Variance −1.164∗∗∗ −0.045∗∗∗
(0.395) (0.015)
Constant 2.284∗∗∗ −4.947∗∗ 1.153∗∗∗ 0.883∗∗∗
(0.388) (2.055) (0.020) (0.074)
Observations 28 28 28 28
R2 0.191 0.189 0.126 0.162
Adjusted R2 0.160 0.158 0.093 0.130
Residual Std. Error (df = 26) 0.075 0.075 0.078 0.076
F Statistic (df = 1; 26) 6.125∗∗ 6.074∗∗ 3.764∗ 5.026∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Heteroskedastic consistent standard errors are used.
Table 1.E.2: UK Cash outlays GARCH models
(1) (2)
Model 1.E.2 Model 1.E.3
∆11ln(Cash Outlays)t
∆11ln(Cash Outlays)t−1 0.295
∗∗∗ (0.0797) 0.236∗∗∗ (0.0396)
∆11ln(Cash Outlays)t−2 0.00994 (0.0889) -0.0236 (0.0416)
∆11ln(Cash Outlays)t−3 0.392
∗∗∗ (0.0808) 0.457∗∗∗ (0.0449)




∆11ln(Cash Outlays)t−6 -0.0242 (0.0444)








∗∗∗ (0.0940) -0.433∗∗∗ (0.0488)
Constant 0.0318∗∗∗ (0.00707) 0.00867∗∗∗ (0.00277)
σ2t
ε2t−1 0.0187
∗∗∗ (0.00552) 1.330∗∗∗ (0.368)
σ2t−1 1.316
∗∗∗ (0.0100) -0.0205 (0.0182)
σ2t−2 -1.012
∗∗∗ (0.0173)
Constant 0.00369∗∗∗ (0.000394) 0.00117∗∗∗ (0.000213)
N 308 308
p 3.03e-09 1.20e-101
Standard errors in parentheses
The p value for each model refers to a wald test of model significance
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Modelling variance with the Volatility and AltVolatility metrics
Further regressions were performed using the volatility metrics from equations 1.17 and 1.D.1 and
the renormalised spike described by equation 1.18. These can be seen in tables 1.E.3 for the Cash
Outlays spending series.1.59 Here it can be noted however that the two of these regressions that pass
the F-test establish a significantly negative relationship between volatility and the renormalised
spending spike (at the 10% and 5% levels).
Table 1.E.3: Regression for Renormalised Spike Vs Volatility & AltVolatility
Dependent variable:
Renormalised Spending Spike







Log Alt Volatility −0.011∗∗
(0.005)
Constant 0.183∗∗∗ 0.186∗∗∗ 0.191∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.016) (0.005) (0.016)
Observations 30 30 30 30
R2 0.0003 0.001 0.129 0.131
Adjusted R2 −0.035 −0.035 0.098 0.100
Residual Std. Error (df = 28) 0.012 0.012 0.011 0.011
F Statistic (df = 1; 28) 0.009 0.032 4.151∗ 4.224∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
1.F Further discussion
Assumption of disutility from effort in spending money
A crucial assumption for the procrastination model is that there is some level of disutility that is
increasing with spending. The project management industry gives some basic evidence for this.
It is also possible however to motivate this assumption by starting with a performance function
incorporating effort and money and with a cost of effort function involving only effort.
Denoting P (et, xt) as the performance in a period from spending xt and using effort et and
denoting k(et) as the disutility from effort level et the problem for a department is:
max
x1,x2,e1,e2
D [P (e1, x1) + P (e2, x2)]− k(e1)−Dk(e2) (1.F.1)
s.t. x1 + x2 ≤ B
1.59Similar regressions were attempted for the capital expenditure and current expenditure series however due to
a lack of sufficient data these failed the F-test of model significance. These are available on request.
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In any period we can use first order conditions to get a equation for optimal effort as a function of
spending in the current period. As there is no intertemporal constraint on effort only the current
period’s spending will enter this function.
et = f(xt) (1.F.2)
We can substitute this into the performance and functions as:
P (et, xt) = P (f(xt), xt) k(et) = k(f(xt)) (1.F.3)
= v(xt) = e(xt) (1.F.4)
Substituting back into equation 1.F.1 yields equation 1.1.
Assumption of performance monitoring on a fiscal year basis
A key assumption for the procrastination model is that performance is monitored on a fiscal
year basis. This is a reasonable assumption when the UK is considered. While the performance
frameworks of devolved administrations (such as Northern Ireland) will not be explicitly discussed
they can be considered (in the timing dimension) to mirror the central government framework.
Since at least the time of the red book of the exchequer was written around the year 1230
[Hall, 1896, page 855] fiscal reporting has been organised around annual increments. This annual
increment was maintained as performance-related pay was beginning to be introduced in 1991 by
the Major government [Major, 1991]. An early implementation was in local government where a
number of performance metrics were introduced to encourage greater public accountability [Pan-
chamia and Thomas, 2010]. A broader based framework was introduced with the incoming Labour
government in 1998 with the Public Service Agreement System where departments were given
measurable performance targets (termed PSAs) along with completion dates. Despite the presence
of in year completion dates and bimonthly Prime Ministerial meetings with department heads
these performance targets were inexorably linked to the fiscal year. With the passage of the 2000
Government Resource Accounting Act the public spending committee was tasked with monitor-
ing progress towards PSAs by requiring departments to provide performance reporting alongside
spending figures which were published on a fiscal year basis. Furthermore the negotiation of PSAs
was “explicitly tied to the spending review process, which increased the potential for the treasury
to incentivise departments to deliver on government’s overall objectives in return for appropriate
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funding. [Panchamia and Thomas, 2010, page 3]”.
There exists further evidence of performance and spending being scrutinised together in practice
from the reports of the House of Commons Scrutiny Unit [2009, page 4]. In 2010 the incoming
coalition government replaced the PSA system with the Departmental Business Plans system
[Stephen et al., 2013]. These documents were updated on an annual basis and included regular
goalsetting and performance measurement in a similar fashion to the PSA system. One new feature
was the public release of individual performance targets for senior public servants on an annual
(fiscal year) basis [UK Cabinet Office, 2013].
Regular performance appraisal is also common in other countries. The United States Office of
Personnel Management describes the performance award framework for the US government with
awards for performance awarded on a period basis similarly to the UK US Office of Personnel
Management [2015].
Assumption of diminishing returns from spending
In this paper the low quality of spending at the end of fiscal years in interpreted as being a result
of diminishing returns to spending. Diminishing returns from spending emerge as a credible way to
model spending when one considers what mechanisms could explain the link between heightened
spending and low quality. One way this could occur is that managers have less time to spend
on each spending project and projects could blow out costs due to mistakes being made. Whilst
money expended (as a factor of production) can be scaled up, manager’s time is another factor
of production that cannot be scaled up as easily. Another may be frivolous purchases that occur
while senior managers cannot check on all of the purchases made by more junior budget holders. In
this way heightened spending may lead to a higher proportion of funds being spent on items which
may increase personal utility for these budget holders but do not deliver value to the organisation
(for instance new office furniture or highend computer monitors). Crowding out of suppliers may
be a further mechanism - due to higher demand at the end of the fiscal year suppliers raise their
prices (Some evidence for this type of mechanism comes from Hyndman et al. [2007, p.227]). A
further mechanism is that shorter timeframes for contracting as well as more contracts available for
suppliers to quote on result in fewer quotes per project (a mechanism which finds direct support
in the IT project analysis of Liebman and Mahoney [2013, page 24]). In addition there exists the
possibility that departments simply run out of profitable spending opportunities and need to fall
back on less valuable spending opportunities.
There may be alternative ways of modeling why fiscal-year ends have spending of low quality.
The end of year is not an inherently special time however and so it is difficult to devise a feasible
mechanism for this low quality that does not depend upon the heightened level of spending in a
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way that is isomorphic to diminishing returns.
Note that this assumption of diminishing returns from spending is not important for showing
how heightened end of year spending can be caused by procrastination. It is important in a
deterministic setting however for establishing that there are welfare gains from eliminating these
spending spikes however. As is discussed in section 1.5.2 in a stochastic setting end of year spending
spikes can lead to inefficiencies even with a constant returns production function.
Alternate explanations of end of fiscal year spending spikes
Two explanations frequently came up at early seminars of this paper and in discussions with
public servants. The first is that if money is not spent by the end of the fiscal year it is lost by
a government department. This has not been the case in the UK since 1998, nonetheless even if
rollover were not available this is still only an argument for spending an entire budget within a
fiscal year and is not an argument for spending the funds in the final months of a fiscal year. A
further feature is needed in any model to explain why spending is delayed until late in the year.
The second explanation offered is that if funds are not spent in a fiscal year then the budget for
the next fiscal year is reduced by an amount corresponding to the underspend. This is subject to
the same criticism as the first explanation in that it doesn’t explain why spending is delayed until
the end of the fiscal year. In addition it is likely that spending spikes at the end of the fiscal year
would be a bad signal to the parliament which sets the budget. This mechanism may therefore
actually work to push spending away from the end of the fiscal year towards more even spending.
Furthermore Danny Alexander1.60, a former UK secretary of the treasury, indicated that he was
aware of this argument but did “not believe it is entirely the case”. He cites that even after allowing
for the rolling over of funds, “since 2010 departments have on average underspent by an average
of £5 billion a year”.
UK procurement rules require that all calls for proposals be listed for a minimum period (52,
37 or 15 days depending on the case) before contracts can be awarded UK Government [2006].
End of year spending spikes might be explained by multiple calls for proposals being due before
the end of a fiscal year with poorer quality explained by whether these calls are listed for a shorter
duration due to the proximity of the end of the fiscal year. While this is plausible in the no rollover
case this explanation cannot explain why end of year spending persists with rollover. In this case
departments could save money from one fiscal year to pay for a call for proposal that is due in the
next fiscal year.
Another potential mechanism is the release of some funds (Departmental Unallocated Provisions
(DUPs)) that are typically authorised and available for departments in January. There are a few
1.60Source: Communications with the author
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reasons to believe that this effect would have a minor impact on spending spikes. The first is that
as these funds are awarded by January it would be expected that the effect of these funds would
be realised in February and March. As can be seen in figure 1.1 however March spending is much
greater than February. The second is that these funds are approved as DUPs at the start of the
fiscal year and there exists an expectation that they would be approved for spending if they are
required. In the absence of ambiguity about whether these funds would be approved these funds
would be anticipated and funding more evenly dispersed. The third is that heightened spending
is found in every Northern Irish department not all of which receive additional funding provision
within the fiscal year.
Two further putative explanations can be dismissed as an explanation for end of year spending
spikes. One is a general growth in the demand for and cost of government services as a result
of population growth and inflation. The size of the spending spikes observed is far too large to
be accounted for in this way. The second is measurement error where spikes are exaggerated by
imperfect accrual accounting which tends to record a number of expenditure items in the last
month of the fiscal year. Whilst it is credible that this could occur to some degree the survey
data collected by Liebman and Mahoney [2013], Teich [2013] and McPherson [2007] support the
existence of a spending spike independently of any evidence of substantial measurement error.
Furthermore even if the last month is excluded it can be seen that spending is increasing over the
first 11 months of the fiscal year for both Northern Ireland and the UK central government.
As a final point consider that government spending over time is naturally modelled in economics
as a standard consumption smoothing problem where an agent maximises some utility function
subject to an intertemporal budget constraint. In this framework explanations of end of fiscal year
spending spikes can be modelled as predominantly coming from a feature of the budget constraint
or from the utility function being time dependent. In such a setting precautionary savings can be
seen as being driven by the budget constraint (in the absence of rollover) whilst procrastination
comes about due to a time-dependent feature of the utility function. The allowance of budgetary
rollover in the UK implies a lack of fiscal year distortions which means that a model relying on time-
dependent utility is more credible than budget constraints for modelling end of fiscal year spending.
Procrastination is the most credible explanation that results in utility from spending being time
dependent. There may be other explanations possible however that also predict spending spikes
resulting from time-dependent utility. To a large extent the procrastination model of this paper
would be qualitatively isomorphic to other such explanations.1.61 Thus even if there were some
other time dependent utility force that existed alongside procrastination, the procrastination model
1.61Indeed all proofs of this paper are proved in terms of an arbitrary time-dependent utility function rather than
the specific functional form assumed in the paper.
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is likely to inform useful policy measures to address the problem. Indeed the (simple) proof for
time dependent budgetary taxes only depends on time vriant utility.
Auditing to deter end of fiscal year spending
In this section we examine the use of auditing to achieve even spending using the simple determin-
istic model introduced in section 1.3.1. We first assume there exists a penalty that is incurred by
a department in the event of them being found guilty of poor spending. All spending in the fiscal
year is audited with a continuously differentiable increasing convex function1.62 q(x) which gives
the expected utility loss from audits as a function of spending.1.63 This function indicates that
high spending levels (at low marginal value) increase the chance of being penalised (or the penalty
itself conditional on being caught) in an audit.
Thus the problem of the department becomes:
U = [Dv(x1)− e(x1)−Dq(x1)] + [Dv(x2)−De(x2)−Dq(x2)] (1.F.5)
We can now get the following result:
Proposition 5. Auditing with imperfect monitoring and constant penalties is insufficient to induce
even expenditure
Proof. We can note that the periodic utility is:
ut(xt) = Dv(xt)−Dte(xt)−Dtq(xt) (1.F.6)
where D1 = 1 and D2 = D < 1
This satisfies the conditions (1.A.1), (1.A.2), (1.A.3) and (1.A.4) such that the proof of Propo-
sition 1 is applicable.
The reason that a constant level of auditing does not change the fact that late spending is
relatively more attractive than early spending. To fix this a time variant strategy would be needed
to target late spending and make spending in both periods equally attractive.
Now consider the case where the auditing frequency or penalties increase throughout the year.
Thus there are two q(x) functions where the second period function q2(x) is greater than q1(x) for
all x. This means that for any given spending level the expected utility loss from auditing is higher
1.62Specifically the conditions:
q(0) = 0 q′(0) = 0 q′′(x) > 0 ∀x
1.63This can be thought of as a penalty P for being caught spending poorly multiplied by a function that gives
the probability of being caught as a function of spending, n(x). In this case the expected utility loss from audits is
q(x) = Pn(x).
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in the second period than the first. This relationship between q1(x) and q2(x) will be formalised
as:
q2(x) = ηq1(x) (1.F.7)
for η > 1. With this relationship we get the following proposition.
Proposition 6. There exists η > 1 that is sufficient to induce even spending.
Proof. We have the objective function:
V = u1(x1)−Dq1(x1) + u2(x2)−Dq2(x2) (1.F.8)
We assume u1(x1)−Dq1(x1) and u2(x2)−Dq2(x2) are such that equation 1.A.5 holds.







These are equal at the optimal point:
u′1(x1)−Dq′1(x1) = u′2(x2)−Dq′2(x2) (1.F.11)
Substituting in q′2(x) = ηq
′
1(x) we want to find η such that both sides are equalised when x1 =
x2 = xPar. This solves to get:




This η that induces optimal spending is given by:




By implementing harsher auditing throughout the year spending in later periods can be made
less attractive then it was. A sufficiently harsh second period audit is enough to make spending in
either period equally attractive which neutralises the incentive for departments to defer spending
and leads to a constant level of spending throughout the fiscal year. Note that the parliament
CHAPTER 1. PUTTING IT OFF FOR LATER 73
could induce time variant auditing either through increasing the probability of being caught or
through increasing the penalty from getting caught.
While a time variant auditing strategy can induce even expenditure such a strategy may not
practical in some cases. Variable penalties for the same behaviour throughout the year are unlikely
to be tenable to many governments.1.64 Increasing auditing frequency for end of year spending is
another option but not an attractive one on the basis of cost. By contrast it is likely that time
variant budgetary taxes would be close to costless.
Proof of Proposition 6
We have the objective function:
V = u1(x1)−Dq1(x1) + u2(x2)−Dq2(x2) (1.F.14)
We assume u1(x1)−Dq1(x1) and u2(x2)−Dq2(x2) are such that equation 1.A.5 holds.







These are equal at the optimal point:
u′1(x1)−Dq′1(x1) = u′2(x2)−Dq′2(x2) (1.F.17)
Substituting in q′2(x) = ηq
′
1(x) we want to find η such that both sides are equalised when x1 =
x2 = xPar. This solves to get:




1.G Derivation of optimal tax for calibrated model in deterministic set-
ting
As analytical results are not possible a deterministic approximation was used to give a functional
form for a time variant budgetary tax.
1.64For two departments that make the same infraction (albeit in different periods) it would be inequitable to have
them receive different penalties.
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Where Λ is the shadow price and Di is the discounting i periods into the future. Taking the first




































1.H Social Cost and Optimal Budgeting
We find the social cost (λ) that implies an optimal budget choice of 1. This has the implicit
assumption that the parliament does not choose a budget conditional on departmental savings but
instead choose a stationary budget that maximises long run expected utility.
This is justified by the fact that this data refers to departmental expenditure limits which are
decided upon in four year cycles (although departments still receive annual budgets. See appendix
1.B for a general discussion of this feature of governmental budgeting as well as Northern Ireland
Executive [2008] and Northern Ireland Executive [2011]). In this framework it is not possible
for parliaments to budget conditional on departmental savings accrued within a spending review
period. Parliaments could only budget conditional on long term department savings (accrued
between spending review periods). Thus this is a mild assumption. Aside from being close to
the reality this assumption also offers a large computational advantage as the behaviour of the
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department can be determined independently of the parliament as they are not optimising against
the actions of the other party.
We assume that budgets are chosen to maximise the expected annual surplus without taking





Where B is the budget, S is the state space of departmental savings, µ(Sy) is the measure of each
savings level and E[P (B,Sy)] is the expected production for a department with budget B and





Where E[X(B,Sy)] is expected expenditure for a department with budget B and savings Sy.













It is possible to evaluate this equation using numerical estimates of the gradients ∂Expected Production(B)∂B
and ∂Expected Expenditure(B)∂B
1.I 5% and 10% discounting calibrations
The spending pattern of these four calibrations against the Northern Ireland spending data can
be seen in figure 1.I.1. Note that when the spending averages are considered the two exponential
and the two hyperbolic discounting models appear to lie over the top of each other as changes in δ
compensate for the differing discount factors. On other measures however such as the percentage
gains from a time variant tax the 5% models differ from their corresponding 10% model.
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Figure 1.I.1: The exponential and hyperbolic models calibrated to Northern Ireland departmental
spending data
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5% 10% 5% 10%
Exponential Exponential Quasihyperbolic Quasihyperbolic
Calibrated Parameters
δ 0.993 0.986 0.992 0.984
Ω 0.536 0.523 0.257 0.251
σ 0.010 0.020 0.011 0.022
Discounting
β 0.996 0.992 0.998 0.996
k 1.000 1.000 0.975 0.950
Moments
Shocks Mean 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002
Shocks Standard Deviation 0.011 0.021 0.012 0.023
Final Month Spending Ratio 2.584 2.555 3.554 3.601
RSS 3.139 3.119 0.478 0.457
Log Likelihood 1310.602 1018.531 1281.764 997.181
γ and λ
γ 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95
λ 1.046 1.054 1.047 1.055
No Tax Model
B 1 1 1 1
Average x1 1.4% 1.5% 3.18% 3.2%
Average x12 21.5% 21.3% 29.6% 30.0%
Average Annual Production 1.101 1.101 1.102 1.111
Average Annual Spending 1 1 1 1
Parliament Utility 0.055 0.055 0.055 0.056
Tax Model
B 1.788 1.597 1.752 1.532
Tuning Parameters (∇, Υ) NA NA 0.491, 0.022 0.470, 0.059
Final Month Tax (θ12) 1.049 1.112 1.048 1.112
Average x1 8.98% 9.14% 9.09% 9.45%
Average x12 7.52% 7.45% 9.55% 7.61%
Average Annual Production 1.881 1.665 1.869 1.638
Average Annual Spending 1.747 1.515 1.726 1.487
Parliament Utility 0.064 0.069 0.062 0.070
Perfect Agency
Average Annual Production 1.961 1.823 1.953 1.824
Average Annual Spending 1.781 1.643 1.773 1.643
Parliament Utility 0.098 0.091 0.098 0.091
Gains from tax 16.1% 24.3% 12.6% 25.1%
Maximum possible gain 78.8% 64.3% 76.7% 62.9%
Here the shocks mean and standard deviation refer to the first 2 moments of the implied shocks after they are transformed to the normal
distribution. They should be distributed (0, σ) to match the shock process anticipated by departments in the model. The RSS refers sum of
squared differences between the predicted monthly spending values (from the long term average of simulations) and the average spending from
the data over the fiscal year. This is also summarised in figure 1.3. Note that start month and end month spending amounts are not listed
for the direct parliament case as monthly spending will be even spending in all cases at 8.3%. Utility gains from the tax and from the perfect
agency models are relative to the no tax model. The tax equation formula can be found in equation 1.24 for the exponential models, and in
the associated text for the quasi-hyperbolic models.
Table 1.I.1: All 5% and 10% discounting calibrations
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The impact of shock variance on the calibrated model
The model calibrated in section 1.3.2 includes a stochastic αy,m parameter. While it is counter
intuitive it turns out the stochastic process has the effect of moderating the increase in spending
throughout the year. The reason is that shocks are iid throughout the year which acts to encourage
even spending in order to better exploit beneficial shocks. With rollover being available this
moderating force is greater than any precautionary savings motive that might tend towards an
increasing profile of spending.
This can be seen by examining the spending profile of the four calibrations of table 1.I but
with σ = 0. The outcome of these simulations is plotted in figure 1.I.2. The sharper increase in
spending can be seen by comparing this figure to figure 1.I.1.
CHAPTER 1. PUTTING IT OFF FOR LATER 79
Figure 1.I.2: The exponential and hyperbolic models calibrated to Northern Ireland departmental
spending data
1.J Precautionary Savings model Monte Carlos
A number of Monte Carlos were performed using the calibrated CRRA model of Liebman and
Mahoney [2013]. In this model we have (in the notation of equation 1.15) g(xy,m) =
x1−γ−1
1−γ and
the stochastic parameter is drawn from a log normal distribution αy,m ∼ LN(0, σ2). The calibrated
parameter values are as described in table 1.J.1. In contrast to the procrastination model, Liebman
and Mahoney [2013] have the same production function enter both the department and parliament’s
utility functions, a feature that I replicate here.
Their approach to calibration is to normalise λ to 1 and then endogenously determining the
budget that the parliament (congress) will set by maximising an analogous equation to equation
1.2. Thus the budget was set by:
















Table 1.J.1: Precautionary Savings calibrated parameters
With the parameters of table 1.J.1 the optimal budget comes out to be 15.5.
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Time Variant Budgetary Taxes
Monte Carlos were conducted examining the effectiveness of a time variant budgetary tax in a
precautionary savings model. For these Monte Carlos rollover was not allowed so that welfare
gains from time variant taxes can be seen in isolation.1.65
In contrast to the procrastination case, there is no obvious functional form to choose for the
time variant budgetary tax. As a result an exponential form was chosen with ∇ and Υ being
inserted as tuning parameters to be optimised:1.66
θm =

e∇t t ≤ 11
e∇t + Υ t = 12
(1.J.2)
An optimisation was then performed for the parliament choosing B, ∇ and Υ to maximise their
expected utility:












The outcome of this optimisation is shown in table 1.J.2 and the profile of spending throughout
the year can be seen in figure 1.J.1. Note that one interpretation of the welfare gains associated
with time variant taxes in a precautionary savings is that a parliament can achieve the same level
of production while spending 2% less.
Spending spikes and volatility
Monte Carlos for both models were performed in order to ascertain the relationship between the
two volatility measures (as represented by equations 1.17 and 1.D.1) and the renormalised spending
spike (as defined in equation 1.18). The expected volatility and renormalised spending spike can be
seen in figure 1.J.2. To create this figure Monte Carlo simulations were run for the procrastination
model (as calibrated in section 1.3.2) and the precautionary savings model (as described above)
with varying σ values. Two versions of each model were undertaken with and without rollover.
The σ values that generate a certain volatility and renormalised spending spike (in expectation)
are indicated on the figure by the numbers in black on the endpoints of the line (intermediate
points on the line are generated by intermediate σ values).1.67
First considering the models without rollover in figure 1.J.2. Note that when σ is very low the
procrastination model has a volatility close to zero but with relatively high renormalised spending
spikes (This can be seen in figure 1.J.2). The precautionary savings model on the other hand
1.65See their paper for an analysis of the welfare gains from rollover in their model.
1.66Like in section 1.5.2 no claim can be made that the chosen function form is optimal. It it likely that a more
flexible functional form for taxes could outperform the taxes calibrated here.
1.67The results of only a small number of σ values are shown in the figure for clarity. In preparing the figure many
more were computed however.




Expected Production in Year 18.8
Expected Expenditure in Year 15.5
Parliament Utility 3.34





Spending Ratio (m=1) 0.986
Spending Ratio (m=11) 1.02
Spending Ratio (m=12) 1.175
Expected Production in Year 18.8
Expected Expenditure in Year 15.2
Parliament Utility 3.76
Gains relative to no tax 12.4%
Perfect Agency
Expected Production in Year 19.5
Expected Expenditure in Year 14.1
Parliamentary Utility 5.38
Gains relative to no tax 61.1%
Table 1.J.2: Time-variant budgetary taxes in a Precautionary Savings model
exhibits completely flat spending in the absence of shocks and hence the volatility is close to
zero while the renormalised spending spike is around 16 . As σ increases volatility increases for
both models. The difference is the change in the renormalised spending spike. It falls for the
procrastination model reflecting smoother spending in the last months of the fiscal year so that the
department can better exploit iid shocks. On the other hand it rises for the precautionary savings
model as departments hedge against the volatility by holding a greater amount of precautionary
savings that they then expend in the last month of the fiscal year.
For the models where rollover is allowed the procrastination model displays very similar be-
haviour to the no rollover case. On the other hand the precaution model shows no relationship
between volatility and the renormalised spending spike as spending is flat across the fiscal year
regardless of the variance of the shock process.
Spending spikes and volatility - in small samples
Now that the expected relationships between volatility and the normalised spending spikes have
been ascertained, we look at what relationships should be able to be witnessed in a small sample
such as that provided by the NI departmental dataset. We take the case where no rollover is
allowed.1.68 This will be done by sampling σ values from a uniform distribution in the range
1.68This is a fiction for the case of Northern Ireland but is the only way to generate spending spikes with the
precaution model. This is done as the goal of this exercise is to find alternate evidence for the cause of spending
spikes (aside from rollover).
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Figure 1.J.1: Time-variant budgetary taxes in a precautionary savings model
Figure 1.J.2: Expected renormalised spending spike and renormalised volatility in the two models.
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[0, 0.0059] for the procrastination model and in the range [0, 2.6] for the precautionary savings
model. These ranges were chosen as from the top left panel of figure 1.J.2 they generate expected
volatilities in the range [0, 1] which is the range of most of the volatilities in the data as can
be seen in figure 1.D.1.1.69 Twelve departmental σ values are then sampled from each uniform
distribution and 5 years worth of simulated spending is taken for each department.1.70 Volatilities
and renormalised spikes are found for each department-year and these 60 observations are used to
estimate:
Renormalised Spiked,t = β0 + β1Volatilityd,t + εd,t (1.J.4)
No fixed effects were used reflecting the lack of time invariant heterogeneity in the Monte Carlo’s
data generation process (with the exception of different σ values, the effect of which should be
accounted for by the volatility metric). No distinction is made in this Monte Carlo between current
and capital expenditure (as is the case in both models). This procedure was done repeatedly so that
the distribution of β1 that would be expected if the true data generation process is procrastination
or precautionary savings could be found. Two versions were performed, one where shocks were
completely non correlated and one where they were perfectly correlated although of potentially
different variance.1.71
The t-stat from the estimation of β1 that were taken were taken and can be seen in figure
1.J.3. This figure also marks the smallest magnitude t-stat from table 1.2 of −2.48. This provides
a suggestive indication that the t-stats from this table are unlikely to be generated from a sample
generated by the precautionary savings model but are relatively likely to be generated by the
procrastination model.
1.69This assumption of a uniform distribution and the chosen endpoints are admittedly arbitrary, but it is likely
that this exercise will be useful in giving a general idea of the t-stats and β estimates that would be expected from
a finite sample of data generated from the two models.
1.70For these simulations the calibrated parameter values are used for each model with the exception of the shock
variance for each model which is sampled as discussed. The shock
1.71Specifically a set of quasi-random values were generated from the uniform distribution on [0, 1]. Shocks were
then found by putting these uniform quasi-random values into the inverse log normal cdfs for each department’s
σ value. Putting this mathematically for each ε drawn from UD[0, 1], a corresponding shock was then found from
α = F−1(ε, 0, σ) where F−1 is the inverse log normal cdf with mean 0 and variance σ and ε is the input to this
inverse cdf.
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Abstract: In markets where firms sell similar goods to their competitors, firms may be able
to free-ride off the costly price signalling of competitor firms by engaging in price comparative
advertising. As the goods are similar, consumers can reason that if one good is high quality
(revealed through price signalling) then so is the other. This paper models this phenomenon and
finds that in equilibrium there will be firms price signalling as well as freeriding firms that signal
through price comparative advertising. Welfare is strictly higher in markets where advertising
firms are active relative to pure price signalling markets. In some cases advertising markets can be
even more efficient than full information markets as advertisers surrender market power to avoid
costly price signalling.2.1
JEL Codes: D43, D82, D83, M37
Keywords: Comparative advertising, Price Signalling
2.1 Introduction
In many markets firms have more information regarding the quality of their goods than potential
consumers. As a result firms with high quality goods can signal the true quality of their goods
to consumers with prices and warranties being common instruments for this. In many of these
markets some of this uncertainty is common to goods offered by different firms. An example is cable
television where two providers may offer sets of channels with substantial overlap. An alternate
example is package holidays where the utility from holidays to the same location from different but
similar tour companies are likely to be similar. In instances like this it may be possible for firms
to earn greater profits from free-riding on the costly signalling of other firms.
2.1For useful discussions I would like to thank Philipp Kircher, Ludo Visschers, Jan Eeckhout, Margaryta Klymak,
Régis Renault, Sandro Shelegia, Alessandro Spiganti and Ina Taneva. The author was visiting at Universitat Pompeu
Fabra for part of the writing of this article. This work was supported by the ESRC postgraduate funding scheme.
Notwithstanding any advice I have received any errors here are my own.
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This paper investigates the potential for firms to engage in this kind of signal free-riding through
comparative advertising. Comparative advertising occurs when a firm advertises by contrasting
the price and features of its good as compared to those of rival firms. In the previous economic
literature comparative advertising has been seen as directly informing consumers of the difference
in vertical quality between two goods [Barigozzi et al., 2009] or of the difference in horizontal
(seller specific) match utility a consumer would get if he bought a good from a competing firm
as compared to buying from the advertising firm [Anderson and Renault, 2009]. The role of the
disclosure of the prices of rivals in this context has received less attention.2.2
There are many examples of comparative advertising however where the disclosure of price
information is a major part of the message. A basic example is offered in the advertisements of
Progressive Direct, an American auto insurance company that gives prospective consumers the
prices offered by competitors for comparable insurance plans [Yu, 2013]. They also air advertise-
ments promising “we compare our direct rates side by side to find you a great deal, even if its not
with us”. Three, a major UK phone carrier, similarly advertisers with a webpage that asks shop-
pers on their website to “see how our prices compare” with a price comparison of Three against
the prices of all of the other major phone carriers in the market [Three Mobile, 2016]. The online
travel agent Skyscanner allows visitors to automatically replicate their flight searches on compet-
ing services such as Expedia and eDreams. Another example is provided by Book Depository, a
leading UK online bookseller [Charlton, 2009] which for every product sold presented a link to the
corresponding Amazon page for that item.2.3
This paper examines a vertically differentiated market in which consumers cannot directly
observe the quality of goods. In such a market when high quality firms have higher costs, there is a
literature that shows these firms can separate themselves from low quality firms by proposing a high
price, often above the monopoly price they would charge if their quality were known. This is called
in the literature “price signalling” as the price transmits information about the underlying quality
of the good. The problem for high quality firms in such markets is that the high price that enables
signalling may result in lower profits than would be available by pricing at the (lower) monopoly
price in a full information setting. In this setting we show that price comparative advertising has a
clear role: By showing an identical product from a rival firm at a high price, a firm can signal to its
customers that its product must also be of high quality, even if the firm itself does not charge such
a high price. In doing so a firm may be able to increases profits by pricing closer to its monopoly
2.2To the best of my knowledge this is the first paper to examine the informational content of prices as a component
of comparative advertising or the firm strategy of providing competitor prices to their consumers more generally.
2.3A further example is provided by Amazon itself which has a marketplace which allows competitors to compete
against Amazon on Amazon’s website. Amazon also receives a portion of the revenues from these external sellers
on their website. Whilst these revenues no doubt play some role in Amazon’s decision to operate this marketplace
it is also true that this allows Amazon customers to compare Amazon’s prices with other vendors.
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price and freeriding on the rival firm’s price signal.2.4
Clearly the logic of this argument does not immediately carry over to equilibrium behaviour. If
all firms revert to pricing at the lower level rather than price signalling, free-riding possibilities may
be lost. One of the questions in this paper is whether this simple logic extends in some form to an
equilibrium setting. Indeed, only some insights of the previous setting carry over once equilibrium
forces come into play. In equilibrium there will be firms that engage in price comparative adver-
tising and firms that remain pricing at the signalling level. The advertising firms face increased
price competition from the firms they advertise against and thus many will price at levels below
the monopoly price. Thus while in normal price signalling markets asymmetric information has
the effect of increasing prices, the equilibrium exhibiting price comparative advertising will have
some firms pricing above and some below the monopoly level. Total welfare is improved by price
comparative advertising relative to the asymmetric information equilibrium where no advertising is
allowed. Firms do not earn higher profits however due to this additional price competition and the
additional surplus is all accrued by consumers through lower prices. In some cases the welfare of
an asymmetric information market with price comparative advertising can be greater than under
full information as firms surrender market power in order to achieve more efficient signalling.
A number of extensions of the basic model are examined. When there is heterogeneity in
marginal costs among high quality firms I find the intuitive result that it will be the lower cost
firms that will be pricing lower while engaging in price comparative advertising. This result suggest
another avenue through which price comparative advertising increases welfare as high price (and
higher cost) advertisers lose sale quantity to low price (and lower cost) advertisers. An alternate
extension is the special case where all high quality firms source their goods from a monopoly
supplier.2.5 Here it was found that the possibility of advertising can induce the monopoly supplier
to reduce the price they charge reselling firms in the hope of increasing the quantity they sell. These
extensions all point to increased welfare from the use of price comparative advertising. These results
on welfare are considerably more positive for comparative advertising than the previous literature
that examined the comparative advertising of product attributes and found that total welfare could
be decreased when there was a large vertical quality difference between rival firms [Anderson and
Renault, 2009].
Comparative advertising used to be relatively uncommon in developed countries but was le-
galised in the United States and Europe in 1979 [Federal Trade Commission, 1979] and 1997
[Council of European Union, 1997] respectively. Elsewhere in the world however comparative ad-
2.4The analogue in the traditional Spence [1973] signalling model of the labour market is that an uneducated
worker goes to a firm with his educated identical twin. As both individuals are identical and this is observable the
firm will reason that if one sibling is educated and has a high capability then so does the other.
2.5For instance there is a monopoly supplier of Samsung smartphones and Iron Maiden albums.
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vertising is still subject to restrictions. In China and Hong Kong it is banned while in Japan it
is allowed but seldom used due to it being perceived as impolite by Japanese consumers [Singh,
2014]. While comparative advertising has recently been legalised in Turkey [Gürkaynak et al.,
2015] it remains banned in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. In other countries such as Qatar the situa-
tion surrounding comparative advertising is simply ambiguous with no regulations or case law to
determine its legality [Bradley, 2014]. The policy implications of this paper are clear: comparative
advertising delivers lower prices to consumers, is welfare improving and should be supported and
encouraged by governments and regulators.
This paper first provides an outline of the surrounding literature in section 2.2. The model is
then presented in section 2.3 with welfare implications examined in section 2.4 and model extensions
in section 2.5 before section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
This paper has strong links to two key literatures: the price signalling literature and the literature
on comparative advertising.2.6 In addition this paper is related to the marketing literature on
reference pricing as well as recent work on search deterrence.
An early paper to examine the economic consequences of consumers judging quality by price
is that of Scitovszky [1944]. Since that time, the advent of signalling theory has led to a num-
ber of papers applying price signalling to markets with imperfect information regarding product
quality. A common mechanism for signalling is to have higher quality firms producing at a higher
marginal cost than lower quality firms [Wolinsky, 1983, Bagwell and Riordan, 1991, Daughety and
Reinganum, 2008]. In this way high quality firms have a higher optimal price than low quality
firms which makes it comparatively less expensive for them to charge a high price, thus allowing
signalling. This paper will use this feature of marginal cost increasing in product quality to model
a market exhibiting price signalling.
Moving onto the comparative advertising literature, Barigozzi et al. [2009] argue that firms
engage in comparative advertising as a means of signalling the vertical quality of their good. By
directly informing consumers of the vertical quality of their good compared to a competitor’s good
the firm opens itself up to litigation expenses if claims made about the comparison of goods are
unreasonable. Only a firm with a high quality good would engage in this practice as low quality
firms would face a high expected loss from litigation. In this way comparative advertising serves
as a signal for good quality as well as a vehicle for direct disclosure of quality. While they do not
consider the impact of comparative advertising on total welfare they conclude that it should be
2.6The comparative advertising literature can further be considered a branch of the informative advertising liter-
ature. See Renault [2016] for a survey.
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supported by regulators as it allows easier market access for new entrants. The authors note that
this mechanism for comparative advertising is reliant on an effective court system which suggests
comparative advertising would be less effective in countries with weaker institutions.
Another comparative advertising paper is that of Anderson and Renault [2009] who examine a
duopolistic market where each firm sells a horizontally and vertically differentiated good. Vertical
quality is readily apparent to consumers and so advertising focuses on horizontal differentiation
rather than signalling vertical quality. Firms can engage in advertising by disclosing the match
utility a consumer would get with their firm or comparative advertising by disclosing the match
utility a consumer would get from both firms. They find that in cases where there is a small
difference in vertical quality both firms will engage in advertising of their own match utility to
benefit from the higher price generated by additional product differentiation. When there is a large
quality differential however weaker firms will generally be the firms using comparative advertising
to disclose both matches in order to increase their demand. They find in this setting that consumers
and lower quality firms are better off when comparative advertising is allowed. So much damage
is done to the higher quality firm profits however that total welfare falls as a result of comparative
advertising. Related ideas are examined by Koessler and Renault [2012] and Celik [2014] who look
at the conditions under which disclosure of quality attributes will occur.
This paper is different from the previous literature on comparative advertising in that it is the
disclosure of prices of competitor firms rather than the direct disclosure of horizontal or vertical
product attributes that is important. Indeed to highlight this channel, the model I present will
exhibit firms advertising against competing firms offering identical products with no horizontal
differentiation existing.2.7 Before introducing this model however I will briefly mention two other
literatures that are related to this paper.
The reference pricing strand of the marketing literature is related to the notion of price sig-
nalling. An example of reference pricing is a $200 price crossed out and replaced with “$100 for
a limited time only!”. The idea is that this $200 is suggestive of the quality of the good however
the key problem with this strategy is credibility [Grewal and Compeau, 2002, Compeau et al.,
2002, Kan et al., 2013]. Consumers will often doubt that the reference price is ever charged or is
representative of the quality of the item. While this paper uses an economic signalling approach,
its message might otherwise be motivated by external offers providing credible reference prices to
consumers.
Finally the mechanism described by this paper represents an interesting contrast to the mech-
anism described by Armstrong and Zhou [2015] in a paper on search deterrence. That paper has
2.7Of course in the real world firms may advertise against competing products that are differentiated but share
some common value component. In this case it is likely that comparative advertising plays the price-comparative
role outlined in this paper along other roles of comparative advertising explored in the literature.
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a model where a shopper is presented with a good of known quality but has an unknown outside
option. It is shown that where possible a seller can increase profits by committing to an exploding
offer where the consumer has to buy before seeing the outside option. This is in contrast to the
current paper where the additional external information can efficiently signal the quality of the
current good and thereby increase seller profits. When the good is high quality, this provision of
information is good for the selling firm as they can freeride on the price signalling of other firms.
2.3 The Model
There is a high quality good and a low quality good in the market each of which is sold by a unit
mass of firms. The quality of a good is observable to firms but not to consumers. Firms selling
low quality goods have a marginal cost of cL while firms selling high quality goods have a higher
marginal cost of cH with cH > cL. A fraction λ of firms sell high quality goods.
There is a unit mass of consumers, each of whom gets a utility equal to Q−Pf for buying good
Q ∈ {H,L} from firm f at price Pf . Consumers have a heterogeneous outside option denoted by
Ωk for customer k. This outside option is logconcave distributed with a pdf denoted γ(Ω) and cdf
denoted Γ(Ω).
The timing of this singleshot game is as follows. A firm is approached by one random consumer.
The firm offers that consumer a price and the consumer can either buy at that price or leave the
firm in favour of their outside option. Denoting the consumer’s perceived quality level by Q̂, the
condition for a consumer to buy is:
Q̂− Pf ≥ Ωk (2.1)
Thus the maximum Ωk consumer that will buy the good will have an Ωk value of Q̂−Pf and hence
from the firm’s perspective the probability of a sale is given by Γ(Q̂− Pf ).
Signalling equilibria are refined by the intuitive criterion [Cho and Kreps, 1987]. Beliefs are
formalised by a function µ(P ) that gives the believed probability of a good being high quality given
a price of P . Finally as this paper examines the potential use of price comparative advertising2.8
as a signalling tool alongside price signalling, I will consider only fully separating equilibria.
2.3.1 Separating Equilibrium without price comparative advertising
In this section the fully separating equilibrium for this basic model lacking price comparative
advertising will be examined. First defining the equilibrium concept:
2.8To be defined in terms of the model in section 2.3.2.
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Definition 1 PBNE (without advertising). A pure strategy Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
(PBNE) in this model without advertising will be described by low and high firm pricing strategies
PL, PH as well as a belief function µ(P ), such that:
πL(PL) ≥ πL(P ) ∀ P ∈ <+ (2.1)
πH(PH) ≥ πH(P ) ∀ P ∈ <+ (2.2)
and the belief function µ(P ) is derived in accordance with bayes rule and player strategies for all
prices charged with positive probability in equilibrium.
As in a standard price signalling separating equilibrium we get the result that firms selling low
quality goods will price at their monopoly price (to be denoted PL) which maximises their profit:
PL = arg max
P∈<+
(P − cL)Γ(L− P ) (2.3)
With the corresponding profit being denoted πML = (PL − cL)Γ(L − PL). The prices that high
quality firms can charge to differentiate themselves from the low quality firms are those prices P ∗
that satisfy:
πML ≥ (P ∗ − cL)Γ(H − P ∗) (2.4)
The price which makes this expression bind with equality (The Riley [1979] price) is denoted by
PS . With the intuitive criterion applied beliefs will satisfy µ(PS) = 1. A natural way to extend
these beliefs over all prices is thus:
µ(P ) =

1 P ≥ PS
0 P < PS
(2.5)
In any fully seperating equilibrium, high quality firms will charge the maximum of PS or the high
firm’s monopoly price (which will be denoted PMH ) which maximises their profit in the absence of
asymmetric information:
PMH = arg max
P∈<+
(P − cH)Γ(H − P ) (2.6)
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With the corresponding profit being denoted πMH = (P
M
H − cH)Γ(H−PMH ). Henceforth we assume
that this market is one where price signalling is costly and hence PMH < P
S . The profit of the high
firm when signalling is denoted by πSH and can be expressed as:
πSH = (P
S − cH)Γ(H − PS) < πMH (2.7)
To restrict attention to separating equilibria we assume that high firms prefer signalling to being
mistaken for low firms. This condition is
πSH > (P − cH)Γ(L− P ) ∀ P ∈ <+ (2.8)
Finally we can show that PMH > PL by first obtaining an expression for the optimal monopolist
price from first order conditions of π(P ) = (P − cQ)Γ(Q− P ). This results in:




As Γ(x) is logconcave there is a well-defined solution to this problem and Γ(x)γ(x) is a monotonically
increasing function [Bagnoli and Bergstrom, 2005]. From this we can see that the solution price is
increasing in cost and in perceived quality. Hence we will always have PMH > PL.
Proposition 1. Without the possibility of advertising, a PBNE exists where L and H firms price
at PL and P
S respectively and consumer belief formation is as per equation 2.5.
Proof. Equations 2.3, 2.4 and 2.8 ensure that high and low firms cannot get higher profits from
deviating. The belief function described in equation 2.5 is consistent with this equilibrium.
The prices charged and profits earned by each firm in equilibrium along with the high firm full
information profits (that are unattainable under asymmetric information) are shown in figure 2.1.
2.3.2 Separating Equilibrium with price comparative advertising
In this section firms are allowed to engage in price comparative advertising at no cost. As mo-
tivation for this, consider that a high quality firm deviates from the no advertising signalling
equilibrium described in the preceding section. They charge the monopolist price PMH . At this
price however the consumer cannot tell if the good is of high or low quality. The firm can show
the offer of another firm offering this same (high quality) good. This other price will be PS as all
other firms selling the high quality good charge this price. The consumer knows that both goods
are the same and so will be convinced that the good is high quality after seeing this other price.
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Figure 2.1: Profits in the no advertising fully separating equilibrium
The firm will earn πMH > π
S
H and hence this is a profitable deviation. This section considers how
the possibility of this profitable deviation changes the equilibrium outlined in proposition 1.
It is assumed that when the consumer enters the market and meets a firm, that firm can
costlessly show the consumer an offer from a competing firm that sells the same good.2.9 As
both offers concern the same good if one is high quality then so is the other. Henceforth the term
advertiser will be used to describe a firm that provides an external offer. Firms that do not provide
an external offer will be referred to as non-advertisers.
The assumed timing is that each firm decides on their own price and whether or not to show a
competitors price simultaneously. A key assumption is made that advertising is undirected - firms
cannot condition their advertising on the price offered by the firm they advertise against. This
assumption can be simply motivated by considering firms to commit separately and simultaneously
to their strategy of prices and advertising.2.10
For simplicity an advertising firm only shows one price from an external firm. A consumer
2.9There is an assumption here prohibiting a high/low firm from showing an offer from a low/high firm. This
can be justified by the presence of many goods in the real world (while in the model there is one high and one low
quality good). Thus a consumer shown an unrelated good cannot use this information to infer information about
the good at hand and there is no incentive for firms to show these unrelated goods to the consumer.
2.10This assumption of undirected price comparison seems to be a good representation of progressive direct; three;
skyscanner and book depository from the introduction.
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observes a price from the external firm but not the advertising strategy of this external firm. A
consumer at this point can decide to buy from either the advertising firm or the external firm (at
no extra cost). The tie-breaking rule is adopted that when both firms price at an equal amount is
that it is assumed that the consumer will buy from each with 50% probability.
The beliefs of a consumer who has seen one price will be represented by the function µ(P )
while the beliefs of consumer who has been shown two prices will be given by a function taking
two arguments, µ(P, PE). The convention will be maintained that the first price is that of the
advertising firm and the second price is the price from an external firm. This paper will examine
a fully separating mixed pricing PBNE. The equilibrium price domain of type Q ∈ {L,H} firms
with strategy s ∈ {A,N} for advertising and non-advertising will be denoted by the set DQ,s.
Definition 2 PBNE (with advertising). A fully separating PBNE in this model with advertising
will be described by pricing strategies and equilibrium profits denoted π̂L, π̂H , such that:
πH,N (P ) = π̂H ≥ πH,N (P ′) ∀ P ∈ DH,N , P ′ ∈ <+ \DH,N (2.1)
πH,A(P ) = π̂H ≥ πH,A(P ′) ∀ P ∈ DH,A, P ′ ∈ <+ \DH,A (2.2)
πL,N (P ) = π̂L ≥ πL,N (P ′) ∀ P ∈ DL,N , P ′ ∈ <+ \DL,N (2.3)
πL,A(P ) = π̂L ≥ πL,A(P ′) ∀ P ∈ DL,A, P ′ ∈ <+ \DL,A (2.4)
The belief functions µ(P ), µ(P, PE) are in accordance with the intuitive criterion, Bayes rule and
player strategies for all information sets reached with positive probability in equilibrium.
The logic behind simple price signalling for a firm that does not advertise still applies and hence
µ(P ) will be as set in equation 2.5. Beliefs when advertising is undertaken shall be in accordance
with Bayes rule at all points within the domain of prices charged in equilibrium. Thus:
µ(PA, PE) =
λProb.(PA, PE |Good is H)
λProb.(PA, PE |Good is H) + (1− λ)Prob.(PA, PE |Good is L)
(2.5)
As we are restricting attention to fully separating equilibria we restriction attention to the case
where there is no price point PS > P > PL that is charged by a positive mass of high firms and
low firms.
Lemma 1. In any fully separating equilibrium, no low firms offer a price P > PL.
Proof. We can first show there will be no advertisers pricing above PL. Consider a putative
equilibrium where there were advertisers pricing above PL with price dispersion. The highest
pricing advertiser would make no sales and be better off monopolising at PL.
Consider a putative equilibria where there are low quality advertisers at a masspoint above PL.
As there are no high firms at this price (by the restriction to fully separating equilibria), these
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firms will be seen as being of low quality. Hence beliefs cannot worsen from undercutting and there
is a profitable deviation for a firm to undercut this masspoint. For low firms that do not advertise,
as pricing at PL dominates pricing higher given the beliefs in equation 2.5 there will be no low
firms pricing above PL either.
This lemma makes it possible for a high firm to signal high quality by advertising whilst pricing
at less than PS but more than PL. This leads to the first proposition which states that in any
equilibrium there will exist advertising firms.
Proposition 2. In any equilibrium there will be a positive mass of high firm advertisers.
Proof. In the event of all mass of high firms being non-advertisers at PS , consider a high firm’s
option of deviating to price at PMH and advertising against another firm selling the same good.
If the customer accepted this firm was high quality the deviating firm would be better off. By
contrast a low firm attempting to emulate high quality by doing the same would be worse off
even if they were believed to be high quality as they would lose the sale to another low firm
(that would be pricing at PL). Thus this is a profitable deviation as the high firm could use the
intuitive criterion to price closer to their monopoly price whilst convincing consumers of their high
quality. As this profitable deviation remains whilst there is a zero measure of advertisers we get
the proposition.
One implication of this proposition is that the equilibrium described in Proposition 1 is no
longer an equilibrium where advertising is allowed. Whilst beliefs of µ(P, PE) = 0∀P, PE could
support this equilibrium such beliefs would not be supported by the intuitive criterion.
Lemma 2. At all prices P > PL, the equilibrium price distributions of high quality advertisers is
atomless.
Proof. If there were an atom at a price exceeding marginal cost then one of those firms could
undercut the others. With a similar intuitive criterion argument as presented in the proof of
proposition 2, the undercutting firm could convince consumers of their high quality and hence
could get a discontinuous jump in expected profits. If there were an atom at a price equal to
marginal cost [Bertrand, 1883] then profits are zero and the firms at this price would be better off
monopolising to earn πSH .
This lemma is similar in spirit to Varian [1980, Proposition 3] or Stahl [1989, Lemma 1] and
reflects the fact that if there were a mass of firms offering a certain price then one of those firms
could get a discontinuous jump in expected profits by undercutting the others. Note that non-
advertisering firms are monopolists and hence there is no similar restriction on mass points in the
pricing distribution of these firms. This lemma is truncated to prices above PL to reflect the pos-
sibility of adverse beliefs for advertisers pricing at or below PL which would prevent undercutting.
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We have now established that no low firms will price above PL. The next two lemmas show
that all low firms will in fact not be advertising and will be charging a price of PL.
Lemma 3. If the equilibrium price distribution of high firm advertisers is atomless at prices
P ≤ PL then in equilibrium there will be a mass of non-advertising low firms offering a price of
PL.
Proof. For low firms that do not advertise, Pricing at PL dominates any other price.
If all firms were advertising with price dispersion the firm with the highest price would get no
profit and hence would be better off not advertising whilst setting a price of PL. If all low firms
were advertising at a certain price less than PL then from equation 2.5 (and the lack of high firm
masspoints below PL) they would be considered low quality and would be better off not advertising
at a price of PL.
Lemma 4. If the equilibrium price distribution of high firm advertisers is atomless at prices
P ≤ PL then in equilibrium all low firm will be non-advertisers at a price of PL.
Proof. Lemma 1 shows that no low firm will price at P > PL and not-advertising at PL dominates
not-advertising at any other price. Thus it suffices to show no low firms will advertise at any
price P ≤ PL. Considering the possibility of advertising at a price P ≤ PL the possible price
distributions are a continuous distribution of prices, a masspoint of low firm advertisers at certain
discrete prices or a distribution with both of these features. We shall show that these distributions
are not sustainable in equilibrium.
We can first show that no low firm advertiser masspoints can survive in equilibrium at prices
less than PL. If there were an advertiser masspoint at a price P < PL then from equation 2.5 (and
the lack of high firm masspoints below PL) they would be considered low quality and would earn
strictly higher profits undercutting other firms in this masspoint. Thus no masspoints of low firm
advertisers can survive in equilibrium.
Now consider a putative equilibria where there is no atom of high firm advertisers at PL but a
mass of low firm non-advertisers at PL (as per lemma 3) and a distribution of low firm advertisers
on the domain [P̄ , P ] with PL ≥ P̄ > P . The total mass of low firm advertisers is some number
0 < ∇ < 1. Consider the advertiser pricing at P̄ . It matches with a firm pricing at PL with
probability (1−∇) and matches with another (lower priced) advertiser with probability ∇. When
PA = P̄ , PE = PL are subbed into the beliefs equation 2.5 the numerator of this expression
P (P̄ , PL|Good is H) will be zero as there is no mass of high firms charging PL. The denominator
is nonzero as there is a mass of low firms offering this price. Thus the advertiser at P̄ is recognised
as being low quality and earns:
πL,A(P̄ ) = (1−∇)P̄Γ(L− P̄ ) < πL,M (PL) (2.6)
Thus the advertiser would be strictly better off being a non-advertiser at PL.
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In addition note that due to the assumed tiebreaking rule an advertiser at PL is worse off than a
non-advertiser at the same price. Thus if the equilibrium price distribution of high firm advertisers
is atomless at a price P ≤ PL there can be no low firm advertisers in equilibrium.
We have now established that if the equilibrium price distribution of high firm advertisers is
atomless at a price P ≤ PL then all low firms will not advertise while setting a price of PL. We
can now shift attention to examining the behaviour of high firms. Assuming an atomless high firm
pricing distribution, As no low firm will ever price at a price other than PL high firms will be
able to use the intuitive criterion to price at any level that represents a profitable deviation for
them and still be recognised as high quality. We can thus write the profit function for high firm
advertisers when the price distribution of high firm advertisers is atomless:
πH, Advertiser(P ) = (P − cH)Γ(H − P ) [(1− η) + ηG(P ) + ηG(P )] (2.7)
Where G(P ) is the survival function of the prices charged by high quality advertisers and η is
the proportion of high quality advertisers. The terms in the square brackets account for the
probabilities of matching with a non-advertiser, matching with an advertiser and an external
advertiser matching with the firm respectively.
Now denoting g(P ) to be the pdf of the advertiser price distribution (which is defined when
the advertiser pricing distribution is atomless) we can show that the pricing distribution of high
firms will be gapless:
Lemma 5. If the equilibrium price distribution of high firm advertisers is atomless then there are
no equilibria exhibiting gaps of positive measure in the price distribution of advertising high firms.




Proof. Note from Lemma 4 that atomlessness in equilibrium implies low firms never advertise and
an advertiser will always be recognised as high quality. Consider the case if such a gap did form
between prices P and P + ε with ε > 0. Consider in particular the firm pricing at P . This firm
could increase its price to P + ε which would increase (P − cH)Γ(H − P ) whilst not changing
[(1− η) + ηG(P ) + ηG(P )]. Thus there is a profitable deviation.
We can now find that there will be high firm non-advertisers and in equilibrium all high firms
will earn the same profits they would make price signalling at PS . Intuitively this occurs because
the possibility of not advertising while charging PS puts a lower bound on how much Bertrand
competition among advertisers can reduce their profits.
Lemma 6. If the equilibrium price distribution of high firm advertisers is atomless then there is
a positive mass of high firms selling at the signalling price PS and not providing additional offers
to consumers.
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Proof. If all mass of high firms were advertising in an atomless distribution then the top pricing
firm would make no profits and be strictly better off offering a price of PS without advertising.
Corollary 7. If the equilibrium price distribution of high firm advertisers is atomless then in
equilibrium all high firms earn profits of πSH .
Proof. Immediate from lemma 6, proposition 2 and definition 2.
We can now use the profit function from equation 2.7 and the equilibrium profit from Corollary
7 to find the domain of high firm advertiser pricing and the proportion of advertisers.
Lemma 8. If the equilibrium price distribution of high firm advertisers is atomless, The bottom
pricing advertiser will charge PB where PB is the solution to:




Proof. Substituting equilibrium profit and that for the bottom pricing firm G(PB) = 1 into equa-
tion 2.7 yields this expression.
Lemma 9. If the equilibrium price distribution of high firm advertisers is atomless then the top
pricing advertiser will charge PMH .
Proof. This comes from equation 2.7. In the event the top pricing firm had a price less than PMH
they could raise their price and increase (P − cH)Γ(H − P ) whilst the fraction lost to other firms
[(1− η) + 2ηG(P )] stayed the same.
Lemma 10. If the equilibrium price distribution of high firms is atomless, the proportion of ad-
vertising firms in equilibrium is:





Proof. To see this consider equation 2.7 for the advertiser offering a price of PMH . As G(P
M
H ) = 0,
their profit is πMH (1 − η) which from lemma 7 must be equal to πSH in expectation for a firm to
price at this level. The lemma follows immediately from this equality.
Now now split the analysis into two different cases. The first is where PB > PL and hence the
atomlessness of the high firm advertiser pricing distribution is assured from lemma 2. The second
is the complementary case where atomlessness is not assured.
Case A: PB > PL
From Lemma 8 all high firm advertisers will price at least at PB > PL. Thus from lemma 2 the
advertiser price distribution will be atomless and all of the preceding results are applicable.
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Proposition 3. There will exist a PBNE for this game. All low firms will price at PL and earn
πL = (PL−cL)Γ(L−PL) whilst all high firms will earn πSH as defined by equation 2.7. A proportion





Γ(H − P )− (P − cH)γ(H − P )
(P − cH)2Γ(H − P )2
]
PB ≤ P ≤ PMH (2.10)
A proportion 1− η of high firms will not advertise and will set a price of PS.
Beliefs in this PBNE will satisfy:
µ(P ) =
1 P ≥ P
S
0 P < PS
µ(P, PE) =
1 for P > PL and ∀PE0 for P ≤ PL and ∀PE
Proof. This pricing distribution can be obtained by noting that in equilibrium the price distribution
G(P ) must satisfy:
(P − cH)Γ(H − P ) [1− η + 2ηG(P )] = πSH
[1− η + 2ηG(P )] = π
S
H






(P − cH)Γ(H − P )
− 1 + η
]
PB ≤ P ≤ PMH
(2.11)
The associated pdf can be found by differentiating the survival function and multiplying by negative
one. Equation 2.11 is a valid survival function being decreasing in price with endpoints of G(PMH ) =
0 and G(PB) = 1, thus this price distribution is feasible.
These beliefs will be satisfied in this equilibria as all high firms price at more than PL and all
low firms price at PL. There is no profitable deviations for high firms who earn π
S
H at any point in
the pricing domain and cannot earn higher profits outside this domain. Likewise low firms cannot
profitably deviate.
From its construction we can note that the equilibrium pricing distribution in proposition 3
is unique in the class of fully separating equilibria.2.11 This equilibrium can be seen in figure 2.1
where the advertising support line shows the prices and corresponding sale quantities of advertising
firms. At prices close to PHM the advertising support line sits beneath the high firm demand curve,
Γ(H − P ), as they lose a share of their customers to the firms they advertise against. At lower
prices it sits above the non-advertiser demand curve as they retain most of their customers and also
2.11Although this equilibrium pricing distribution could be sustained by different out of equilibrium beliefs.
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gain customers from competing advertising firms. While the advertisers at PMH retain a proportion
of 1 − η of the firms they encounter, those pricing closer to cH retain or win a greater total
proportion of 1 + η firms. This demonstrates the demand shifting taking place with the lowest
pricing advertisers selling (1+η)Γ(H−PB)
(1−η)Γ(H−PMH )
times more goods than the highest pricing advertiser. All
advertisers earn the same equilibrium profits however with expected profit the same as for the
price signalling non-advertiser firms.
Figure 2.1: Equilibrium with advertising
Case B: PB ≤ PL
Considering the case when PB < PL is more problematic as lemma 2 cannot be used to obtain
atomlessness of the pricing distribution. The equilibrium explored in this section will be one
where the price distribution of high firms is guessed to be atomless at all prices (this guess will
be verified later on). As a result of this however no claim can be made as to the uniqueness of
the resulting equilibrium among the class of fully separating equilibria. Note that this assumption
of atomlessness at any price is sufficient such that all of the previous supporting lemmas hold.
In particular this conjecture results in an equilibrium closely related to the equilibrium expressed
in proposition 3. This equilibrium will have the same functions to describe firm pricing decisions
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however PL is cut out of this distribution
Proposition 4. There will exist a PBNE for this game. All low firms will price at PL and earn
πL = (PL−cL)Γ(L−PL) whilst all high firms will earn πSH as defined by equation 2.7. A proportion









for PB ≤ P ≤ PMH , P 6= PL
0 for P = PL
(2.12)
A proportion 1− η of high firms will not advertise and will set a price of PS.
Beliefs in this PBNE will satisfy:
µ(P ) =
1 P ≥ P
S




1 for P > PL and ∀PE
1 for P ≤ PL and PE 6= PL
0 for P ≤ PL and PE = PL
(2.14)
Proof. The proof of this proposition largely follows that of proposition 3. The key difference is the
omission of PL (a zero measure set) from the advertiser pricing function. The pricing distribution
is atomless (which verifies the atomless guess) and all of the previous lemmas hold. Thus low firms
will all not advertise while setting a price of PL as per lemma 4 and beliefs for advertisers are the
same as in proposition 3 for any set price.
While this is an equilibrium with beliefs that are robust to the intuitive criterion it relies on
discontinuous beliefs at a certain point. This may be less credible as a model for some markets
than the previous case where PB > PL. For instance this equilibrium may not be robust if the
marginal cost of low firms is continuously heterogeneous in some interval as there would then be a
continuum of PL prices.
2.4 Producer and Consumer Surplus
The total surplus generated in a separating equilibria when a consumer visits a firm is Q − cQ if
that consumers buys the good and is that consumer’s outside option otherwise. The problem for
the consumer on the other hand is to choose from the maximum of Q − Pf and Ωk. Clearly this
implies that the closer is price to marginal cost the greater surplus generated in the market.
In order to evaluate the impact of advertising we can note that the low firms do not change
their price from the full information case or the no advertising case (presented in proposition 1)
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and so welfare is unchanged for consumers visiting low firms. When consumers visiting high firms
are considered, equilibrium advertiser prices are less than both the full information monopoly
price or the signalling price. Specifically we can write the following expressions for the surplus
generated from consumers visiting high firms in the full information (FI) equilibrium, pure price
signalling (PS) equilibrium as well as the surplus from a single advertiser (SA) and surplus from
the advertising equilibrium (AE) respectively:




























SAE = (1− η)SPS + ηSSA (2.4)
Where the distribution ḡ(P ) is the pdf of the first order statistic from two draws from the advertiser
pricing distribution. This arises when a consumer has prices from two advertisers and will pick the
lower price.
Here it can be seen that the surplus generated by a single advertiser is higher than the surplus
generated by a price signalling firm or a firm in the full information equilibrium as the price an
advertiser offers is always lower. This implies that when the fraction of advertisers is sufficiently
high, it is possible for the advertising equilibrium to deliver greater surplus than the corresponding
full information equilibrium. As the above expressions are analytically intractable this is shown
numerically but first stating these implications in a proposition.
Proposition 5. In any asymmetric information market, surplus is always weakly greater in the
fully separating equilibrium exhibiting advertising relative to the fully separating equilibrium where
no advertising is allowed. In some cases surplus can be higher in asymmetric information markets
with advertising than in the corresponding full information markets.
Proof. Proof for the first statement is provided by the fact consumers always choose the maximum
of Ωk and H−Pf , whilst surplus is maximised by them taking the maximum of Ωk and H−cH . The
price distribution in the price signalling case weakly stochastically dominates the price distribution
where advertising occurs and hence delivers weakly lesser surplus (strictly if πSH < π
M
H ). The proof
of the second statement is by example 1.
Example 1. We define a uniform distribution of outside options in the space [0, 1]. Thus we have
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Γ(x) = x in this domain. We assume that H = 1, cL = 0 and L =
8
17 .
2.12 We can use these to get

























From these prices and profits expressions for the proportion of advertisers and the bottom price can
be obtained:













Finally we can write the survival function and pdf of the advertiser pricing distribution as well as
an expression for ḡ(P ):2.13
G(P ) =
πSH







πSH(1 + cH − 2P )
2η(P − cH)2(1− P )2
ḡ(P ) = 2G(P )g(P )
Now examining the bounds of feasible cH values we focus on the case of a separating equilibria
with costly signalling. Hence the maximum cH value we consider is
15
17 as at this cost level the
signalling price is equal to the monopoly price for the high firm. The lower limit cH value is zero
as by construction it is at a marginal cost of cL when a firm is indifferent to selling with an expected
value of L at the low monopoly price or H at the signalling price.
It can be seen in figure 2.1 that when cH is low it implies that π
M
H is high compared to π
S and
thus there are many advertisers in the market. Intense competition between these firms depresses
prices closer to marginal cost. This results in surplus in the advertising equilibrium being higher
than the full information equilibrium.
On the other hand when cH is high π
M
H is not much higher than π
S and thus there are fewer
advertisers in the market with less intense competition between them. In this case surplus is higher
in the full information equilibrium than the advertising equilibrium.
2.12The values given H, cL are chosen so that the demand curve is downward sloping across all feasible prices. The
value given L is chosen as it is approximately halfway up the interval and exploits the pythagorean triple (8, 15, 17)
to get a rational signalling price. In general a higher L value leads to full information delivering higher surplus for
all cH whilst lower L values lead to the advertising equilibrium being more efficient for all cH . Figures 2.1 and 2.1
were constructed with these parameters and cH = 0.4.
2.13For discussion on finding the pdf of an order statistic see for instance Blitzstein and Hwang [2015, Theorem
8.6.4]
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Figure 2.1: Surplus generated in each equilibrium case
2.5 Extensions
2.5.1 Cost heterogeneity in high firms
As noted in Shelegia [2012] even small differences in marginal cost can lead to firms randomising
over different ranges of prices in a mixed strategy pricing equilibria such as those presented in this
paper. This observation may have welfare implications in this paper as advertising results in a
shift of quantity from higher pricing advertisers to lower price advertisers. If low cost firms are
also low price firms this means that advertising can boost aggregate surplus by awarding larger
quantity to lower cost firms.
This section examines this possibility by augmenting the model of section 2.3 with high firms
with heterogeneous costs. Rather than having a homogeneous group of high firms we assume half
are α firms with a marginal cost of cα and half are β firms with a higher marginal cost of cβ > cα.
Both types of firms sell high quality goods and a firm cannot selectively advertise against one of
the two classes of firms. In all other aspects the model is unchanged. As the analysis for the most
part follows that performed in section 2.3 it is deferred for appendix 2.A but two key implications
are here stated.
Proposition 6. In any fully separating equilibrium exhibiting advertising:
(a) All α firms will price equal or less than all β firms.
(b) β firms will never earn more than their signalling profits however α firms may earn more.
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Proof. See appendix 2.A.
The intuition for the point (a) is that α firms have a lower monopoly price which means price
signalling is relatively more expensive for them as compared to β firms. This leads them to be more
likely to advertise and more likely to offer lower prices while advertising. For a simple example
of point (b) consider a case where cα is low enough such that the monopoly price of α firms,
PMα , is less than the marginal cost of β firms, cβ . In this case an α firm could price at P
M
α and
advertise losing at most half of their consumers to other α firms and still gain some customers
from advertising against β firms. In some cases this fraction of the monopoly profit will exceed
the signalling profit.
Thus in the presence of cost heterogeneity, advertising can add to market efficiency as it shifts
demand away from higher cost firms towards lower cost firms. Firms with lower costs will position
themselves as lower pricing firms within the advertising equilibrium. Thus there is an efficiency
gain from demand being shifted towards firms with a lower marginal cost.
2.5.2 Monopolist supplier for high quality good
Now we consider the special case where the common good sold in the market is provided by a single
supplier firm that behaves as a monopolist and produces the product costlessly. This will often
be the case where the product is copyrighted or patented. We will refer to these supplying firms
as suppliers and the firms that buy from the suppliers as merchants. We assume full information
exists between suppliers and merchants but consumers do not know the quality level of a good
unless it is signalled to them.
In analysing this case we will first write an expression for the cH level which equalises the
monopoly price of high firms (which does depend on cH) with the signalling price (which does not
depend on cH). This cost is denoted cSig and is defined as the cost level which solves the following
equation.
PS = arg max
P∈<+
(P − cSig)Γ(H − P ) (2.1)
where PS is as defined in section 2.3.1. We can now write the profit function for the supplier as a
function of the price they charge merchants. In this expression we will write the advertiser price
pdf as gc(P ), the bottom price as PB(c) and the monopoly price as P
M
H (c) reflecting the fact that
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these are affected by c:
πSupplier(c) =

cΓ(H − PMH (c)) c > cSig
cΓ(H − PS) c ≤ cSig, without advertising
c
[
(1− η)Γ(H − PS) + η
∫ PMH (c)
PB(c)
Γ(H − P )gc(P )dP
]
c ≤ cSig, with advertising
(2.2)
The benchmark price signalling model without advertising is first considered. We get the result
that suppliers will always price at least cSig such that P
M
H ≥ PS .
Proposition 7. In markets where advertising is not allowed the price charged by suppliers to
merchants will never be less than cSig
Proof. Given that merchants will need to charge at least the signalling price to ensure low quality
firms will not emulate high quality, all firms will price at PS for all levels of c below a critical level
to be denoted cSig. As the price charged by merchants is the minimum of the signalling and their
monopoly price, this critical level cSig is such that these prices are equal as defined in equation 2.1.
Therefore in the absence of advertising a supplier will never charge less than cSig as they would
sell the same quantity of Γ(H − PS) whilst earning a lower price.
The intuition here is that the supplier profit strictly increases as c increases until c reaches cSig.
This is because merchants charge PS at all of these cost levels and hence as the supplier increases
c the price the supplier receives increases whilst the quantity stays constant.
If advertising is allowed when c ≥ cSig then PS ≤ PMH and hence no advertising will be
undertaken.2.14 On the other hand if advertising is allowed when c < cSig then P
S > PMH and
hence advertising will be undertaken. This observation raises the following possibility:
Proposition 8. In some markets where advertising is allowed it may be optimal for suppliers to
reduce their price below cSig and thus induce advertising to increase their sale quantity.
Proof. Proof is by example 2.
Example 2. This example follows on from example 1 except for cH now being endogenously
determined by a monopolist supplier who produces the good costlessly. All other parameters and





The demand curve faced by the monopolist supplier in the advertising and no advertising case
along with areas representing optimal profits are shown in figure 2.1.2.15 It can be seen that where no
2.14From equation 2.1 we have πSH = π
M
H when c = cSig. As cSig increases above this level the signalling profit
drops below the monopoly profit. Hence there is no incentive to drop price and advertise.
2.15Note that equations for these demand curves are as described in equation 2.2 (once the c term giving the margin
per item is removed)
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Figure 2.1: Monopolist supplier demand curves and profits
advertising is allowed the monopolist supplier prices at cSig. When advertising is allowed however
a lower c of approximately 0.41 is set as the greater sales volume obtainable is sufficient to make
up for the loss in margin.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper has examined comparative advertising from the perspective of disclosing differences
in prices. While at first glance this strategy seems counter-intuitive as it would result in greater
pricing competition it is found that it can act as an alternative method of signalling quality than
price signalling.
In the fully separating equilibria that this paper presents some firms will remain price signalling
whilst other firms will lower their price closer to the monopoly level and instead signal by price
comparative advertising against rival firms. While an advertiser may be able to achieve greater
sales quantity by reducing their price, they also face competition from the firm they advertise
against. Advertising has the effect of decreasing the equilibrium distribution of prices offered in
the asymmetric information setting which increases consumer surplus. Firm profits on the other
hand do not change from the case where no advertising is allowed. While firms do manage to price
closer to their monopoly price any additional profits are lost through increased competition with
other advertising firms.
A number of extensions were examined including the possibility of high quality firms having
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heterogeneous marginal costs. In this case advertising can play a role in shifting demand from
higher marginal cost firms to lower cost firms. The case of a monopoly supplier who provides
goods to many reselling firms was also examined. It is found that advertising can result in suppliers
reducing the price they charge reselling firms. As a large fraction of reselling firms no longer need to
price signal (at a high price with low sale quantity) the supplier can reduce their price to incentivise
advertising and boost sales volume. If the increase in quantity makes up for the decrease in margin
then this can be more profitable.
These implications for welfare are substantially more clearcut and supportive of comparative
advertising than previous papers that model it as the disclosure of differences in product features.
This may indicate that the form of comparative advertising matters from a policy perspective.
Anderson and Renault [2009] find that comparative advertising of horizontal good attributes can
deteriorate total welfare when there is a sufficiently large quality gap between rival firms. By
contrast this paper implies that price comparative advertising will increase total welfare and in
addition no agent’s surplus is decreased by the legalisation of comparative advertising. In the basic
model this increase in welfare comes entirely from lower prices to consumers and more efficient
signalling for firms. When the extensions are considered however there are additional vehicles for
surplus to increase including the shifting of quantity to lower cost producers of the high quality
good and the inducing of a monopolist supplier into decreasing the price they change reselling
firms. All of these insights present the clear and unambiguous implication that price comparative
advertising is beneficial for welfare and should be supported by legislators and regulators.
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Appendices
2.A Heterogeneity Main Results
Following on from the extension to the model introduced in section 2.5.1, equilibrium in this context
can be defined as:
Definition 3. A fully separating PBNE in this model will be described by pricing strategies and
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equilibrium profits π̂L, π̂α, π̂β, such that:
πL,N (P ) = π̂L ≥ πL,N (P ′) ∀ P ∈ DL,N , P ′ ∈ <+ \DL,N (2.A.1)
πL,A(P ) = π̂L ≥ πL,A(P ′) ∀ P ∈ DL,A, P ′ ∈ <+ \DL,A (2.A.2)
πα,N (P ) = π̂α ≥ πα,N (P ′) ∀ P ∈ Dα,N , P ′ ∈ <+ \Dα,N (2.A.3)
πα,A(P ) = π̂α ≥ πα,A(P ′) ∀ P ∈ Dα,A, P ′ ∈ <+ \Dα,A (2.A.4)
πβ,N (P ) = π̂β ≥ πβ,N (P ′) ∀ P ∈ Dβ,N , P ′ ∈ <+ \Dβ,N (2.A.5)
πβ,A(P ) = π̂β ≥ πβ,A(P ′) ∀ P ∈ Dβ,A, P ′ ∈ <+ \Dβ,A (2.A.6)
The belief functions µ(P ) and µ(P, PE) are derived in accordance with Bayes rule and player
strategies for all information sets reached with positive probability in equilibrium.
It can be seen that all of the results from lemma 1 to lemma 6 carry over without modification
to this case. Thus all low firms will not advertise while pricing at PL and all advertisers will be
believed as being of high quality. It can be noted that the signalling price, PS of both firms will
be identical and as described in equation 2.4. Profits at the signalling price will be denoted by πSα
and πSβ . The profit of a type d ∈ {α, β} advertiser can be written as:
πd,A(P ) = (P − cd)Γ(H − P ) [1− η + 2ηG(P )] (2.A.7)
Where η is the proportion of all firms that are advertising and G(P ) is the advertiser price distri-
bution. For brevity in some proofs this will be written as:
πd,A(P ) = (P − cd)Q(P ) (2.A.8)
with Q(P ) = Γ(H − P ) [1− η + 2ηG(P )].
The monopoly prices of α and β firms are denoted PMα , P
M
β respectively with the corresponding
profits denoted πMα and π
M
β . To ensure that from lemma 2 the advertiser price distribution is
atomless we assume that the bottom pricing advertiser will price above PL. This condition will be
formalised later on.
Lemma 11. No equilibrium exhibits an α firm not advertising while a β firm does advertises.
Proof. To see this consider the case where a β firm advertisers at some price P ∈ Dβ,A while an α
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firm is not advertising. For the β firm we must have for some advertising price P :
(P − cβ)Q(P ) ≥ (PS − cβ)Γ(H − PS)
(P − cα)Q(P ) + (cα − cβ)Q(P ) ≥ (PS − cα)Γ(H − PS) + (cα − cβ)Γ(H − PS)
(P − cα)Q(P )− (PS − cα)Γ(H − PS) ≥ (cα − cβ)
[
Γ(H − PS)−Q(P )
]
Note that as cα < cβ and Γ(H − PS) < Q(P ) the right hand side is positive. This putative case
also implies for α firms:
(PS − cα)Γ(H − PS) ≥ (P − cα)Q(P )
(P − cα)Q(P )− (PS − cα)Γ(H − PS) ≤ 0
A contradiction. Thus no equilibrium exhibits an α firm not advertising while a β firm does
advertise.
Corollary 12. In any equilibrium there will be a positive mass of α firms advertising.
Proof. From proposition 2 there must be a positive mass of advertisers. From lemma 11 these
advertisers cannot all be β firms unless all firms are advertisers which would contradict lemma
6.
Lemma 13. In any equilibrium:
1. A positive mass of β firms will not advertise while setting a price at PS;
2. β firms earn πSβ in equilibrium. Thus π̂β = π
S
β .
Proof. From lemma 6 in any equilibrium there exists a positive mass of α non-advertisers and/or
β non-advertisers and one or both of the following equalities will hold:
πα = π
S
α πβ = π
S
β (2.A.9)
Application of lemma 11 shows that no equilibrium with only α advertisers can exist. Thus in
equilibrium there must be a positive mass of β firms not advertising while setting a price of PS .
As a result of this all β firms must earn πSβ .
Proposition 9. In any equilibrium all α firms will price lower than all β advertisers.
Proof. First considering the case for advertisers. Consider a putative equilibrium where β firms
weakly prefer pricing at P than pricing at P ′ and α firms weakly prefer pricing at P ′ than P with
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P < P ′. Then for β firms:
(P − cβ)Q(P ) ≥ (P ′ − cβ)Q(P ′) (2.A.10)
(P − cα)Q(P ) + (cα − cβ)Q(P ) ≥ (P ′ − cα)Q(P ′) + (cα − cβ)Q(P ′) (2.A.11)
(P − cα)Q(P )− (P ′ − cα)Q(P ′) ≥ (cα − cβ) [Q(P ′)−Q(P )] (2.A.12)
Note that as cβ > cα and Q(P ) > Q(P
′) the right hand side is positive. Now consider the case of
the α firm:
(P ′ − cα)Q(P ′) ≥ (P − cα)Q(P ) (2.A.13)
(P − cα)Q(P )− (P ′ − cα)Q(P ′) ≤ 0 (2.A.14)
A contradiction. Hence there is no equilibrium where α firms advertise at a price higher than β
firms. Now considering non-advertisers from lemma 11 there can never be α non-advertisers whilst
there are β firms advertising.
At this point we introduce the bottom advertising price (analogously to PB in equation 2.8).
Lemma 14. The bottom price will be PB,α which will be defined by:




Proof. From proposition 9 the bottom pricing advertiser will be an α. The bottom price is the
lowest price that delivers this firm the equilibrium profit level for α firms.
The condition for all advertisers to price more than PL is thus PB,α > PL. From this point
onwards we focus on proving the existence of equilibrium in the special case where there are some
β firms advertising.2.16
Lemma 15. If πMβ ≥ 2πSβ then there will be a positive mass of β advertisers in equilibrium.
Proof. If this did not hold then a β firm could price at PMβ and would win against all other β
firms to earn profits of at least
πMβ
2 . With the assumption π
M
β ≥ 2πSβ this is strictly more than the
profits attainable by not advertising with a price of PS .
Lemma 16. If πMβ ≥ 2πSβ the top advertiser price will be PMβ
Proof. The top pricing advertiser is a β firm. With similar arguments to lemma 9 they will charge
their monopoly price.
2.16Whilst there is in principle no impediment to analysing the alternate case where all β firms (and potentially
some α firms) monopolise, this restriction is in order to show the notable result where α firms earn above signalling
profits as discussed in section 2.5.1.
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Proof. The top pricing β firm charges PMβ where G(P
M
β ) = 0 and must earn π
S
β . The expression
follows immediately from substituting these factors into equation 2.A.7.
Lemma 18. If πMβ ≥ 2πSβ then there is a unique price charged by both types of advertisers P̄ ≡
Dβ,A ∩Dα,A which is given by:
P̄ =
cβ π̂α − cαπ̂β
π̂α − π̂β
(2.A.17)
Proof. At the unique price P̄ where there are advertisers from both types of firm the profits are:
πβ,A(P̄ ) = (P̄ − cβ)Γ(H − P̄ )[1− η + 2ηG(P̄ )] (2.A.18)








Rearranging this equation and noting at this point they make their equilibrium profits yields the
lemma.
Proposition 10. If πMβ ≥ 2πSβ then α firms will earn more than their signalling profits in equi-
librium.








Now examining signalling profits:
πSβ = (P
S − cβ)Γ(H − PS) (2.A.22)
πSα = (P








CHAPTER 2. COMPARATIVE ADVERTISING: THE ROLE OF PRICES 115
As
P−cβ







And substituting in π̂β = π
S
β
πSα < π̂α (2.A.26)
So profits above signalling profits are made.
At this point all of the results presented in section 2.5.1 have been shown to hold. The last
remaining task is to show that an equilibrium will exist.
The profit functions for α and β firms are:
πβ,A(P̄ ) = (P̄ − cβ)Γ(H − P̄ )[1− η + 2ηG(P̄ )] (2.A.27)
πα,A(P̄ ) = (P̄ − cα)Γ(H − P̄ )[1− η + 2ηG(P̄ )] (2.A.28)







(P−cβ)Γ(H−P ) − 1 + η
]





(P−cα)Γ(H−P ) − 1 + η
]
for Pα,B ≤ P ≤ P̄
(2.A.29)
Proposition 11. If πMβ ≥ 2πSβ then the equilibrium described by a proportion η of β firms (as
described in equation 2.A.16) monopolising at PS and all other firms advertising at prices described
by the survival functions in equation 2.A.29 and the beliefs described by
µ(P ) =
1 P ≥ P
S
0 P < PS
(2.A.30)
µ(P, PE) =
1 for P > PL and ∀PE0 for P ≤ PL and ∀PE (2.A.31)
is a PBNE.
Proof. Similar arguments as were made in lemma 4 show that these beliefs will be robust in
equilibrium and no low firms will attempt to emulate high quality.
The G(P ) function described in equation 2.A.29 is feasible, being decreasing in price and ranges
between 0 and 1 when price changes from PMβ to Pα,B .
The case of low firms is unchanged to that described in proposition 3 with them unable to
convincingly advertise. Hence there is no profitable deviation for these firms.
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. From proposition 10 they
earn more than their signalling profit. From proposition 9 they also earn more than is possible at
any point in Dβ,A and hence there are no profitable deviations for these firms.




. From proposition 13 they
earn their signalling profit. From lemma 9 they also earn more than is possible at any point in
Dα,A and hence there are no profitable deviations for these firms.
Chapter 3
It’s Good to be Bad: A Model of
Low Quality Dominance in a Full
Information Consumer Search
Market (with Margaryta Klymak)
Abstract: This paper examines a consumer search market exhibiting vertically differentiated
firms, heterogeneous consumers and endogenous consumer market entry. In an asymmetric infor-
mation setting high and low quality firms make equal sales and profit in this market. Conversely
when there is full information, search frictions induce an unravelling mechanism that leads to a
unique refined equilibrium where all consumers approach low quality firms and high quality firms
make no sales or profit. This presents a rationale for why low quality firms may disclose their
quality and high quality firms may not even when disclosure is costless.3.1
JEL Codes: D82, D83, L15
Keywords: Quality Disclosure, Consumer Search
3.1 Introduction
The literature on asymmetric information in markets is largely focused on cases where higher
quality firms may seek to differentiate themselves from lower quality firms. The role of low quality
3.1Baumann (Corresponding author): Stuart.Baumann@ed.ac.uk, School of Economics, University of Edinburgh,
30 Buccleuch Pl, Edinburgh EH8 9JT, United Kingdom. Klymak: klymakm@tcd.ie, Department of Economics,
Trinity College Dublin, College Green, Dublin 2, Ireland. This work was supported by the ESRC postgraduate
funding scheme (for Baumann) and the Grattan Scholarship scheme (for Klymak). For useful comments we would
like to thank Philipp Kircher, Ludo Visschers, Andrew Clausen, Patrick Harless, Régis Renault, József Sákovics,
Carl Singleton and Ina Taneva as well as seminar participants at the University of Edinburgh PhD seminar (2016)
and internal seminar (2017), Royal Economic Society (2017), Irish Economic Society (2017).
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firms has received less attention in this context. Looking at some marketing materials reveals
however that some firms go to lengths to communicate that they are low quality to potential
customers. A prominent example is Europe’s budget airline Ryanair which has been proactive
in building a low quality reputation as part of their “no frills” strategy. Ryanair CEO Michael
O’Leary has stated to the media that “Anyone who thinks Ryanair flights are some sort of bastion
of sanctity where you can contemplate your navel is wrong. We already bombard you with as
many in-flight announcements and trolleys as we can. Anyone who looks like sleeping, we wake
them up to sell them things [The Telegraph, 2016]”.3.2 Other examples are discount stores that
specialise in selling “factory seconds” such as Australia’s “Reject Shop”. These stores can often
be seen airing advertisements with phrases that are vague but suggestive of low quality such as
“like new”, “discontinued”, “second-hand” or “refurbished”. These advertisements are perplexing
because even though some laws may require disclosure of quality information before purchase, no
law requires firms to air advertisements disclosing this information to potential customers before
they even approach the firm.
Looking at the advertising decisions of lawyers in the United States shows a similar story with
many lawyers advertising in undignified ways that are likely to undermine confidence in their
ability. The United States has at least three attorneys that call themselves “the hammer” in
their advertisements [AboveTheLaw.com, 2012]. In Texas a criminal defence attorney has been
advertising by calling himself the “Texas Law Hawk” and performing stunts likes doing wheelies
on a dirt-bike or throwing sticks of dynamite [Wilson, 2016]. This kind of advertising is strongly
discouraged by the American Bar Association who warn that “lawyers should consider that the
use of inappropriately dramatic music, unseemly slogans, hawkish spokespersons, premium offers,
slapstick routines or outlandish settings in advertising does not instil confidence in the lawyer or
the legal profession [American Bar Association, 2016]”, a view that finds support in the marketing
literature [Trebbi et al., 1999].3.3 This again presents the question of why lawyers would choose
forms of advertising which are likely to undermine consumer confidence in their ability.
This paper seeks to explain why firms may disclose that they are of low quality. A model is
presented with a high quality firm and a low quality firm. Consumers have heterogeneous marginal
utility from quality (“taste”) and can choose what firm to go to upon entering the market. The
key mechanism presented is one of unravelling. Considering a putative equilibrium where high
taste consumers go to the high quality firm and low taste consumers go to the low quality firm, the
high quality firm will price to make one of the consumers approaching it indifferent to buying and
3.2This has gone so far as the CEO of Ryanair publicly announcing that extra charges for toilet use were under
consideration from the airline [The Economist, 2013]. These charges were never actually implemented.
3.3In addition the American Bar Association had previously banned all lawyer advertising in 1907 however this
ban was overturned by the supreme court in 1977 on freedom of speech grounds [US Supreme Court, 1977].
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searching at the low quality firm. The diamond paradox applies to this marginal consumer and
they make no surplus. When a consumer can anticipate however that when they arrive at a high
quality firm they will be this marginal consumer then that consumer would be better off (by the
extent of the search cost) going to the low quality firm ex ante where there will be some lower taste
consumer who will be made indifferent to buying and taking their outside option. This will result
in fewer and higher taste consumers visiting the high quality firm which will result in this firm
raising its prices to make a higher taste consumer indifferent to buying and searching at the low
quality firm. This new marginal consumer will again be better off going to the low quality firm ex
ante. Through this mechanism we get a full information unravelling result where the sole refined
equilibrium is one where all consumers go to a low quality firm and no consumers will visit a high
quality firm. Clearly search frictions are key to this result, however the only crucial assumptions
over that of a standard consumer search model are that consumers can choose what firm to go to
upon entering the market and that consumers have heterogeneous marginal utility from quality.
Aside from presenting a rationale for low quality firms to disclose their quality, a second con-
tribution is to the growing literature considering a firm’s choice between signalling and disclosing
quality. Our model shows a force which acts to deter high quality firms from disclosing their
quality as a known high quality firm is visited by no consumers in equilibrium. Signalling which
occurs after a consumer visits a high quality firm remains a feasible strategy however. Low quality
firms on the other hand will choose to disclose their low quality before consumers approach firms
but will never want to disclose their quality after consumers have approached firms. This conflict
between disclosure and signalling is different from the previous literature that emphasised strate-
gic competitive pricing considerations [Jansson and Roy, 2015] or disclosure costs [Daughety and
Reinganum, 2008]. A third contribution is that the model presented has an interesting contrast
with Akerlof [1970]. Whilst in Akerlof asymmetric information causes markets to unravel with
only low quality goods remaining, in this paper the opposite result is shown with unravelling only
occurring in the full information setting.
An important insight of the model is that disclosure can adversely impact market efficiency by
resulting in the suboptimal equilibrium where all consumers visit the low quality firm. In addition
search frictions can encourage firms to decrease the quality of their good offerings even when it
is costless to produce a higher quality good. To avert these outcomes it may thus be desirable to
implement minimal quality standards in markets exhibiting search frictions. In addition it may
be welfare improving for regulators to prevent low quality firms from voluntarily disclosing their
quality. For instance this paper would provide an argument in support of the view that legal bar
associations should have the ability to restrict forms of advertising that allow lawyers to disclose
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their low quality to the market.
3.2 Background
There is an extensive literature examining the disclosure decisions of vertically differentiated firms
where consumers cannot directly observe quality. Many early papers conclude that an unravelling
result will prevail in such markets [Grossman, 1981, Milgrom, 1981]. This occurs from the highest
quality firm in a putative pooling equilibria wanting to differentiate itself which lowers the expected
value of the remaining pool, leading to the next highest quality firm wanting to differentiate itself
from the pool and so on. That mandatory disclosure laws are thought necessary in the face of this
unravelling result presents somewhat of a puzzle and so later papers look at where this result can
fail [Dranove and Zhe Jin, 2010].
Board [2009] presents a duopolistic model where firms are heterogeneous in quality and con-
sumers have heterogeneous marginal utility from quality. He finds cases where disclosure of quality
information can result in intensified price competition and lower firm profits. This presents a ratio-
nale for mandatory disclosure to increase consumer surplus at the expense of firm profits through
better sorting as well as the intensification of price competition among firms. Levin et al. [2009]
present a model with two firms offering horizontally and vertically differentiated products. They
also find that disclosure can intensify price competition thus deterring firms from disclosing quality
information.
There have also been papers that have tried to include signalling and disclosure decisions
in a unified framework. Daughety and Reinganum [2008] create a unified model where firms
choose between disclosure and signalling. They find that when disclosure is costless all firms
will disclose but if disclosure is sufficiently costly firms may signal. Another paper to include
signalling and disclosure is that of Caldieraro et al. [2011]. Interestingly this paper shows cases
where it can be optimal for low quality firms to disclose their quality. Their model includes the
possibility of high quality firms signalling their quality by depressing their price which intensifies
price competition with the low quality firms. Both high and low quality firms can avert this by
disclosure to increase the proportion of consumers that can recognise quality. By informing these
consumers the incentives for high quality firms to depress their price for signalling are eroded and
both firms are better off while consumer surplus is reduced.
A recent paper to look at the choice between disclosure and signalling in a duopolistic market
is that of Jansson and Roy [2015]. They examine firms that can be high or low quality (defined
by an exogenous probability) where firms interact in a two stage game. In the first stage each
firm can credibly disclose their quality to the market whilst in the second stage each firm offers a
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consumer a price. The consumer then buys from the firm that offers the higher utility after taking
into account perceived quality and price. They find equilibria where firms with high quality goods
decide to signal rather than disclose due to the strategic effects of disclosure on the other firm’s
price. When firms price without knowing the quality of their competitor, price competition is less
intense. Thus the effects of price competition deter disclosure.
This paper seeks to build upon the literature in a few respects. Whilst Jansson and Roy [2015]
offer a mechanism where high quality firms are deterred from disclosure even when it is costless,
their mechanism relies on market power and hence would not generalise to markets where there are
many firms. On the other hand the mechanism presented in this paper relies on search frictions and
hence may be more generalisable to such markets.3.4 A second contribution is that in our model,
low quality firms proactively disclose that their goods are of low quality. Whilst this possibility
has been examined by Caldieraro et al. [2011] two points of difference should be drawn. Caldieraro
et al. [2011] present a model where it is beneficial for all firms to disclose quality while this paper
presents a case where only low quality firms would like to disclose and this disclosure harms high
quality firms. Finally the mechanism for low quality firms to disclose in Caldieraro et al. [2011]
requires firms to signal high quality by reducing their price. While this is supported in their model
and may occur in certain markets, it is more intuitive to believe that in general consumers perceive
high price to signal high quality. This paper on the other hand presents a rationale for low quality
firm disclosure that stems from search fractions and thus may better describe some markets.
3.3 The Model
There are two firms in a market, one of which sells a product of quality H (the “high firm”) and
one of which sells a good with a lower quality of L (the “low firm”). Both firms produce their
goods costlessly. There is a unit measure of consumers. Consumers have heterogeneous marginal
utility from quality described by a “taste” parameter. A consumer with a taste parameter of ai,
with an offer for a good with an expected quality of Q and a price of P gets an expected utility
from purchase of:
aiQ− P (3.1)
3.4Whilst for simplicity the model of this paper analyses the case of two firms, in an extension (section 3.4.4) it
is shown that the result where low quality firms benefit from full information extends to the setting of many firms.
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The taste parameter is uniformly distributed on [0, 1] with a cdf given by:3.5
Prob[ai < x] = x for x ∈ [0, 1] (3.2)
Either firm can choose to disclose the qualities of both firms to the market in which case both
qualities are observable and there is full information.3.6 If neither firm chooses to disclose then
there is asymmetric information and both goods appear identical to consumers. In the case of full
information a fraction 1−ψ of “directed” consumers (orthogonal to taste) can choose to approach
either the low or high quality firm upon entering the market. The complementary fraction, ψ, of
consumers are “undirected” and approach either firm with 50% probability. Upon entering the
market undirected and directed consumers are identical.
The timing is as follows. Firms choose whether or not to disclose and the information setting
is realised. Consumers then proceed to approach one of the two firms. Firms offer a price to all
consumers with no price discrimination possible. Consumers can then decide to buy, search at the
other firm with a search cost of s or leave the market to get an exogenous outside option of value
0. We assume L > 0 and thus a low quality firm recognised as being low quality will still be able to
make some sales if visited by consumers with sufficiently high taste. We adopt the indifference rule
that where aiQ−PQ < 0 for both firms for a consumer with taste ai that consumer will approach
the firm with a higher value of aiQ− PQ.
We assume that all consumers enter the market costlessly.3.7 Consumers face a search cost
for visiting the other firm once they are in the market however. We assume that this search cost
is strictly nonzero and positive but sufficiently small such that the best alternative to buying for
the marginal consumer at the high firm is to buy from the low firm. This assumption depends on
equilibrium pricing decisions and thus will be formalised later on.3.8
Note that the mass of undirected consumers ensures that each firm is always approached by a
positive mass of consumers. This ensures that in the putative equilibrium where all consumers visit
3.5The simple form of the utility from consumption aiQ − P and the uniform distribution of taste parameters
are useful for tractability reasons, however the central unravelling mechanism (Proposition 1) extends to other









3.6Alternatively this can be though of as one firm disclosing the relative qualities of its good in comparison to the
other.
3.7One justification is that consumers may benefit from the experience of visiting a single firm but get bored
thereafter. For instance the first test-ride of car at a dealership may be enjoyable whilst the process of looking for
similar cars at other dealerships may be dull. To take an alternate example in the legal services market, a consumer
facing criminal charges may benefit from hearing one lawyer’s opinion on their case (while that lawyer provides
a quote) but gets no additional information from visiting other lawyers (and getting other quotes). An alternate
justification of this assumption may include undirected consumers randomly running into shops as they go about
their normal day while directed consumers may be those able to plan their movements to choose what stores they
run into. For instance a directed consumer intending to visit a beach may choose to go to one near a low/high
quality shopping centre in order to visit a low/high quality firm at the same time. In this setting an undirected
consumer is one that lives near only one beach so they cannot choose what firm to visit for free.
3.8This is done on page 125 just before lemma 3.
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one of the firms the beliefs of the other firm regarding the taste of deviating consumers visiting
them out of equilibrium do not need to be established. The methodology of analysing this game
will be to first examine the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBEs) at any given level of ψ. For the
equilibrium that we will call refined we will then take the limit of a sequence of PBEs as ψ → 0.3.9
These equilibrium concepts can be formally described as:
Definition 1 (Equilibrium Concepts). A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) in this game is
defined as a pricing and disclosure strategy for firms, a search strategy for consumers and quality
beliefs of consumers such that no consumers or firms have a profitable deviation and all beliefs are
supported by Bayes rule in equilibrium.
A Refined Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (RPBE) is the limit of a sequence of PBEs as ψ → 0.
Start
High FirmLow Firm
Leave market (0) Buy (aiH − PH)Buy (aiL− PL)
−s
−s
Figure 3.1: Consumer search paths in the full information setting for the consumer with taste ai
The possible search paths open to consumers in the full information setting are summarised
in figure 3.1. This paper will first analyse the full asymmetric information subgame in section
3.3.1 before the full information subgame is examined in section 3.3.2. The disclosure decision of
firms is then examined in section 3.3.3. Extensions are considered in section 3.4 before section 3.5
concludes.
3.3.1 The asymmetric information subgame
In the asymmetric information case, both firms appear identical so both directed and undirected
consumers approach firms at random, each of which has an expected quality of H+L2 . In equilibrium
each firm will be approached by a mass of 12 with tastes uniformly distributed on the unit interval.




− P ≥ max(0, aH + L
2
− PE − s) (3.1)
3.9Thus the refined equilibrium we present can be interpreted as a trembling hand refinement [Selten, 1975] of an
equilibrium without undirected consumers, with the start of search strategy being trembled.
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Where PE is the consumer’s expected price from the other firm. From the Diamond [1971] paradox
result the right hand side of this expression will equal 0 for the consumer made (ex post) indifferent





















Which implies that both firms sell only to consumers with a taste greater than 12 .
3.3.2 The full information subgame
We open our analysis of the full information subgame with a lemma and a corollary that help to
narrow the range of putative equilibria considerably:
Lemma 1. When â > a∗ and H > L there will not exist any equilibrium where a taste a∗ directed
consumer goes to the firm with expected quality H whilst a taste â directed consumer goes to a firm
with expected quality L.
Proof. In the a space the utility from each good is linear and given by aL−PL and aH−PH . This
implies a single crossing condition that ensures that all consumers with a taste above the intercept
point will approach the high firm and all consumers with a lower taste will approach the low firm.
The assumed indifference rule ensures this holds in the case of low taste consumers where both
aL− PL and aH − PH are less than 0.
Corollary 2. In any equilibrium, the set of directed consumers that choose to visit firms of a
particular quality level will be convex in the “taste” dimension. We will denote the ex ante indif-




H−L , hence [0, aA] consumers will visit the low firm and [aA, 1]
consumers will approach the high firm.
Proof. The ex ante indifferent consumer has equal expected utility from either firm and thus:





By setting up expressions analogous to equation 3.1 and rearranging, we can derive expressions
for the indifferent taste consumers at each firm. These can be seen in table 3.1:3.10
3.10It should be noted that at the high firm consumers use their expectation of PL and at the low firm consumers
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Notation Location of consumer Indifferent between Formula
aH High firm Buying and going to low firm
PH−PEL −s
H−L
aHL High firm Buying and leaving market
PH
H
aHLM High firm Going to low firm and leaving market
PEL +s
L
aL Low firm Buying and leaving market
PL
L
aT Low firm Buying and going to high firm
PEH−PL+s
H−L
Table 3.1: Indifferent Consumers
These can be used to write the demand function of the high firm:3.11
QHigh(PH) =

















(1− ψ) [1−max(aA, aHL(PH), aH(PH))]+
In this demand function it can be seen that the high firm receives all directed consumers with a
taste greater than aA and undirected consumers from the low firm with a taste more than aA+
s
H−L
(if any exist). Note also that aA is taken exogenously by the high firm knowing that consumers use
their expectation of PH (rather than the high firm’s choice of PH) to determine their search path.
The high firm sells to all consumers that approach it with tastes between 1 and the maximum of
aH and aHL.
The demand function for the low firm can be written as:
QLow(PL) =
Undirected - own︷ ︸︸ ︷
ψ
2
[min(1, aT (PL))− aL(PL)]+ +













(1− ψ) [min(aA, aT (PL))− aL(PL)]+
In this case the low firm receives all directed consumers with a taste less than aA and undirected
consumers from the high firm with tastes between aH and aHLM (if any exist). The low firm sells
to all consumers that approach it with tastes between aT and aL.
3.12
At this point we recall the assumption that search costs are sufficiently small such that the
best alternative to buying for the marginal consumer at the high firm is to go to the low firm.
Mathematically this translates to the requirement that search costs are sufficiently low that in every
use their expectation of PH . Before directed consumers enter the market they use their expectations of both prices.
As pricing is simultaneous, each firm prices using an expectation of the other firm’s price.
3.11We use here and throughout the notation [x]+ = max(0, x).
3.12The fact that H > L > 0 ensures that tastes higher than aT strictly prefer to leave for the high firm and tastes
lower than aL strictly prefer to leave the market and consumers in the interim prefer to buy.
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prove that for a sufficiently low search cost, all equilibria will have the property that equilibrium
prices satisfy PHH >
PL
L and hence it is possible to find a positive search cost that satisfies this
condition.
Lemma 3. For a sufficiently low search cost, there are no equilibria where PHH ≤
PL
L
Proof. See appendix 3.A.
Mathematically we must have aT > aA > aH and aHLM > aL. As any equilibria will have the
property PHH >
PL
L , we can additionally infer that aL > aHL, aT > aL and aH > aHLM .
3.13 Putting
these together leaves the only remaining taste ordering of aT > aA > aH > aHLM > aL > aHL.
At this point it can be noted that the marginal consumer at the high firm has a taste of aH
which is strictly less than the taste of the ex ante indifferent consumer aA. This has profound
implications for the equilibrium as highlighted in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 (Unravelling of equilibrium without undirected consumers). In the special
case where there are no undirected consumers (ψ ≡ 0) there cannot exist equilibria where a positive
measure of consumers approach both the high and low quality firms.
Proof. A necessary condition for equilibrium in the absence of undirected consumers is that aH =
aA. If we had aH > aA then consumers in the interval [aA, aH) will not buy at the high firm and
would be better off going to the low firm ex ante. If we had aH < aA then the high firm sells to
consumers in the interval [aA, 1] whilst setting a price to make a consumer aH indifferent. If this
firm increased its price to make aA indifferent it could maintain its quantity at a higher price.
One way to think about this result is as an unravelling mechanism. Consider if the firm received
all consumers with tastes in the interval [x, 1] and x is sufficiently high that the high firm wants
to price to sell to all consumers with a taste greater than x.3.14 The firm should optimally price
to make the consumer with taste x indifferent to buying and walking away to the low firm. This
implies a price of x(H − L) + PEL + s which leaves the consumer with a taste x as getting utility
of Lx−PEL − s. This consumer would be strictly better off going to the low firm initially however
as she would get an expected payoff of Lx − PEL . If this consumer (and others of similar taste)
deviate to the low firm, then the high firm will be approached by consumers with tastes in the
interval [x′, 1] where x′ > x. It will again be optimal for the high firm to price high enough so
that the consumer with taste x′ would be better off ex ante going to the low quality firm. This
unravelling would continue until the high firm has no mass of consumers remaining.
3.13All of these inequalities come immediately from simple algebraic manipulation of the formulae in table 3.1.
3.14In the complementary case when x is low there cannot be an equilibrium as some consumers would not buy
from the high firm and would instead go to the low firm - thus these consumers would be better off going to the low
firm ex ante.
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This proposition does not hold when there are undirected consumers however as the high firm
may set a price to make an undirected consumer with a taste lower than aA indifferent. The effect
of aH > aA still has a substantial impact on the resulting equilibrium however as it implies that
the optimal price for the high firm will be quite high. To see this informally note that the first
order conditions of the general profit equation π = PQ(P ) imply that the optimal price satisfies
P = Q(P )Q′(P ) . When there are few undirected consumers then Q
′(P ) is quite low which implies a
high optimal price.
We will show this formally by first rewriting the demand function (3.3) to incorporate the taste
ordering discussed following lemma 3 and noting that the marginal consumer will have a taste
between 0 and aA:
QHigh(PH) =
















(1− ψ) [1− aA]
Taking first order conditions for πHigh = PHQHigh(PH) and rearranging yields:
PH =
HaAψ − 2HaA + 2H − LaAψ + 2LaA − 2L+ PEL ψ
2ψ
(3.6)
Now looking at the low firm’s demand function it is not possible to determine if the firm will lose
undirected consumers to the high firm. That is it is unclear if aT < 1 in equilibrium. In the
succeeding analysis we will assume aT < 1 and do the complementary case in appendix 3.C. First
rewriting the demand function for the low firm (3.4):
QLow(PL) =
Undirected - own︷ ︸︸ ︷
ψ
2
[aT (PL)− aL(PL)] +












(1− ψ) [aA − aL(PL)]
Taking first order conditions for πLow = PLQLow(PL) and rearranging yields:
PL =
HLaAψ − 2HLaA +HLaHLMψ − L2aAψ + 2L2aA − L2aHLMψ − LPEHψ
2Hψ − 4H − 4Lψ + 4L
(3.8)
In equilibrium we will have PEH = PH and P
E
L = PL. Substituting this, aHLM =
PL+s
L and
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aA =
PH−PL
H−L into equations 3.6 and 3.8 and solving for equilibrium prices yields:
PH =
2 (H − L) (4H − 2L−Hψ + 2Lψ − ψs)







8(H − L) +Hψ(2− ψ) + 2Lψ(1 + ψ)
(3.10)
πH =
2ψ (H − L) (Hψ − 4H − 2Lψ + 2L+ ψs)2
(8(H − L) +Hψ(2− ψ) + 2Lψ(1 + ψ))2
(3.11)
πL =




2L (8(H − L) +Hψ(2− ψ) + 2Lψ(1 + ψ))2
(3.12)
We can also write an expression for the ex ante indifferent consumer and the marginal undirected
consumer who leaves the low firm for the high:
aA =
8(H − L) + 2ψ(2L−H) + ψ2s
8(H − L) +Hψ(2− ψ) + 2Lψ(1 + ψ)
(3.13)
aT =
8H2 − 2H2ψ + 6HLψ − 16HL+ 2Hψ2s− 2Hψs− 8Hs− 4L2ψ + 8L2 − 3Lψ2s− 2Lψs+ 8Ls
(H − L) [8(H − L) +Hψ(2− ψ) + 2Lψ(1 + ψ)]
(3.14)
At this point we can state this paper’s second proposition establishing equilibriums for the full
information subgame:3.15
Proposition 2. For any given ψ satisfying aT < 1 (with aT given by equation 3.14) there exists
a PBE of the full information subgame with firms pricing PH , PL according to equations 3.9 and
3.10 respectively and directed consumers with tastes [0, aA] approaching the low firm and consumers
with taste [aA, 1] approaching the high firm with aA according to equation 3.13. Firms have correct
beliefs over taste distribution of consumers approaching them and consumers have correct beliefs
over the quality of goods.
Of the undirected consumers that initially approach the high firm, consumers with taste [aH , 1]
will buy; consumers with taste [aHLM , aH ] will go the low firm and buy and consumers with taste
[0, aHLM ] will leave the market. Of the undirected consumers that initially approach the low firm,
consumers with taste [aT , 1] will go to the high firm, consumers with taste [aL, aT ] will buy from
the low firm and consumers with taste [0, aL] will leave the market.
There are a few interesting features of this equilibrium. First we will consider the special case
where there are no directed consumers (ψ = 1). In this case we get the intuitive result that the
high quality firm earns strictly more than the low firm. Dividing equation 3.11 by equation 3.12
shows that the high firm’s profit is 4L(3H−s)
2
H(4L−3s)2 times higher than the profit of the low firm. For a
small search cost (in the limit as s→ 0) this approaches 9H4L . This is a smaller ratio of high to low
firm profits however than occurs in the competitive market setting where the high firm earns 4HL
3.15For the equilibrium values in the alternative case where aT > 1 see appendix 3.C.
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Figure 3.1: Equilibrium demand curves
times more than the low firm.3.16
Firm profits change markedly however when there are directed consumers in the market. This
is illustrated by figure 3.1 which shows the demand curves faced by the high and low quality firms
under two sets of parameters with their optimal prices, quantities and profits being indicated by the
shaded rectangles. In both cases there is a search cost of s = 0.001 and product qualities of L = 1
and H = 1.5 for the low and high firms respectively. In the left hand panel3.17 25% of consumers are
undirected and so ψ = 0.25 while on the right hand panel3.18 there are 10% undirected consumers
and so ψ = 0.10. Considering first the left hand panel it can be seen that both demand curves
have a flatter segment at high prices where firms sell to their directed consumers and undirected
consumers with the same taste as their directed consumers. In these flatter segments the high firm
sells to consumers with tastes in their interval [aA, 1] while the low quality firm sells to consumers
with tastes in the interval [aL, aA]. As price is lowered however the firms have eventually sold
to all consumers in these intervals and start selling to other undirected consumers. The slope of
each demand curve becomes steeper reflecting the fact that there are fewer undirected consumers
3.16See appendix 3.B for analysis of the competitive market and comparison with search market profits.
3.17The equilibrium quantities end up being PL = 0.379, PH = 0.781, πL = 0.161, πH = 0.152, aA = 0.805 and
aT = 0.806.
3.18The equilibrium quantities end up being PL = 0.468, PH = 0.922, πL = 0.208, πH = 0.085, aA = 0.908 and
aT = 0.909.
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approaching them. The high firm sets its price so that a consumer with a taste of aA − sH−L is
indifferent to buying and going to the low firm. This price and quantity is slightly to the right and
below the point at which the flatter and steeper segments of the demand curve meet which is that
point at which consumers with taste aA are indifferent to buying.
Looking now at the right panel, the only change to the parameters is that the population of
undirected consumers has been reduced. In accordance with equation 3.13, aA shifts upwards which
results in the high firm receiving fewer directed consumers and the flat segment of the demand
curve is narrower as a result. As the low firm receives more high taste consumers it raises its price
which deteriorates the outside option for directed consumers at the high firm. As a result the
high firm can sell to their directed consumers at a higher price. Overall however their profit has
deteriorated relative to the case where more consumers were undirected.
The key takeaway from this figure is that even in full information markets where a significant
fraction of consumers enter the market randomly, the low firm can earn greater profits than the
high firm. In the left panel the low firm earns profits that are around 6% higher than the high
firm whilst in the right panel the low firm earns 142% more. The reduction in the number of
undirected consumers allows the low firm to capture market share from the high quality firm. This
observation leads to the following proposition for the refined equilibrium of this subgame as the
proportion of undirected consumers approaches zero:
Proposition 3. The sole refined equilibrium of the full information subgame is one where no
consumers approach the high firm who make no profits. The low firm sells a quantity of 12 at a
price of L2 for a profit of
L
4 .
Proof. Equation 3.13 describing the ex ante indifferent consumer taste (aA) is continuous in ψ and
is 1 when ψ = 0. This indicates that as ψ → 0 we will have aT = aA + sH−L exceeding 1. Once ψ
is sufficiently high that aT > 1 the relevant equation describing aA is as given in equation 3.C.6
which also exhibits aA → 1 as ψ → 0.
As in the limit no directed consumers approach the high firm and no undirected consumers
exist the high firm will make no profit. The low firm’s price, quantity and profit can be found by
taking the limit as ψ → 0 for equations 3.C.3 and 3.C.5.
As a final point before the full game is considered note that in the special case when ψ ≡ 0
(as opposed to the refined equilibrium which is a limit as ψ → 0) it is also possible to establish all
consumers visiting the low quality firm as an equilibrium of the subgame.3.19 In this case however
it would be necessary to state beliefs of the high firm over the tastes of consumers who deviate to
3.19For appropriate low firm beliefs on deviating consumers it is also possible to establish an equilibrium of the
subgame (with ψ ≡ 0) where all consumers approach the high quality firm. As can be seen in the preceding analysis
however this alternate equilibrium would not survive trembling hand refinement through trembling the initial market
entry strategy of consumers choosing to approach the low or high firm.
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visit it out of equilibrium. The assumption that the high firm could observe the taste of a deviating
consumer before pricing (and assuming a finite amount of consumers so each is of positive mass)
or that the high firm believes that deviating consumers are of taste 1 would be sufficient to sustain
this equilibrium.
3.3.3 The disclosure decision
In order to ascertain whether either firm will choose to disclose quality to the market it is necessary
to consider each firm’s profit in the asymmetric information and full information cases. Considering
the refined equilibrium where all consumers visit the low firm and the high firm makes zero profits
it is clear that the high firm will not choose to disclose when ψ is low. Whilst this firm can make
H+L
16 in the asymmetric information market its profit tends to zero in the full information case as
ψ → 0. The condition for the low firm to prefer to disclose is found by comparing its profit in the
full information case which tends to L4 as ψ → 0 to its profits in the asymmetric information case
H+L
16 . This shows that the low firm will strictly prefer to disclose if H < 3L.
Proposition 4. If H > 3L then the sole refined equilibrium is one where no firm discloses and
the asymmetric information equilibrium described in section 3.3.1 results. If H < 3L then the
sole refined equilibrium is one where the low quality firm discloses and the full information refined
equilibrium described by proposition 2 results. If H = 3L then the two aforementioned equilibria
are possible.
Proof. See the paragraph preceding this proposition.
3.3.4 Welfare
The profits and surpluses corresponding to the refined PBEs from proposition 4 can be seen in
table 3.1 along with the profits and surpluses that would result from the asymmetric information
subgame. It can be seen that the full information refined equilibrium delivers lower surplus than
occurs under asymmetric information. Indeed the full information refined equilibrium delivers the





Average Purchased Quality L L+H2
Low firm Profit L4
L+H
16













Table 3.1: Profits and surpluses in each equilibria
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3.4 Extensions & Discussion
3.4.1 Endogenous Quality
In the benchmark model quality is exogenous. In this extension we consider the case where quality
is endogenous and firms are able to choose their quality level. We assume that firms can costlessly
choose any quality level Q ∈ [0, Q̄] where Q̄ is some upper limit set by technology. We consider
only the full information subgame where firms choose their quality level concurrently with their
pricing decision. Otherwise the game proceeds as per the model of section 3.3 and we will consider
only refined equilibria.
At this point we can state a proposition describing the quality choices in this setting:
Proposition 5. In all possible refined equilibria of the full information subgame, both firms will
choose the minimum quality level 0 and no surplus will be generated in the market.
Proof. Denoting the first and second firm’s qualities by Q1, Q2, no equilibrium can exist with
Q1 > Q2 ≥ 0. In this setting, the second firm could increase their profits by increasing their
quality closer to Q1 . By symmetry no equilibrium can exist with Q2 > Q1 ≥ 0.
In any putative equilibrium with Q1 = Q2 > 0, one firm can earn a discontinuous increase
in profits by reducing their quality by an epsilon and disclosing qualities to the market. This
possibility exists until one of the firms offers a quality of zero.
Considering the putative equilibrium where Q1 = Q2 = 0. Neither firm can increase their
profits given the strategy of the opposing firm and this is an equilibrium.
The intuition here is that in a mechanism similar to the Bertrand [1883] argument, firms can
capture the whole market if they undercut the other firm on quality. This potential to earn a
discontinuous increase in profits through undercutting will persist until one firm has a quality of
zero and no further undercutting is possible.
3.4.2 Signalling
The model presented does not include the possibility of signalling. This section will discuss how the
possibility of signalling can affect the outcome of the model. We will consider signalling to occur
at the point of the firm (for instance price signalling) rather than occurring before the consumer
enters the search market (for instance money-burning advertising).3.20
The addition of signalling at the point of the firm would be a nontrivial change to the model
and would require a beliefs refinement as well as cost differences (or some other difference between
3.20This temporal relationship where signaling can occur closer to the point of purchase than disclosure is similar
in spirit to the assumptions of the model of Jansson and Roy [2015]. Signalling which occurs before the consumer
enters the search market would be quite similar to disclosure in our model.
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high and low quality firms) to allow for signalling. For this study on disclosure however only
one implication of an expanded model is important. The low quality firm would be worse off
(relative to the full information refined equilibrium) in any equilibrium where consumers recognise
low quality at the point of sale but do not approach firms endogenously as they are uninformed
before approaching firms. Whilst in both cases the low firm is recognised as low quality, in cases
where consumers approach firms randomly the low firm does not benefit from higher sale volumes.
Furthermore greater equilibrium sales of the high firm means that they are selling to a wider range
of high taste consumers. This results in a lower high firm price which means the low firm would lose
more high taste consumers to the high firm. These forces mean that the low firm will strictly be
worse off in signalling markets (with random market entry) than in the full information disclosure
market (with endogenous market entry). Thus signalling could never occur even if allowed as
the low quality firm would pre-emptively disclose their quality to induce the full information
equilibrium presented in this paper.
On the other hand note that if the low firm were not able to disclose in this market3.21 then
the high quality firm would also not want to disclose even if it were possible for them to do
so. Depending on the costs involved, the high firm may wish to signal at the point of the firm
however so consumers recognise its high quality.3.22 In this way the high firm benefits from a
higher perceived value without losing customers through endogenous consumer market entry.
3.4.3 Multi-product Firms
The endogenous entry of consumers to the market has interesting implications in a setting of multi-
product firms. Multi-product firms may also be though to arise in part from high qualities seeking
to thwart the unravelling mechanism of this paper by encouraging low taste consumers to approach
them. In this extension we consider that there are two firms: one that sells both the high and low
quality good (the “both” firm) and the other that sells only the low quality good (the “low” firm).
We will consider only the full information subgame.
This is an interesting extension because a monopolistic screening problem appears for the both
firm. The lower is the price they set for the low quality good, the more high taste consumers will
opt for it cover the higher margin high quality good. In the case of endogenous market entry, the
firm selling both goods will encounter fewer low taste consumers than the low quality firm that
specialises in only selling this good. This ratio of high taste to low taste consumers amplifies the
monopoly screening effect. The firm selling both goods will not want to price lower than the low
3.21For instance consider the case in the United States between 1907 and 1977 where bar association advertising
rules prohibited lawyers from advertising.
3.22For instance while lawyer advertising was banned, large law firms invested heavily in opulent offices and
amenities which may have been a mechanism to signal quality.
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firm for fear of high taste consumers opting for it over the high quality good. The implication is
that a firm with high quality goods trying to avert the unravelling result by also selling low quality
goods will not be successful in this endeavour. Indeed in the full information subgame as ψ → 0,
the low firm still takes over the market:
Proposition 6. In the unique refined equilibrium of the full information subgame, the both firm
will price the low good at PL+s where PL is the low firm’s price for this good. This means the both
firm sells to all undirected consumers that visit it but low taste directed consumers still prefer to
approach the low firm. As is the case in proposition 3 as ψ → 0 the ex ante indifferent consumer
taste will approach 1, aA → 1. The both firm’s profit will tend to zero and the low firm’s profit to
L
4 in this refined equilibrium.
Proof. The proof is included in appendix 3.D
3.4.4 Many Firms
The full information equilibrium result where aA → 1 as ψ → 0 extends to the setting of many
firms. This can be seen in appendix 3.E. It also appears likely that this result would also extend
to the whole game depending on how disclosure was modelled in a multifirm setting. This paper
has so far modelled disclosure as one firm revealing both qualities. Whilst this is credible in the
duopolistic setting as a firm can disclose the relative differences in the two goods, it does not extend
easily to the multifirm setting.
A natural way in which disclosure could be added to the model would be to allow firms to choose
to disclose their quality or to pool by choosing to stay silent.3.23 Depending on what disclosures
occur, there could be no disclosures with the asymmetric information subgame occurring, there
could be all high quality or all low quality firms disclosing which would result in the full information
subgame occuring, there could be some (but not all) of one group of firms disclosing resulting in a
pooled quality level and a set of firms of known quality and finally there could be an information
setting where three quality levels exist for low firms, high firms and an intermediate group of pooled
firms.
With a sufficiently small search cost, the likely equilibrium would exhibit the low taste marginal
consumer at a low quality firm indifferent to buying and leaving the market, while the low taste
marginal consumer at a pooled firm is indifferent to buying and going to a low quality firm and
the marginal consumer at the high quality firm is indifferent to buying and going to a pooled firm.
In this setting the same unravelling result will occur as described in proposition 1. Consider a
3.23A second way that disclosure could be modelled is as firms exerting effort to shift the market’s ψ value. The
low firms may all choose to advertise more which leads to more informed consumers and more directed consumers.
Depending on the costs of this advertising to lower ψ and other parameter values, this may be a profitable strategy
for low quality firms.
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split with consumers of taste [0, x) going to the low firms, consumers of taste [x, x′) with x′ > x
going to the pooled firms and consumers of taste [x′, 1] going to the disclosing high firms. In the
absence of undirected consumers the high firm will want to price to make the consumer with taste
x′ indifferent between buying and leaving. This will lead to consumers of taste x′ being better off
going to a pooled firm ex ante which results in the same unravelling as discussed before. The same
unravelling would also occur at the margin of the low firms and the pooled firms.3.24 This will lead
to low firms disclosing as pooled and high quality firms make no profits in the refined equilibria.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper has presented a consumer search model with two key features: consumers have hetero-
geneous marginal utility from quality and enter the market endogenously. It is shown that when
consumers have full information in this simple setting the only equilibrium that survives refinement
is one where only the low quality firms sell goods. This result comes about because the effect of
quality on pricing decisions can be anticipated by consumers. The high firm will price to make
one of the consumers approaching it indifferent between buying and searching further after this
consumer has arrived at the firm. Anticipating this the consumer would be better off going a low
quality firm ex ante. Having lost such consumers the high quality firm will want to raise its price
to make a higher taste consumer indifferent. And thus there is an unravelling result where all
consumers end up shopping at the low quality firm.3.25
In an asymmetric information setting a pooling equilibrium may be sustainable if the quality
of the high firm’s goods are sufficiently higher than the quality of the low firm’s goods. In such
cases the low firm will prefer to pool with a higher perceived value of their good than disclose
and get a higher quantity. On the other hand if the high firm started signalling or disclosing after
consumers approach the firm then the low firm would not benefit from pooling and would be strictly
better of disclosing. Thus we can offer an argument for why a high quality firm may choose costly
signalling (at the point of the firm) over costless disclosure (before consumers approach firms) in
search markets. The caveat is that where a high quality firm separates itself from a low quality
firm through signalling there is no disincentive for the low quality firm to proactively disclose its
quality. The low firm can disclose their quality and benefit from a greater number of consumers
visiting the firm in equilibrium.
The analysis indicates that information provision is not necessarily harmful to a low quality
3.24The calculations for the case of unravelling with 3 levels of quality and many firms is shown in appendix 3.F.
3.25At a methodological level, consumer search models often have equilibria where no consumer searches beyond
their initial firm. A further contribution of this paper is that it highlights that in such a market with heterogeneity,
the assignment of consumers to their initial firm is important. In this paper’s model the equilibrium induced by
endogenous market entry differs markedly from the equilibrium induced by random assignment of consumers to
firms (which can be seen by considering equations 3.9 to 3.14 when ψ = 1).
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firm in markets exhibiting search frictions. It may indeed be in the best interests of a low quality
firm to disclose its low quality. Similarly it may not be in the interests of a high quality firm to
disclose its high quality as that may deter consumers from approaching the firm for fear of high
prices.
Whilst quality disclosure in this paper’s model can boost a low firm’s profits it is generally
bad for welfare. Both consumer surplus and producer surplus are decreased by the disclosure of
information to the market. In addition when quality is endogenised in the model it is shown that
competition can lead to firms reducing the quality they offer consumers even when both firms can
produce a good of any quality at the same cost. This implies that it may be welfare improving for
regulators to impose minimal quality standards in the market. It may also be welfare improving
for regulators to stop a low quality firm from voluntarily disclosing its quality to consumers until
consumers are at the point of sale. This suggestion may be problematic in many cases as it could be
argued firms and consumers have a moral right to voluntarily exchange truthful information before
trading. On the other hand such disclosures adversely impact consumers and the high quality firm
in the refined equilibrium presented in this paper. This is in addition to the issue in some markets
(such as the United States legal services market) where the mechanisms for low quality disclosure
produces undesirable externalities for other participants in the market.3.26 Thus in certain cases it
may on balance be better for a regulator or professional body to intervene to prevent low quality
firm disclosures.
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Appendices
3.A Proof of lemma 3
To prove lemma 3 we will show first that given sufficiently small search costs, no equilibrium can
satisfy PHH =
PL





Lemma 4. For a sufficiently low search cost, there are no equilibriums where PHH =
PL
L :
Proof. In the first case note that in an equilibrium with PHH =
PL
L = 0 then neither firm is making
any profits. The high firm could earn positive profits by setting a small price and selling to high
taste consumers.
In the second case we consider a putative equilibria where PHH =
PL
L > 0. We will use the
notation x = PHH =
PL
L and note that aA = x and the low firm gets all consumers with a lower
taste and the high firm gets all consumers with a higher taste. At first we will assume aT ≤ 1.














where all sales are to undirected consumers that visit the low firm initially. Note that sales are
entirely dependent on the extent of the search cost s. Now if the low firm instead reduced their
price to xL− ε where xL > ε > 0 then their profit would be:






























































Where sales are to undirected consumers who visit the firm initially as well as directed consumers


















positive for a sufficiently small s.
Now considering the case where aT > 1. Using the demand function (3.4) we can write the









where all sales are to undirected consumers that visit the low firm initially. Note that as aT > 1
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then (1− x) < sH−L . Now if the low firm instead reduced their price to xL− ε where xL > ε > 0
and ε is sufficiently small that aT is still greater than one then their profit would be:











































Where sales are to undirected consumers who visit the firm initially as well as directed consumers
















as positive and this is a profitable deviation.
Lemma 5. For a sufficiently low search cost, there are no equilibria where PHH <
PL
L :
Proof. Suppose that PHH <
PL
L . We will denote xL =
PL
L and xH =
PH
H . In this case aA =
HxH−LxL
H−L .
We can note this implies we must have aT < 1 if the search cost is small. This is because
aT > 1 would imply:
HxH − LxL + s
H − L
> 1
L(1− xL) + s > H(1− xH)
Now as H > L and (1 − xH) > (1 − xL), it is not possible for this to hold if the search cost is
sufficiently small.




















Where the firm only sells to undirected consumers that approach it initially if the search cost is
sufficiently high (as xH < xL). Note for a sufficiently small s this profit is zero. Now if the low
firm lowers its price to xLL− Lε,3.27 it gets a profit of:




xH(H − L) + εL+ s
H − L









Which is greater than πLow(xLL) for a sufficiently small value of s.
3.27Note that this is always possible unless xH = 0 which is not possible from lemma 4.
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3.B Equilibrium in a competitive market
In this appendix the benchmark model will be analysed in the absence of search frictions. All
consumers buy one good knowing the two prices. There is no search cost and as a result the
concept of directed/undirected consumers is not used here.
With similar logic as earlier in this paper it can be noted that the set of consumers who will
buy from a given firm will be a convex set. It can also be noted that the high firm will not sell to
all consumers as this would require a price of 0 which would result in no profits.
We will use the notation of [0, aL] to describe the consumers who will not buy but will take the
outside option; [aL, aA] is the set of consumers who will buy from the low firm and [aA, 1] is the
set of consumers who will buy from the high firm. Considering the condition for a consumer to be
indifferent between the high and low firm’s offering we get aA =
PH−PL
H−L . Considering a consumer
indifferent between buying at the low firm and the ouside option yields aL =
PL
L . These can be

























Taking first order conditions of equations 3.B.1 and 3.B.2 yields the reaction functions PH(PL) =
H−L+PL
2 and PL(PH) =
LPH















Examining the profit expressions (3.B.4), we can note in this setting the high firm’s profit is
always strictly higher than low firm’s profit by a factor of 4HL .
Comparing the high firms profit in the search model (3.11) with no directed consumers (ψ = 1)
to the high firm profit in the competitive model (3.B.1) we find that in the search case profits
are (3H−s)
2(4H−L)2











2−12 ≈ 3.65 then this profit ratio is greater than one. Now examining the
ratio of low firm profits it can be calculated that the low firms profits are (4L−3s)
2(4H−L)2
2L2(9H−4L)2 . In the
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3.C Derivation of Equilibrium when aT > 1
We derive the equilibrium in the case when aT > 1 which is likely when ψ is low and aA is close
to 1. First rewriting QLow(PL) (equation 3.7):
QLow(PL) =
















(1− ψ) [aA − aL(PL)]
With the same solution steps as in section 3.3.2 we can derive the following expressions:
PH =
2H2ψ − 8H2 − 4HLψ + 12HL + 2Hψs + 2L2ψ − 4L2
Hψ2 − 2Hψ − 8H + 8L
(3.C.2)
PL =
−HLψ2 − 4HL +Hψ2s + 2Hψs + L2ψ2 + 4L2


















Hψ2 − 2Hψ − 8H + 8L
)2 (3.C.5)
aA =
8H2 − 2H2ψ −HLψ2 + 4HLψ − 16HL + 2Hψ2s − 2Hψs − 8Hs + L2ψ2 − 2L2ψ + 8L2 + 8Ls
(H − L)
(
8(H − L) + 2Hψ −Hψ2
) (3.C.6)
aT =
8H2 − 2H2ψ −HLψ2 + 4HLψ − 16HL + 2Hψ2s − 2Hψs − 8Hs + L2ψ2 − 2L2ψ + 8L2 + 8Ls
(H − L)
(
8(H − L) + 2Hψ −Hψ2
) (3.C.7)
3.D Multiproduct firms
Now consider that there is one firm that sells both high and low quality goods (the “both” firm)
and one that only sells the low quality firm (the “low” firm). PH is the price of the high good
(sold by the both firm), PB is the price of the low good from the both firm and PL is the price
of the low good from the low firm. The profits of the low and both firm are given by πL and πB
respectively. We will consider only the full information subgame. We will redefine the ex ante





We will use λ to denote the fraction of directed consumers with tastes lower than aA that go to
the low firm upon entering the market. Clearly λ = 1 if in an equilibrium PL < PB and λ = 0
if PL > PB . A consumer indifferent between buying and leaving a firm will choose to buy at the
current firm.
We can note that no equilibrium can take place where PB > PL + s. In this case the both firm
could reduce their price to PL+s and sell to low taste undirected consumers at the both firm while
the outside option for these consumers (of buying the low good at total cost PL+s) would stay the
same. There can also be no equilibrium where PL > PB + s. In this case the low firm would sell
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no quantity and make no profit. They could make strictly positive profits by pricing at another
level (for instance this firm can guarantee a positive profit by selling to undirected consumers at a
price of s2 ).
Now writing the firm profit functions for a putative equilibrium where |PB − PL| ≤ s. In this
case a consumer will never leave one firm to buy the low quality good from the other. The profit















































) + PH(1− aA)
]
+
High taste runoff from low firm︷ ︸︸ ︷
ψ
2




At this point it can be seen that intuitively as the both firm lowers the price of the low quality
good (within P − s ≤ PB ≤ PL+ s) it reduces the amount of the high quality good it can sell. The
low firm faces no such problem. This leads to the following lemma:
Lemma 6. For a small search cost and a nonzero fraction of undirected consumers, no equilibrium
exists where PB ≤ PL.
Proof. We will show this by supposing the contrary such that PB ≤ PL and hence aA = PH−PBH−L .
We will first guess that in equilibrium PH−PL+sH−L < 1 Taking first order conditions of equations




−2HaAλψ + 2HaAλ+ 2LaAλψ − 2LaAλ+ PEHψ + ψs
)














HaAλψ −HaAλ−HaAψ +HaA − LaAλψ + LaAλ+ LaAψ − LaA + PEHψ
)
2Hλψ − 2Hλ−Hψ + 2H − 2Lλψ + 2Lλ+ 2Lψ − 2L
(3.D.6)
Substituting in that in equilibrium PEH = PH and aA must satisfy aA =
PH−PB
H−L and solving these
equations yields expressions for the prices of the putative equilibrium:3.28
PH =
(2H − 2L− ψs) (2Hλψ − 2Hλ−Hψ + 2H − Lλψ + Lλ+ Lψ − L)
(H − L) (ψ + 2) (2λψ − 2λ− ψ + 2)
(3.D.7)
PB =
L (2H − 2L− ψs) (λψ − λ+ 1)
(H − L) (ψ + 2) (2λψ − 2λ− ψ + 2)
(3.D.8)
aA =
2H − 2L− ψs
(H − L) (ψ + 2)
(3.D.9)
3.28The expression for PL is omitted as it is long but it can be found by substituting equations 3.D.9 and 3.D.7
into equation 3.D.4.
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Now taking the difference between PL and PB and taking s to zero in the limit. This should be
nonnegative by assumption.
PL − PB =
Lψ (2Hλψ − 2Hλ−Hψ − 3Lλψ + 3Lλ+ Lψ − L)
(ψ + 2) (2λψ − 2λ− ψ + 2) (2Hλ− 2Hλψ +Hψ + 2Lλψ − 2Lλ)
(3.D.10)
First considering the case where PL > PB and hence λ = 0 this difference should be strictly
positive. In this case it simplifies to:
PL − PB =
L (−L− (H − L)ψ)
H (2− ψ) (ψ + 2)
(3.D.11)
Which is strictly negative. Thus we cannot have an equilibrium where PL > PB for a small
search cost. Now considering the other case where PL = PB and hence 1 ≥ λ ≥ 0. The
difference in equation 3.D.10 must be equal to zero. This is the case if either ψ = 03.29 or
(2Hλψ − 2Hλ−Hψ − 3Lλψ + 3Lλ+ Lψ − L) = 0. This second condition can only hold if λ =
(H−L)ψ+L
(3L−2H)(1−ψ) . The numerator of this equation is always greater than L and the denominator is
always less than L. As λ can only be in the range [0, 1] this indicates there is no equilibrium with
equal low quality good prices.
Now we guess that PH−PL+sH−L ≥ 1. Taking first order conditions of equation 3.D.2 and rearrang-
ing:
PL =
L (2aAλψ − 2aAλ− ψ)
4λψ − 4λ− 2ψ
(3.D.12)
With the reaction functions for PH and PB being identical to equations 3.D.5 and 3.D.6. As PL
does not enter these other reaction functions the prices PH ,PL and aA in this equilibrium are
identical to those given in equations 3.D.7, 3.D.8 and 3.D.9 respectively. PL can be found by
substituting these expressions into equation 3.D.12. Now taking the difference between PL and PB
and taking s to zero in the limit. This should be nonnegative by assumption.
PL − PB = −
Lψ
(
ψ2 + 4λ− 2λψ2 − 2λψ
)
2 (ψ + 2) (ψ + 2λ(1− ψ)) (2− 2λ(1− ψ)− ψ)
(3.D.13)
Which is negative for all λ. Hence we cannot have an equilibrium where PH−PL+sH−L ≥ 1 and
PB ≤ PL.












3.29This can be seen intuitively by substituting ψ = 0 into eqations 3.D.2 and 3.D.3 and taking the first order
conditions which are scalar multiples of each other.
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Which will be positive for a small search cost and PB < L.
3.30. This implies that the optimal PB
will be equal to PL + s which is the top of the domain of possible prices satisfying |PB − PL| ≤ s.
Note that if the both firm posted a higher price they would experience a discontinuous in sales
while the outside option of their consumers would stay the same.
Now using λ = 1, aA =
PH−PL
H−L and PB = PL + s and using first order conditions to solve for
equilibrium quantities for the case where PH−PL+sH−L < 1 as:
PH =
4H2ψ − 8H2 − 8HLψ + 12HL+ 2Hψ2s− 4Hψs+ 4L2ψ − 4L2 − 3Lψ2s
(ψ + 2) (2Hψ − 4H − 3Lψ + 4L)
(3.D.15)
PL =
2L (−Hψ + 2H + Lψ − 2L+ 2ψs)
(ψ + 2) (4H − 2Hψ + 3Lψ − 4L)
(3.D.16)
PB =
2HLψ − 4HL+ 2Hψ2s− 8Hs− 2L2ψ + 4L2 − 3Lψ2s− 6Lψs+ 8Ls
(ψ + 2) (2Hψ − 4H − 3Lψ + 4L)
(3.D.17)
aA =
2H − 2L+ ψs
(H − L) (ψ + 2)
(3.D.18)
Where aA approaches 1 as ψ → 0. This will imply that at some level of ψ we have PH−PL+sH−L ≥ 1.
Now considering this case we can get the equilibrium quantities:
PH =
4H2ψ − 8H2 −HLψ2 − 6HLψ + 12HL+ 2Hψ2s− 4Hψs+ L2ψ2 + 2L2ψ − 4L2 + 2Lψs





−Hψ2 + 2Hψ − 4H + Lψ2 − 2Lψ + 4L+ 2ψ2s− 2ψs
)




−HLψ2 + 2HLψ − 4HL+ 2Hψ2s− 8Hs+ L2ψ2 − 2L2ψ + 4L2 − 2Lψs+ 8Ls
)
2 (H − L) (ψ − 2) (ψ + 2)
(3.D.21)
aA =
2H − 2L+ ψs
(H − L) (ψ + 2)
(3.D.22)
Where again aA approaches 1 as ψ → 0.
3.E For Online Publication: Many Firms in a full information consumer
search
There are h+ l firms in a market, h of which sell a product of quality H (the high firms) and l of
which sell goods with a lower quality of L (the low firms), where H > L. We assume h > 1 and
l > 1 and that all firms produce their goods costlessly. We make the assumption that all firms of
a particular quality level sell at the same price. This is done in order for this analysis to arrive
at a similar equilibrium to that of section 3.3.2. With these assumption lemmas 1, corollary 2
and lemma 3 carry over with the only modification that directed consumers approach a quality
3.30This can be seen by substituting taking the first order condition for the optimal PH (identical to equation











2(H−L) which is positive as
1
ψ
> 1 > PB
L
and s is small.
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level rather than a specific firm. As before we will denote the ex ante indifferent consumer aA so
consumers with a lower taste approach a low firm and higher taste consumers approach high firms.
QHigh(PH ) =
Undirected - own︷ ︸︸ ︷
ψ
h + l
[1 −max(aHL(PH ), aH (PH ))]+ +
















1 −max(aA, aHL(PH ), aH (PH ))
]
+
The demand function for the low firm can be written as:
QLow(PL) =




min(1, aT (PL)) − aL(PL)
]
+ +
















min(aA, aT (PL)) − aL(PL)
]
+
As before we examine the case when the search costs are sufficiently low that the high firm’s marginal consumer is indifferent to the low firm.
QHigh(PH ) =




1 − aH (PH )
]
+

















Case A: aT < 1
Now assuming aT < 1 we can rewrite the low firm’s demand function as:
QLow(PL) =




aT (PL) − aL(PL)
]
+










And we can solve to get:
PH =
2H2h2 + 3H2hlψ +H2l2ψ2 +HLh2ψ − 3HLh2 +HLhlψ2 − 4HLhlψ −HLl2ψ2 + 2Hh2ψs +Hhlψ2s − 3Hhlψs − 2Hl2ψ2s − L2h2ψ
2Hh2ψ + 2Hh2 +Hhlψ2 + 3Hhlψ +Hl2ψ2 + Lh2ψ2 − 2Lh2 + Lhlψ2 − 3Lhlψ − Ll2ψ2
+
L2h2 − L2hlψ2 + L2hlψ + Lh2ψ2s + Lhlψs
2Hh2ψ + 2Hh2 +Hhlψ2 + 3Hhlψ +Hl2ψ2 + Lh2ψ2 − 2Lh2 + Lhlψ2 − 3Lhlψ − Ll2ψ2
PL =
HLh2 + 2HLhlψ +HLl2ψ2 −Hhlψ2s −Hhlψs −Hl2ψ2s − L2h2 − 2L2hlψ − L2l2ψ2 + Lh2ψ2s + 2Lh2ψs + 2Lhlψ2s − Lhlψs − Ll2ψ2s
2Hh2ψ + 2Hh2 +Hhlψ2 + 3Hhlψ +Hl2ψ2 + Lh2ψ2 − 2Lh2 + Lhlψ2 − 3Lhlψ − Ll2ψ2
πH =
ψ
(H − L) (h + l)
(
2Hh2ψ + 2Hh2 +Hhlψ2 + 3Hhlψ +Hl2ψ2 + Lh2ψ2 − 2Lh2 + Lhlψ2 − 3Lhlψ − Ll2ψ2














(H + Lψ − L)
L (H − L) (h + l)
(





2 −Hhlψ2s −Hhlψs −Hl2ψ2s − L2h2 − 2L2hlψ − L2l2ψ2Lh2ψ2s + 2Lh2ψs + 2Lhlψ2s − Lhlψs − Ll2ψ2s
]2
aA =
2Hh2 + 3Hhlψ +Hl2ψ2 + Lh2ψ − 2Lh2 + Lhlψ2 − 3Lhlψ − Ll2ψ2 + 2h2ψs + 2hlψ2s − 2hlψs − l2ψ2s
2Hh2ψ + 2Hh2 +Hhlψ2 + 3Hhlψ +Hl2ψ2 + Lh2ψ2 − 2Lh2 + Lhlψ2 − 3Lhlψ − Ll2ψ2
(3.E.5)
aT =
H2lψ(3h + lψ) −HLh2(4 − ψ) + 2H2h2 −HLhlψ(6 − ψ) − 2H(Ll2ψ2 + h2s) +Hhlψs(ψ − 5) − ψ(2Hl2ψs + L2h2)
(H − L)
(
2Hh2ψ + 2Hh2 +Hhlψ2 + 3Hhlψ +Hl2ψ2 + Lh2ψ2 − 2Lh2 + Lhlψ2 − 3Lhlψ − Ll2ψ2
)
+
L2h(2h − lψ2) + L2lψ(3h + lψ) − Lh2ψs(ψ + 2) − Lhs(3lψ2 − 2h) + Llψs(5H + 2lψ)
(H − L)
(
2Hh2ψ + 2Hh2 +Hhlψ2 + 3Hhlψ +Hl2ψ2 + Lh2ψ2 − 2Lh2 + Lhlψ2 − 3Lhlψ − Ll2ψ2
)
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Case B: aT ≥ 1
Now assuming aT ≥ 1 we can rewrite the low firm’s demand function as:
QLow(PL) =














And we can solve to get:
PH =
2H2h2 + 3H2hlψ +H2l2ψ2 − 3HLh2 − 4HLhlψ −HLl2ψ2 + 2Hh2ψs +Hhlψ2s − 3Hhlψs − 2Hl2ψ2s
2Hh2ψ + 2Hh2 +Hhlψ2 + 3Hhlψ +Hl2ψ2 − Lh2ψ2 − Lh2ψ − 2Lh2 − 3Lhlψ − Ll2ψ2
+
L2h2 + L2hlψ − Lh2ψ2s − Lh2ψs + Lhlψ2s + Lhlψs
2Hh2ψ + 2Hh2 +Hhlψ2 + 3Hhlψ +Hl2ψ2 − Lh2ψ2 − Lh2ψ − 2Lh2 − 3Lhlψ − Ll2ψ2
PL =
HLh2ψ2 +HLh2 + 2HLhlψ +HLl2ψ2 −Hhlψ2s −Hhlψs −Hl2ψ2s − L2h2ψ2 − L2h2
2Hh2ψ + 2Hh2 +Hhlψ2 + 3Hhlψ +Hl2ψ2 − Lh2ψ2 − Lh2ψ − 2Lh2 − 3Lhlψ − Ll2ψ2
+
Lh2ψs − 2L2hlψ − L2l2ψ2 − Lh2ψ2s + 2Lhlψ2s − Lhlψs − Ll2ψ2s
2Hh2ψ + 2Hh2 +Hhlψ2 + 3Hhlψ +Hl2ψ2 − Lh2ψ2 − Lh2ψ − 2Lh2 − 3Lhlψ − Ll2ψ2
πH =
ψ
(H − L) (h + l)
(
2Hh2ψ + 2Hh2 +Hhlψ2 + 3Hhlψ +Hl2ψ2 − Lh2ψ2 − Lh2ψ − 2Lh2 − 3Lhlψ − Ll2ψ2










L (h + l)
(
2Hh2ψ + 2Hh2 +Hhlψ2 + 3Hhlψ +Hl2ψ2 − Lh2ψ2 − Lh2ψ − 2Lh2 − 3Lhlψ − Ll2ψ2
)2 [Hhlψ2s −HLh2ψ2 −HLh2
−2HLhlψ −HLl2ψ2 +Hhlψs +Hl2ψ2s + L2h2ψ2 + L2h2 + 2L2hlψ + L2l2ψ2 + Lh2ψ2s − Lh2ψs − 2Lhlψ2s + Lhlψs + Ll2ψ2s
]2
aA =
2H2h2 + 3H2hlψ +H2l2ψ2 −HLh2ψ2 − 4HLh2 − 6HLhlψ − 2HLl2ψ2 + 2Hh2ψs + 2Hhlψ2s − 2Hhlψs −Hl2ψ2s
(H − L)
(
2Hh2ψ + 2Hh2 +Hhlψ2 + 3Hhlψ +Hl2ψ2 − Lh2ψ2 − Lh2ψ − 2Lh2 − 3Lhlψ − Ll2ψ2
) (3.E.7)
+
L2h2ψ2 + 2L2h2 + 3L2hlψ + L2l2ψ2 − 2Lh2ψs − Lhlψ2s + 2Lhlψs + Ll2ψ2s
(H − L)
(
2Hh2ψ + 2Hh2 +Hhlψ2 + 3Hhlψ +Hl2ψ2 − Lh2ψ2 − Lh2ψ − 2Lh2 − 3Lhlψ − Ll2ψ2
)
aT =
Hψ2(Hl2 − Lh2) −HLh(4h + 6lψ) +H2h(2h + 3lψ) − 2H(Ll2ψ2 + h2s) −Hhlψs(5 − ψ) − 2Hl2ψ2s + L2h2ψ2 + 2L2h2 + 3L2hlψ
(H − L)
(
2Hh2ψ + 2Hh2 +Hhlψ2 + 3Hhlψ +Hl2ψ2 − Lh2ψ2 − Lh2ψ − 2Lh2 − 3Lhlψ − Ll2ψ2
) + L2l2ψ2 + Lh2ψ2s − Lh2ψs + 2Lh2s − Lhlψ2s + 5Lhlψs + 2Ll2ψ2s
(H − L)
(
2Hh2ψ + 2Hh2 +Hhlψ2 + 3Hhlψ +Hl2ψ2 − Lh2ψ2 − Lh2ψ − 2Lh2 − 3Lhlψ − Ll2ψ2
)
As ψ → 0
As ψ → 0 we get aA as defined by equation 3.E.5 approaching 1.3.31 This indicates that as ψ → 0
we get aT going above aA and hence the second case will arise. As ψ → 0 we get aA as defined by
equation 3.E.7 approaching 1.
Thus in a similar result to proposition 3, the low quality firms take over the market in the full
information as the number of directed consumers increases.
3.F For Online Publication: Three levels of quality in the market
The top firm has a quality of H. The middle firm has a quality of M and the lower firm has a
quality of L. The ex ante indifferent consumers between the low and middle quality firms have
a taste denoted aA while the ex ante indifferent consumers between the high and middle quality
firms have a taste denoted aA2. There are γ firms in total, β lower quality firms and α middle
quality firms and so γ − α− β high quality firms.
By setting up expressions similar to equation 3.1 and rearranging, we can derive expressions
for the indifferent taste consumers at each firm. These can be seen in table 3.F.1:
3.31This can be seen by substituting ψ = 0 into the equation and noting the feasible range of aA is the closed
interval between 0 and 1.
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Notation Location of consumer Indifferent between Formula










aH High firm Buying and going to medium firm
PH−PEM−s
H−M
aHLeave High firm Going to low firm and leaving market
PEL +s
L
aMH Medium firm Buying and going to high firm
PEH−PM+s
H−M
aM Medium firm Buying and going to low firm
PM−PEL −s
M−L
aMLeave Medium firm Going to low firm and leaving market
PEL +s
L
aLM Low firm Buying and going to medium firm
PEM−PL+s
M−L
aL Low firm Buying and leaving market
PL
L
Table 3.F.1: Indifferent Consumers for model with three quality levels
Now we will examine the putative equilibria where s is small. We shall suppose that the search
cost is sufficiently low that all of the following hold. The best outside for the marginal consumer
at a high firm is to go to a medium firm, the best outside option for the highest taste marginal
consumer at a medium firm is to go to a high firm. The best outside option for the bottom
taste marginal consumer at a medium firm is to go to a low firm. The top and bottom marginal
consumers at the low firm will go to a medium firm/ leave market respectively.
We write profit functions for each firm starting with the low firms:
QuantityL(PL) =
Undirected - own︷ ︸︸ ︷
ψ
γ
[min(1, aLM (PL)) − aL(PL)]+ +




















Now writing the demand function for the medium firms:
QuantityM (PM ) =
Undirected - own︷ ︸︸ ︷
ψ
γ
[min(1, aMH(PM )) − aM (PM )]+ +





aA2 − max(aA +
s


















[aA2 − max(aA, aM (PM ))]+
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Now writing the demand function for the high firms:
QuantityH(PH) =
Undirected - own︷ ︸︸ ︷
ψ
γ
[1 − aH(PH)]+ +
Undirected Runoff from the bottom firms︷ ︸︸ ︷
ψ β
γ
γ − α− β [1 − max(aA2, aH(PH))]+
+
Undirected Runoff from the medium firms︷ ︸︸ ︷
ψ α
γ
γ − α− β
[








γ − α− β [1 − max(aA2, aH(PH))]+
Algebra
The sympy package of python was used to solve for equilibrium values PL, PM , PH , aA, aA2. The
code to do this can be seen on the following pages. It can be found that in the case aMH < 1 &
aLM < 1, the case aMH < 1 & aLM < 1 and the case aMH > 1 & aLM > 1 we have aA → 1 and
aA2 → 1 as ψ → 0.3.32
’ ’ ’
Pap e r : I t ’ s Good t o b e Bad : A mode l o f l ow q u a l i t y d om inan c e i n a f u l l i n f o r m a t i o n c on s ume r s e a r c h
ma r k e t
Au t h o r : S t u a r t Baumann & Ma r g a r y t a Klymak
Da t e : 6 t h o f A p r i l 2 017
Comments : T h i s c o d e s o l v e s t h e mod e l w h e r e t h e r e a r e t h r e e q u a l i t y l e v e l s a s o c c u r s when t h e r e a r e many
f i r m s o n l y some o f w h i c h may d i s c l o s e . V e r s i o n 1 . 0 o f sympy i s u s e d .
’ ’ ’
# P r e p a r i n g w o r k s p a c e and d e c l a r i n g v a r i a b l e s
%re s e t −f
import sympy as sy
H, M, L , psi , a A , a A2 , s , p L , p M , p H , alpha , beta , gamma = sy . symbols ( ’H M L ps i a A a {A2} s p L
p M p H alpha beta gamma ’ )
# Wr i t i n g F u n c t i o n t o s o l v e f o r e q u i l i b r i u m .
def GetEquil ibrium (LowDemandExpr , MedDemandExpr , HighDemandExpr ) :
global H, M, L , psi , a A , a A2 , s , p L , p M , p H , alpha , beta , gamma
# G e t t i n g R e a c t i o n F u n c t i o n s
LowPi = LowDemandExpr∗p L
LowReactionFunction = next ( i t er ( sy . s o l v e s e t ( sy . d i f f (LowPi , p L ) , p L ) ) )
MedPi = MedDemandExpr∗p M
MedReactionFunction = next ( i t er ( sy . s o l v e s e t ( sy . d i f f (MedPi , p M) ,p M) ) )
HighPi = HighDemandExpr∗p H
HighReactionFunction = next ( i t er ( sy . s o l v e s e t ( sy . d i f f ( HighPi , p H) , p H) ) )
# Ex Ante I n d i f f e r e n t Consumer s
ExAnteInd i f f e rent = {a A : (p M−p L ) /(M−L) , a A2 : (p H−p M) /(H−M) }
# Sub i n a A and a A2
LowFunction2 = LowReactionFunction . subs ( ExAnteInd i f f e rent )
MedFunction2 = MedReactionFunction . subs ( ExAnteInd i f f e rent )
HighFunction2 = HighReactionFunction . subs ( ExAnteInd i f f e rent )
# S o l v i n g t o g e t e a c h a s f u n c t i o n o f o t h e r two
LowFunction3 = next ( i t er ( sy . s o l v e s e t ( LowFunction2 − p L , p L ) ) )
MedFunction3 = next ( i t er ( sy . s o l v e s e t (MedFunction2 − p M ,p M) ) )
HighFunction3 = next ( i t er ( sy . s o l v e s e t ( HighFunction2 − p H , p H) ) )
# E l i m i n a t e Low p r i c e f r om o t h e r two .
MedFunction4 = next ( i t er ( sy . s o l v e s e t (MedFunction3 . subs ( p L , LowFunction3 ) − p M ,p M) ) )
HighFunction4 = next ( i t er ( sy . s o l v e s e t ( HighFunction3 . subs ( p L , LowFunction3 ) − p H , p H) ) )
# Sub MedFun c t i o n 4 i n t o H i g h F u n c t i o n 4 t o g e t e x p r e s s i o n f o r h i g h p r i c e . Then g e t medium and l ow
p r i c e s
3.32Output of the code is not shown as the expressions are complicated and occupy many pages. Should you wish
to replicate these results please find the python code on the author’s (Baumann) website.
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RawHighPrice = next ( i t er ( sy . s o l v e s e t ( HighFunction4 . subs (p M , MedFunction4 ) − p H ,
p H) ) )
RawMedPrice = next ( i t er ( sy . s o l v e s e t ( MedFunction4 . subs (p H , RawHighPrice ) − p M ,
p M) ) )
RawLowPrice = next ( i t er ( sy . s o l v e s e t ( LowFunction3 . subs ({p H : RawHighPrice , p M : RawMedPrice}) − p L ,
p L ) ) )
# S i m p l i f y i n g p r i c e s
LowPrice = sy . f a c t o r ( sy . s imp l i f y (RawLowPrice ) )
MedPrice = sy . f a c t o r ( sy . s imp l i f y (RawMedPrice ) )
HighPrice = sy . f a c t o r ( sy . s imp l i f y ( RawHighPrice ) )
# G e t t i n g e x p r e s s i o n s f o r e x a n t e i n d i f f e r e n t c o n s ume r s
a AExpr = sy . f a c t o r ( sy . s imp l i f y ( ( MedPrice − LowPrice ) /(M−L) ) )
a A2Expr = sy . f a c t o r ( sy . s imp l i f y ( ( HighPrice − MedPrice ) /(H−M) ) )
# What do a A and a A2 t e n d t o a s $ p s i \ r i g h t a r r o w 0 $ . No t e t h a t d i r e c t s u b s t i t u t i o n i s ok
# a s e x p r e s s i o n s w i l l b e c o n t i n u o u s
a ALowPsi = sy . f a c t o r ( sy . s imp l i f y ( a AExpr . subs ( psi , 0 ) ) )
a A2LowPsi = sy . f a c t o r ( sy . s imp l i f y ( a A2Expr . subs ( psi , 0 ) ) )
# D i c t i o n a r y To Re t u r n
Equi l ibr iumValues = { ’ p L ’ : LowPrice , ’p M ’ : MedPrice , ’ p H ’ : HighPrice , ’ a A ’ : a AExpr , ’ a A2 ’ :
a A2Expr ,
’ a ALimit ’ : a ALowPsi , ’ a A2Limit ’ : a A2LowPsi }
# R e t u r n i n g E q u i l i b r i u m Va l u e s
return ( Equi l ibr iumValues )
# Case 1 : T h i s i s g u e s s i n g f o r t h e l ow and medium f i r m s t h a t t h e 1 n e v e r b i n d s i n t h e min f u n c t i o n .
LowDemandExpr = ( ps i /gamma) ∗((p M − p L + s ) /(M−L) − p L/L ) + (( p s i ∗alpha ) /(gamma∗beta ) ) ∗( a A − s /(M−L
)− p L/L) + (( p s i ∗(gamma−beta−alpha ) ) /(gamma∗beta ) ) ∗( a A − p L/L) + ((1− ps i ) /( beta ) ) ∗( a A − p L/L)
MedDemandExpr = ( ps i /gamma) ∗((p M − p H − s ) /(M−H) − (p M − p L − s ) /(M−L) ) + (( p s i ∗beta ) /(gamma∗alpha )
) ∗( a A2 −a A − s /(M−L) ) + ( ( p s i ∗(gamma−beta−alpha ) ) /(gamma∗alpha ) ) ∗( a A2 − s /(H−M) − a A ) + ((1−
ps i ) /( alpha ) ) ∗( a A2 − a A )
HighDemandExpr = ( ps i /gamma) ∗(1 − ( p H − p M − s ) /(H−M) ) + (( p s i ∗beta ) /(gamma∗(gamma−alpha−beta ) ) ) ∗(1 −
a A2 ) + (( p s i ∗alpha ) /(gamma∗(gamma−alpha−beta ) ) )∗(1− a A2 − s /(H−M) ) + ((1− ps i ) /(gamma−alpha−beta )
) ∗(1 − a A2 )
EqCase1 = GetEquil ibrium (LowDemandExpr , MedDemandExpr , HighDemandExpr )
# Case 2 : We h a v e a {MH} > 1 b u t a {LM} < 1
LowDemandExpr = ( ps i /gamma) ∗((p M − p L + s ) /(M−L) − p L/L ) + (( p s i ∗alpha ) /(gamma∗beta ) ) ∗( a A − s /(M−L
)− p L/L) + (( p s i ∗(gamma−beta−alpha ) ) /(gamma∗beta ) ) ∗( a A − p L/L) + ((1− ps i ) /( beta ) ) ∗( a A − p L/L)
MedDemandExpr = ( ps i /gamma) ∗(1 − (p M − p L − s ) /(M−L) ) + (( p s i ∗beta ) /(gamma∗alpha ) ) ∗( a A2 −a A − s /(M−
L) ) + ( ( p s i ∗(gamma−beta−alpha ) ) /(gamma∗alpha ) ) ∗( a A2 − s /(H−M) − a A ) + ((1− ps i ) /( alpha ) ) ∗( a A2 −
a A )
HighDemandExpr = ( ps i /gamma) ∗(1 − ( p H − p M − s ) /(H−M) ) + (( p s i ∗beta ) /(gamma∗(gamma−alpha−beta ) ) ) ∗(1 −
a A2 ) + (( p s i ∗alpha ) /(gamma∗(gamma−alpha−beta ) ) )∗(1− a A2 − s /(H−M) ) + ((1− ps i ) /(gamma−alpha−beta )
) ∗(1 − a A2 )
EqCase2 = GetEquil ibrium (LowDemandExpr , MedDemandExpr , HighDemandExpr )
# Case 3 : We h a v e a {MH} > 1 and a {LM} > 1
LowDemandExpr = ( ps i /gamma) ∗(1 − p L/L ) + (( p s i ∗alpha ) /(gamma∗beta ) ) ∗( a A − s /(M−L)− p L/L) + (( p s i ∗(
gamma−beta−alpha ) ) /(gamma∗beta ) ) ∗( a A − p L/L) + ((1− ps i ) /( beta ) ) ∗( a A − p L/L)
MedDemandExpr = ( ps i /gamma) ∗(1 − (p M − p L − s ) /(M−L) ) + (( p s i ∗beta ) /(gamma∗alpha ) ) ∗( a A2 −a A − s /(M−
L) ) + ( ( p s i ∗(gamma−beta−alpha ) ) /(gamma∗alpha ) ) ∗( a A2 − s /(H−M) − a A ) + ((1− ps i ) /( alpha ) ) ∗( a A2 −
a A )
HighDemandExpr = ( ps i /gamma) ∗(1 − ( p H − p M − s ) /(H−M) ) + (( p s i ∗beta ) /(gamma∗(gamma−alpha−beta ) ) ) ∗(1 −
a A2 ) + (( p s i ∗alpha ) /(gamma∗(gamma−alpha−beta ) ) )∗(1− a A2 − s /(H−M) ) + ((1− ps i ) /(gamma−alpha−beta )
) ∗(1 − a A2 )
EqCase3 = GetEquil ibrium (LowDemandExpr , MedDemandExpr , HighDemandExpr )
